I am pretty tired of and disgusted by the constant denigration of men in popular media. That said, this one is pretty funny.
Double click to expand to full screen.
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
Cycles of famine, war, and plague as pressures of evolutionary change.
From A Troublesome Inheritance by Nicholas Wade. Page 149.
This is, I think, the weakest beam in Wade's construction.
But has there been such distinctively different influences in the different parts of the world so that there is now distinctively different behaviors (and therefore different institutions)? That is the part I find hard to accept. Possible but it seems improbable.
My hesitancy to dismiss out of hand is heavily influenced by select passages from The Pursuit of Glory: The Five Revolutions that Made Modern Europe 1648-1815 by Tim Blanning. A deeply interesting read. I know much of the information he is recounting in Chapter 2 but he is putting it in a different frame in the past which makes it especially pertinent to Wade's argument. Blanning mentions that before the Industrial Revolution, Europe (and the rest of the world) was stuck in the Malthusian Trap. In particular, there were three winnowers of the population. Not all at the same time but in different cycles. The three were Famine, War and Plague (add in Death and you have the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse).
For Wade's argument to work you need at least two elements. The first is evolutionary pressure and the second is for that pressure to have a direction.
Frequent mass death events is certainly one form of evolutionary pressure. It would at least be influential via a founder effect. Would multiple near extinction effects be sufficient simply through the founder effect to incidentally drive a difference in continent wide behaviors. Possibly, but I instinctively would be skeptical.
The second element would depend on the near extinction events having some shaping commonality. Would the surviving populations survive because, for example, they had a higher disposition towards cooperative behavior? Certainly possible. But if there were similar near extinction events happening in Africa and Asia, wouldn't the outcome be similar? Seems like too many dependent variables to be reliably true.
So I remain skeptical, but here are some of the passages from The Pursuit of Glory: The Five Revolutions that Made Modern Europe 1648-1815 which cause me hesitation and reflection. Pages 43, 53 and 59
This is, I think, the weakest beam in Wade's construction.
Each of the major civilizations has developed the institutions appropriate for its circumstances and survival. But these institutions, though heavily imbued with cultural traditions, rest on a bedrock of genetically shaped human behavior. And when a civilization produces a distinctive set of institutions that endures for many generations, one can reasonably ask if some variation in the genes underlying human social behavior may have accompanied the emergence of these institutions.Yes, its more than plausible that behavior shapes institutions and we know that at least some aspects of behavior are genetically influenced.
But has there been such distinctively different influences in the different parts of the world so that there is now distinctively different behaviors (and therefore different institutions)? That is the part I find hard to accept. Possible but it seems improbable.
My hesitancy to dismiss out of hand is heavily influenced by select passages from The Pursuit of Glory: The Five Revolutions that Made Modern Europe 1648-1815 by Tim Blanning. A deeply interesting read. I know much of the information he is recounting in Chapter 2 but he is putting it in a different frame in the past which makes it especially pertinent to Wade's argument. Blanning mentions that before the Industrial Revolution, Europe (and the rest of the world) was stuck in the Malthusian Trap. In particular, there were three winnowers of the population. Not all at the same time but in different cycles. The three were Famine, War and Plague (add in Death and you have the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse).
For Wade's argument to work you need at least two elements. The first is evolutionary pressure and the second is for that pressure to have a direction.
Frequent mass death events is certainly one form of evolutionary pressure. It would at least be influential via a founder effect. Would multiple near extinction effects be sufficient simply through the founder effect to incidentally drive a difference in continent wide behaviors. Possibly, but I instinctively would be skeptical.
The second element would depend on the near extinction events having some shaping commonality. Would the surviving populations survive because, for example, they had a higher disposition towards cooperative behavior? Certainly possible. But if there were similar near extinction events happening in Africa and Asia, wouldn't the outcome be similar? Seems like too many dependent variables to be reliably true.
So I remain skeptical, but here are some of the passages from The Pursuit of Glory: The Five Revolutions that Made Modern Europe 1648-1815 which cause me hesitation and reflection. Pages 43, 53 and 59
Following the catastrophic population losses caused by the Black Death in the middle of the fourteenth century, recovery began in the late fifteenth and continued throughout the sixteenth. But around 1600, the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse returned with a vengeance to many parts of Europe, bringing war, plague and famine with devastating demographic consequences.The great plague which struck Castile in 1599-1600, for example, was only the first of many such visitations which reduced the population of the region by a quarter by 1650.
[snip]
It has been estimated that during the terrible mortalite of 1692-94, 2,800,000 people, or 15 per cent of the total population of France, perished. The 1690s proved to be particularly destructive all over western, northern, central and eastern Europe. In Finland the famine of 1696-7 carried off at least a quarter and perhaps as much as a third of the population. In Scotland, a poor harvest in 1695 was followed by severe failure in 1696, a modest improvement in 1697 but general failure in 1698. In the worst affected counties, such as Aberdeenshire, the mortality rate reached 20 per cent. As Sir Robert Sibbald observed: "Everyone may see Death in the Face of the Poor.'
[snip]
Some idea of the havoc inflicted by plague can be gained from simple statistics: Naples lost about half its population and Genoa 60 per cent in 1656; Marseilles and Aix-en-Provence lost half in 1721; Reggio di Calabria lost half in and Messina 70 per cent in 1743; Moscow lost 50,000 or about 20 per cent in 1771-2, and so on.
Tuesday, August 30, 2016
We went to sleep above the wash of ripples
From The Odyssey Book IX translated by Robert Fitzgerald.
Now all day long until the sun went down
we made our feast on mutton and sweet wine,
till after sunset in the gathering dark
we went to sleep above the wash of ripples.
When the young Dawn with finger tips of rose
touched the world, I roused the men, gave orders
to man the ships, cast off the mooring lines;
and filing in to sit beside the rowlocks
oarsmen in line dipped oars in the grey sea.
So we moved out, sad in the vast offing,
having our precious lives, but not our friends
The ruler was subject to the law and in which a representative body held him accountable to it.
From A Troublesome Inheritance by Nicholas Wade. Page 145.
But I can't help but feel that this is idea that is best viewed at a distance. Feels too much like a Just So Story. I am not sure that the argument above holds when examined closely. Seems like there are too many exceptions in Europe which leap to mind, and too many instances in India and China where at least moderately similar forces were in play at different times.
So maybe part of the story, but I don't think the complete story.
The church used it power to back the idea of law, first of the Justinian code, a Byzantine codification of Roman Law that was rediscovered around 1070 AD, and then of canon law, the synthesis by Gratian of church laws through the centuries. Because law had the church's authority, sanctioned by a higher power, there emerged in Europe the novel idea that the ruler could not rule in defiance of the law and indeed owed his position to his role in upholding the law.OK. I am attracted to the idea that the concept of Rule of Law was a pivotal institutional/cultural development that explains a lot of divergence in world history between Europe and Asia.
Feudal Europe was a collection of local barons installed in in largely impregnable castles. Kings tended to be the first among equals and had to negotiate with others to exercise power. They were obliged to take account of the concept that the law and not the king was sovereign. They could not tax or conscript peasants because those rights belonged to the feudal lords. Nor could they seize land because of property rights conferred by the feudal system.
National states emerged in Europe as part of a struggle between the king, the elites and other sources of power. The kings were seldom absolute rulers. The limitation on their powers was taken furthest in England, where Parliament raised its own armies, executed Charles I and forced James II to abdicate. The English state thus constructed a system, later followed by other European countries, in which the ruler was subject to the law and in which a representative body held him accountable to it.
But I can't help but feel that this is idea that is best viewed at a distance. Feels too much like a Just So Story. I am not sure that the argument above holds when examined closely. Seems like there are too many exceptions in Europe which leap to mind, and too many instances in India and China where at least moderately similar forces were in play at different times.
So maybe part of the story, but I don't think the complete story.
Monday, August 29, 2016
To continue reading or not continue reading, that is the question.
From A Crowd of One: The Future of Individual Identity by John Henry Clippinger.
Not the kind of book I often buy - business, speculative, trendy. But the title alludes to a real issue that I think bears deep consideration in our evolving knowledge and social ecosystem with proliferating affiliative virtual communities. But at $3, you can afford to take a gamble that the packaging belies the substance. On top of that, Clippinger appears to be both deeply and widely accomplished so the probability of useful insight increases substantially.
And in the first few pages, it felt like I was indeed in for a good intellectual ride. Framing of interesting and pertinent ideas. But then I encountered this passage on page 12.
Why this grubby, condescending, and incomplete partisan attack? Why the snide air quotes "realists"? Why the inference with "war cabinet"?
Just from this passage, you would think that the Iraq Resolution was not a bipartisan endorsement by both the House and Senate (including a majority of the Democratic senators in the Senate) of a major foreign policy. You wouldn't, from this passage, realize that virtually the entire current Democratic Party leadership (Biden, Clinton, Reid, Feinstein, Kerry, Schumer, etc.) all voted the Iraq Resolution.
Fair enough, the war in hindsight may or may not have been ill-considered or poorly conducted (judgments yet to be settled on either score). But it's inappropriate, if you want to be considered to be making a carefully reasoned argument, to so blatantly distort history in order to make virtue-signaling, high-horse post hoc condescending judgments.
Am I reading a genuine inquiry into the nature of identity in a universally connected world or am I reading some sort of hobby horse polemic?
Reluctantly, but with the hope that this was an aberration, I continued reading.
Just a few pages on, on page 17, there is this:
To be fair Clippinger published this in 2007, preceding by four years Steven Pinker's magisterial The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined which offers pretty compelling evidence that for much of human history, and still in some places, we did indeed live in a close to Hobbesian environment. However, Steven A. Le Blanc had made basically the same argument as Pinker but in 2004 in his Constant Battles: Why We Fight.
Anthropology, sociology, psychology, and behavior research have all been having a bad few years as classic study after classic study fails to replicate. For a sad reflection on this, read Reckoning with the Past by Michael Inzlicht, a practitioner who sees much of his professional life's working washing away under strict scrutiny. Alternatively, and a broader indictment, there is Scott Alexander's Devoodooifying Psychology.
All this overturning of classic work in these fields is recent but even in 2007 and earlier, there was much critical commentary on much of the work being done in these fields. Critics pointed out small sample sizes, reluctance to share source data, non-randomized test groups, etc. as red flags warning us to be cautious.
OK. Now I am pretty jaundiced. In the next few pages Clippinger veers into some significant moral equalizing which I take to be an intellectual exercise but also could be read as a legitimate belief on his part. Then on page 21 we get to:
Fifty words later, Clippinger himself is supporting his argument with a fallacious appeal to authority (SCIENCE) in virtually identical wording as that which he ascribes to Atta and LeMay. Hobbes is scientifically wrong!!!!
A doubly ironical argument to make given that Pinker, Le Blanc, and the Replication movement have now, just a decade later, completely undermined the categorical conclusion that Hobbes is wrong.
The topic of identity in a universally affiliative world remains a worthwhile topic. At twenty pages though, there are a lot of red flags that perhaps there might not be much of value in this work, partisan, over-confident, and ill-sourced as it so far appears to be. Maybe a few more pages just to see, but my hopes are fading.
Not the kind of book I often buy - business, speculative, trendy. But the title alludes to a real issue that I think bears deep consideration in our evolving knowledge and social ecosystem with proliferating affiliative virtual communities. But at $3, you can afford to take a gamble that the packaging belies the substance. On top of that, Clippinger appears to be both deeply and widely accomplished so the probability of useful insight increases substantially.
And in the first few pages, it felt like I was indeed in for a good intellectual ride. Framing of interesting and pertinent ideas. But then I encountered this passage on page 12.
Unfortunately, Hobbes's argument was not just a seventeenth-century intellectual artifice but has come over the centuries, and especially in recent years, to represent a kind of accepted wisdom among "realists" of the Right, whose political philosophy of international politics, contains the conviction that without the firm hand of a presiding authority, the world will revert to a Hobbesian state of nature in which anything goes. . . . The same logic was embraced by President George W. Bush and his war cabinet, who decided that once America was attacked, it could be understood as being in a continuous state of war, which conferred on it moral legitimacy to pursue whatever means it sees fit to defend itself to avenge any and all parties who support or harbor its shadowy enemies. You are either for us or against us. Bring it on. The same moral immunity appears to be extended to the domestic arena as well, by virtue of the fact that some potential terrorists may be domestic - hence, the invocation of Hobbes's state-of-nature argument for domestic surveillance and the weakening of the First and Fourth Amendments. Hobbes has been much in evidence so far in the twenty-first century.Like suddenly stubbing your big toe on piece of furniture you hadn't noticed. This passage is so outside the tone in the other dozen pages that it's unexpectedness increases the disappointment.
Why this grubby, condescending, and incomplete partisan attack? Why the snide air quotes "realists"? Why the inference with "war cabinet"?
Just from this passage, you would think that the Iraq Resolution was not a bipartisan endorsement by both the House and Senate (including a majority of the Democratic senators in the Senate) of a major foreign policy. You wouldn't, from this passage, realize that virtually the entire current Democratic Party leadership (Biden, Clinton, Reid, Feinstein, Kerry, Schumer, etc.) all voted the Iraq Resolution.
Fair enough, the war in hindsight may or may not have been ill-considered or poorly conducted (judgments yet to be settled on either score). But it's inappropriate, if you want to be considered to be making a carefully reasoned argument, to so blatantly distort history in order to make virtue-signaling, high-horse post hoc condescending judgments.
Am I reading a genuine inquiry into the nature of identity in a universally connected world or am I reading some sort of hobby horse polemic?
Reluctantly, but with the hope that this was an aberration, I continued reading.
Just a few pages on, on page 17, there is this:
Yet as will be argued throughout this book, Hobbes's state of nature is a fiction, unsupported and even contradicted by neuroscience, anthropological, and behavior research.Uh oh. Two out of those three sciences are pretty noted for their sloppy and long history of ideologically motivated research and the third has some pretty notable research failures. If you are going to build your argument on those foundations, you are going to have to be pretty cautious.
To be fair Clippinger published this in 2007, preceding by four years Steven Pinker's magisterial The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined which offers pretty compelling evidence that for much of human history, and still in some places, we did indeed live in a close to Hobbesian environment. However, Steven A. Le Blanc had made basically the same argument as Pinker but in 2004 in his Constant Battles: Why We Fight.
Anthropology, sociology, psychology, and behavior research have all been having a bad few years as classic study after classic study fails to replicate. For a sad reflection on this, read Reckoning with the Past by Michael Inzlicht, a practitioner who sees much of his professional life's working washing away under strict scrutiny. Alternatively, and a broader indictment, there is Scott Alexander's Devoodooifying Psychology.
All this overturning of classic work in these fields is recent but even in 2007 and earlier, there was much critical commentary on much of the work being done in these fields. Critics pointed out small sample sizes, reluctance to share source data, non-randomized test groups, etc. as red flags warning us to be cautious.
OK. Now I am pretty jaundiced. In the next few pages Clippinger veers into some significant moral equalizing which I take to be an intellectual exercise but also could be read as a legitimate belief on his part. Then on page 21 we get to:
Both Atta [9/11 terrorist leader] and Curtis LeMay remain heroes to their own. Both are perfect Hobbesian protagonists, from which philosophy they derive their shared moral legitimacy. But Hobbes is wrong, scientifically wrong. It is no longer just a question of theoretical philosophy or opinion, but of replicable scientific observation.Set aside the sophomoric exercise of equating LeMay and Atta (I understand the logical exercise of doing so). On the preceding page (20), Clippinger has just observed that LeMay and Atta shared (in Clippinger's view) the failing of being men "void of doubt."
Fifty words later, Clippinger himself is supporting his argument with a fallacious appeal to authority (SCIENCE) in virtually identical wording as that which he ascribes to Atta and LeMay. Hobbes is scientifically wrong!!!!
A doubly ironical argument to make given that Pinker, Le Blanc, and the Replication movement have now, just a decade later, completely undermined the categorical conclusion that Hobbes is wrong.
The topic of identity in a universally affiliative world remains a worthwhile topic. At twenty pages though, there are a lot of red flags that perhaps there might not be much of value in this work, partisan, over-confident, and ill-sourced as it so far appears to be. Maybe a few more pages just to see, but my hopes are fading.
The church had a better idea
From A Troublesome Inheritance by Nicholas Wade. Page 144.
A central part in the development of European institutions was played by religion. Religion, Fukuyama argues, was critical first in detribalization and second in instituting the rule of law. The essence of the tribal lineage was the descent of property through the male line. But producing a male heir under medieval conditions of short life expectancy and high infant mortality was far from a sure thing. So the tribes had various strategies for keeping wealth within the lineage. These included cousin marriage, divorce if a woman bore no heir, adoption, and the levirate (marrying of widows to their husband's brother.) In addition, women were not allowed to own property.
The church opposed all these heirship strategies, not because of anything in existing Christian doctrine but because it had a better idea: that people should leave their property to the church instead of their heirs. By the end of the 7th century, a third of the productive land in France belonged to the church. The tribes of Europe, whether Frankish, Anglo-Saxon, Slavic, Norse or Magyar, found that conversion to Christianity soon separated them from their property, robbed them of their influence and paved the way to feudalism.
Sunday, August 28, 2016
This course was ill-taught by an under-confident instructor
From A Literary Education by Joseph Epstein.
I first came across Epstein more than twenty years, nearing thirty years, ago as a subscriber to American Scholar of which he was the editor at the time. A master essayist, he was droll, erudite, generous. He is also prolific, with some twenty odd books to his name, with most of them still in print.
One of his most distinctive traits is his liberal use of quotations to illustrate his points. Not just Oxford Dictionary of Quotations quotes but I read this in this book and noted this line quotes. As you read, you can feel ideas and literature across time, genres, and styles being knitted together before your eyes.
His deep love and focus is literature. Mine is non-fiction. Perhaps for that simple reason, I usually dip in and out of his books, sampling here, mulling there. But whether read at a gulp or sampled at leisure, I have many of his books and recommend them to others.
I am just beginning A Literary Education. He relates a serendipitous course which helped determine the direction of his education. I think this is one of the better and more succinct articulations of the value of literature.
I first came across Epstein more than twenty years, nearing thirty years, ago as a subscriber to American Scholar of which he was the editor at the time. A master essayist, he was droll, erudite, generous. He is also prolific, with some twenty odd books to his name, with most of them still in print.
One of his most distinctive traits is his liberal use of quotations to illustrate his points. Not just Oxford Dictionary of Quotations quotes but I read this in this book and noted this line quotes. As you read, you can feel ideas and literature across time, genres, and styles being knitted together before your eyes.
His deep love and focus is literature. Mine is non-fiction. Perhaps for that simple reason, I usually dip in and out of his books, sampling here, mulling there. But whether read at a gulp or sampled at leisure, I have many of his books and recommend them to others.
I am just beginning A Literary Education. He relates a serendipitous course which helped determine the direction of his education. I think this is one of the better and more succinct articulations of the value of literature.
To give some notion of the randomness, the almost accidental, nature of education, which has always impressed me, I would say that the most significant course I took at the University of Chicago was a badly conceived one that was, in effect, a history of the development of the novel. This course was ill-taught by an under-confident instructor not yet thirty. The reading equivalent of a dance marathon, in ten weeks the course went - at the rate of a novel per week - from The Princess of Cleves through Ulysses, with stops along the way for Jane Austen, Stendahl, Dostoyevksy, Flaubert, Mann and Proust. What do you suppose a boy of twenty gets out of reading Swann's Way? My best guess is somewhere between 15 to 20 percent of what Proust put into it.Given my love of facts and data and patterns, I am not about to throw over a lifetime's habit of reading nonfiction, but I am certain that had I ever had Epstein as a professor, I would have gotten much more out of literature than the run-of-mill literature classes I have taken.
Yet still but nonetheless and however, something about this course lit my fire. From it I sensed that, if any inkling about the way the world works and the manner in which human nature is constituted were to be remotely available during my stay on the planet, I should have the best chance of discovering it through literature, and perhaps chiefly through the novel. The endless details set out in novels, the thoughts of imaginary characters, the dramatization of large themes through carefully constructed plots, the portrayals of how the world works, really works - these were among the things that literature, carefully attended to, might one day help me to learn.
Mutation, drift, migration and natural selection are all unceasing forces that drive the engine of evolution ever onward
From A Troublesome Inheritance by Nicholas Wade. Page 75.
Mutation, drift, migration and natural selection are all unceasing forces that drive the engine of evolution ever onward. Even if a population stays in the same place and its phenotype, or physical form, remains the same, its genotype, or hereditary information, will remain in constant flux, running like the Red Queen to stay in the same place.
Saturday, August 27, 2016
This limitation in oxytocin's radius of trust was discovered only recently
From A Troublesome Inheritance by Nicholas Wade. Page 51.
In the brain, oxytocin has a range of subtle effects that are only beginning to be explored. In general, it seems that oxytocin has been co-opted in the course of evolution to play a central role in social cohesion. It's a hormone of affiliation. It dampens down the distrust usually felt toward strangers and promotes feelings of solidarity. "It increases men's trust, generosity, and willingness to cooperate," say the authors of a recent review. (The same is doubtless true of women too but most such experiments are performed only in men because of the risk that oxytocin might make a woman miscarry if she were unknowingly pregnant.)
The trust promoted by oxytocin is not of the brotherhood of man variety - it's strictly local. Oxytocin engenders trust towards members of the in-group, together with feelings of defensiveness toward outsiders. This limitation in oxytocin's radius of trust was discovered only recently by Carsten De Dreu, a Dutch psychologist who doubted the conventional wisdom that oxytocin simply promoted general feelings of trust. Any individual who blindly trusts everyone is not going to prosper in the struggle for survival, De Dreu supposed, and his genes would be rapidly eliminated; hence it seemed much more likely that oxytocin promoted trust only in certain contexts.
De Dreu showed in several ingenious experiments that this is indeed the case. In one, the young Dutch men who were his subjects were presented with standard moral dilemmas, such as whether to save five people in the path of a train for the loss of one life, that of a bystander who could be thrown onto the tracks to stop the train. The people to be saved were all Dutch but the person to be killed was sometimes given a Dutch first name, like Pieter, and sometimes a German or Muslim name, like Helmut or Muhammad (opinion polls show that neither is a favorite nationality among the Dutch.)
When the subjects had taken a sniff of oxytocin, they were much more inclined to sacrifice the Helmuts and the Muhammads, De Dreu found, showing the dark side of oxytocin in making people more willing to punish outsiders. Oxytocin does not seem to promote positive aggression toward outsiders, he finds, but rather it heightens the willingness to defend the in-group.
Friday, August 26, 2016
Social intelligence develops in children before their general cognitive skills
From A Troublesome Inheritance by Nicholas Wade. Page 48.
Human children, on the other hand, are inherently cooperative. From the earliest ages, they desire to help others, to share information and to participate in pursuing common goals. The developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello has studied this cooperativeness in a series of experiments with very young children. He finds that if infants aged 18 months see an unrelated adult with hands full trying to open a door, almost all will immediately try to help. If the adult pretends to have lost an object, children from as young as 12 months will helpfully point out where it is.
There are several reasons to believe that the urges to help, inform and share are "naturally emerging" in young children, Tomasello writes, meaning that they are innate, not taught. One is that these instincts appear at a very young age before most parents have started to train their children to behave socially. Another is that the helping behaviors are not enhanced if the children are rewarded.
A third reason is that social intelligence develops in children before their general cognitive skills, at least when compared with apes. Tomasello gave human and chimp children a battery of tests related to understanding the physical and social worlds. The human children, aged 2.5 years, did no better than the chimps on the physical world tests but were considerably better at understanding the social world.
The essence of what children's minds have and chimps' don't is what Tomasello calls shared intentionality. Part of this ability is that they can infer what others know or are thinking, a skill called theory of mind. But beyond that, even very young children want to be part of a shared purpose. They actively seek to be part of a "we" a group that has pooled its talents and intends to work toward a shared goal.
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