Friday, March 18, 2016

There's nothing new about conflict of interest

Heh.



Anonymous sources allowed into the chain of custody of the facts of a story

From The Nefertiti 3D Scan Heist Is A Hoax by Cosmo Wenman. The story itself is interesting and worth a read but it was this turn of phrase that caught my eye.
The New York Times has allowed anonymous sources into the chain of custody of the facts of its story.

Thursday, March 17, 2016

Some people type faster than they think.

Snarky but funny. From How to talk about the new Ghostbusters movie with friends, family, and commenters by Kaitlyn Tiffany.
For some, the speed with which one can type a sentence and post it onto the internet has greatly outpaced the speed with which one can form a coherent thought.
Guilty, though I prefer to believe less frequently guilty than many others.

Wednesday, March 16, 2016

Funny economics

Humor in teaching is a much underrated technique.

Click to expand.

Tuesday, March 15, 2016

US submarines and Indonesian independence

From Small Wars, Faraway Places by Michael Burleigh. Page 40.
By a unique accident, the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies laid the foundations for an independent nation. Although the Japanese navy swept the Dutch and their British and American allies aside with ease, one Allied submarine managed to sink a transport carrying half the trained administrators sent by Tokyo to take over the government of the vast Indonesian archipelago – it is as wide as the United States, and Sumatra alone is the size of California. Among some Indonesians the Japanese, and their erasure of Dutch-language street signs and place names, were welcomed, although their earliest actions included the dissolution of political parties and the prohibition of the red and white Indonesian nationalist flag. However, the mass internment of Dutch administrators and the deaths of their Japanese replacements meant that educated Indonesians filled thousands of middle- and upper-echelon administrative and technical jobs. These officials soon gained confidence and realized that they did not need Dutch – or Japanese – tutelage to run their country.

Monday, March 14, 2016

International comparisons of time discounting

From How time preferences differ: Evidence from 53 countries by Mei Wanga, Marc Oliver Riegerb, and Thorsten Hens.
We present results from the first large-scale international survey on time preference, conducted in 53 countries. All countries exhibit hyperbolic discounting patterns, i.e., the immediate future is discounted more than far future. We also observe higher heterogeneity for shorter time horizons, consistent with the pattern reviewed by Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). Cultural factors as captured by the Hofstede cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1991) contribute significantly to the variation of time discounting, even after controlling for economic factors, such as GDP, inflation rate and growth rate. In particular, higher levels of Uncertainty Avoidance are associated with stronger hyperbolic discounting, whereas higher degrees of Individualism and Long Term Orientation predict stronger tendency to wait for larger payoffs. We also find the waiting tendency is correlated with innovation, environmental protection, crediting rating, and body mass index at country level after controlling for county wealth. These results help us to enhance the understanding of differences across financial markets and economic behavior worldwide.
I have long argued that time discounting, both at an individual behavioral level and at a national level, has a measurable causal relationship with good life outcomes and national GDP outcomes. This is also correlated with Trust.

Countries with low cultural trust and individuals with low degrees of trust have a high time discount. They would much rather take a smaller prize today than a larger one later. Countries with a high degree of trust and low time discounts can afford to make long term investments that are likely to have greater long term yields. Interesting to see those suppositions supported by this research.

Analysis, explicable systems, and inexplicable outcomes

A thought.

Root cause analysis only has pertinence to explicable and replicable systems. Root cause analysis depends on the capacity to change individual variables in order to understand the relative impact of those individual variables. Not all outcomes are the result of explicable systems. Many outcomes are the result of a mix of explicable, inexplicable and random systems.

Examples of events arising from non-explicable systems - the popularity of an individual book, movie, song or TV show; the rise and fall in popularity of individuals; the precise weather conditions at a particular location, at a particular time in the distant future; prices; romance; children; many biological systems; many health outcomes from medical or public health policies; etc.

We mix explicable systems (mechanistic systems which we understand and about which we can make precise, accurate and reliable predictions), inexplicable systems (complex systems which we understand in outline but not mechanistically and about which we can not make precise, accurate and reliable forecasts), and random systems (systems about which we have little or no understanding).

Contemporarily inexplicable and random systems, through research and analysis, can yield information that moves them into the explicable systems column. Think about the movement of planets and stars - once inexplicable but now largely explicable.

Inexplicable and random systems are subject to fruitful speculation and conjecture without yet being explicable. Root cause analysis is an invaluable tool with explicable systems. The problem is that it is inherently less reliable when applied to inexplicable and random systems.

You can speculate about how an inexplicable system generates a given outcome and then seemingly apply root cause analysis based on those predicate assumptions and demonstrate that the root cause analysis is consistent with the speculation. But that is essentially a tautological exercise. More precisely, however, all such an exercise does is increase the plausibility of the speculation (if it is indeed consistent with the hypothesis). It cannot, without explicability and replication, actually provide an affirmation. Alternate speculations can simultaneously be equally plausible.

The challenge is to disentangle what type of system with which we are dealing. If it is explicable, then it is possible to speak with authority and confidence.

Most outcomes are the result of inexplicable and random systems. In that case, we can speak with some rationality about plausibility but we cannot speak with authority.

It seems to me that too often, in public discourse, we are blind to these distinctions. Opinions are offered as facts based on a primal/emotional belief in one class of speculation over another.

One question sorts the wheat from the chaff - Is the system reliably explicable? If yes, then great, it is just a matter of making sure the data is correct and the right functions have been performed. Checking the math as it were.

If the answer is no, the system is inexplicable or random, then all conclusions can be usefully parked as speculative.

Sunday, March 13, 2016

He had one of the greatest minds of the twelfth century

From Small Wars, Faraway Places by Michael Burleigh. Page 37.
While Leclerc was commander-in-chief Indochina, de Gaulle’s new High Commissioner was Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu, a militant rightwing Catholic and former Carmelite friar. A member of his staff said he ‘had one of the greatest minds of the twelfth century’.

Saturday, March 12, 2016

Hot bestseller

Searching for an out of print book by an obscure English curate of the last century, I come across - An Annotated Checklist of Nebraskan Bats by J. Knox Jones and Olin L. Webb. A work so encompassing it required two authors.

I love the obscurity of some books that digitization is making accessible.

Gracey relied on his Gurkhas and surrendered Japanese to expel the Viet Minh.

From Small Wars, Faraway Places by Michael Burleigh. Page 33.
The Potsdam conference arranged in the summer of 1945 to reorder the world is often viewed through an exclusively European optic, as reflected in the fact that the Big Three were actually the Big Four, for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was present along with Harry S. Truman (Roosevelt’s successor), Stalin and Churchill. The conference was concerned with winning the ongoing war with Japan and unmaking its empire in South-east Asia. It was decreed that China and Britain should occupy Indochina above and below the 16th parallel, but Al Patti’s OSS units returned to Vietnam, nominally to secure Allied POWs and civilian internees still in Japanese captivity. This gave them a ringside seat to observe how Ho created a fait accompli to pre-empt the restoration of colonial authority. He sent his men into Hanoi across the Doumer Bridge over the Red River to force the abdication of Bao Dai. The capital of Tonkin was bedecked with lanterns, flowers and red banners with the five golden stars, all under the eyes of 30,000 Japanese troops. On 2 September 1945 at a massed meeting on Place Puginier in front of the former Governor-General’s Hanoi Palace, Ho proclaimed Vietnamese independence. There were some deliberate nods to his OSS friends in the wording of his speech:
‘All men are created equal. They are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ This immortal statement appeared in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, it means: All the peoples on earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live and to be happy and free. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, made at the time of the French Revolution, in 1791, also states: ‘All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always remain free and have equal rights.’
He asked the crowd, ‘My fellow countrymen, have you understood?’‘Yes!’ the crowd roared back. Standing alongside Patti, General Giap gave a clenched-fist salute when the band struck up the ‘Star Spangled Banner’. The French were appalled by this. A more senior US team tried to pin down Ho’s political views, but was fobbed off with evasive vagaries: ‘I have difficulty remembering some parts of my long life. That is the problem of being an old revolutionary.’ Meanwhile his regime in Hanoi made short work of any ideological opponents. In addition to a new state security apparatus, the Communists encouraged the creation of ‘traitor elimination committees’ and an ‘Assault Assassination Committee’ whose victims were liberal nationalists, Trotskyites and women who had married French men.

As the new government established itself, 150,000 Chinese KMT Nationalist troops crossed into Vietnam under a drug-addict warlord Chiang was keen to divert from China. The Viet Minh tried to secure their good conduct by supplying him with opium, but the Chinese looted everything up to the roof tiles. Meanwhile, in the southern capital of Saigon, where the Viet Minh played a much weaker hand as part of a broader nationalist coalition, attempts to celebrate Independence Day led to violent clashes between French and Vietnamese residents. Watching the celebrations from high vantage points, the French ostentatiously refused to join in the applause when independence was proclaimed. French snipers started shooting, and in retaliation Europeans were assaulted and their business premises looted.

Four days later 600 men from the 20th Indian Division arrived in Saigon under General Douglas Gracey to disarm 50,000 surrendered Japanese troops. He was not a political general and inflexibly followed his orders, with disastrous consequences. One of his first acts was to use his Gurkha guard to evict the Southern Provisional Executive Committee from the former Governor-General’s Palace, after they had tried to welcome him. He next rearmed liberated French internees, who promptly attacked any ‘native’ they encountered. Angry Vietnamese retaliated, slaughtering 150 Europeans. With fresh French troops slow to arrive, Gracey relied on his Gurkhas and surrendered Japanese to expel the Viet Minh. He declared martial law to break a general strike and used liberated French Foreign Legionnaires to impose their simulacrum of civil order.

In a remarkable example of intra-Allied incivility Gracey ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Dewey, the senior OSS officer in Saigon, to leave Indochina because of the OSS’s ‘blatantly subversive’ involvement with the Viet Minh. Dewey was shot dead en route to the airport after Gracey forbade him to fly the Stars and Stripes on his Jeep and the Viet Minh mistook him for a Frenchman. The following day Gracey threatened Japanese General Numata with prosecution for war crimes if he did not order his men to help the British and French fight the Viet Minh; and so it was that the British coerced the soldiers who had humiliated them in 1942 to reimpose French rule over Vietnam, which the Japanese had overthrown seven months previously.

By early October 1945 there were sufficient French forces in Cochin China for Gracey to relinquish authority south of the 16th parallel to the Free French war hero General Philippe Leclerc, who re-established French rule in Cambodia and Laos, before turning his attention to the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam. By 20 January 1946 the British forces were gone. A French high commissioner designate, Jean Sainteny, was flown to Hanoi accompanied by Patti’s OSS team. They noted that Hanoi was swathed in red banners and bedecked with other banners which, in English, read ‘Independence or Death’ and ‘Vietnam for the Vietnamese’. Only a cordon of Japanese troops prevented the French from being lynched, but Patti and his team settled into a comfortable and unthreatened existence at the Hotel Metropole.
I had not realized, until reading Burleigh, the extent to which the Allies depended on surrendered Japanese troops to maintain civil order in former colonial territories for as long as two years after the war. The Japanese surrendered troops served in this role in Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, Malaysia and elsewhere, while the victorious but exhausted colonial powers of Britain, France and The Netherlands slowly mustered their troops out to the East.