Saturday, March 5, 2016

Well, its complicated . . .

From Small Wars, Faraway Places by Michael Burleigh. I am enjoying this one a great deal. New information or insight on virtually every page. A great antidote for those who want their history to be manichean in its dualistic simplicity. Whatever you thought you knew, you realize it was even more complicated than you realized.

Take the example of China and its resistance to the Japanese in World War II. I knew the outlines of this story but the details are even more incredible. Page 18.
The Nationalists were appalled by the systematic violence unleashed by the Communists, and in 1927 Chiang Kai-Shek, the head of the military section at the Soviet-inspired Whampoa Academy, moved against them, with an arrest list that included Mao's name. The Communists reverted to the defence of ‘Soviet areas’ in which their appetites for bloodthirsty purges of real and imagined opponents were indulged to the hilt and with indescribable cruelty. In 1934 Mao embarked on the 6,000-mile Long March, a year-long extraction of 82,000 Communist fighters from encirclement and destruction in the south, with 8,000 resurfacing as survivors in the remote north. There the Communists could pose as liberators and reformers without fear of attack by either the KMT or the Japanese. Mao gradually emerged as primus inter pares of a statelet that harked back to Plato, with the Party cadres being the philosopher kings while the guardians were the Red Army commanders and soldiers, below whom were the drones whose labour supported them. Since the majority of those who flocked to the remote Yenan redoubt did so merely from a patriotic desire to fight the Japanese, ‘rectification’ campaigns based on confessions and indoctrination were used to re-engineer their personalities, submerging the individual self in the collective as embodied by Mao himself.

The KMT could not mobilize sufficient military power to defeat the Communists as well as resisting Japanese invasion. As elsewhere in East Asia, wealthy figures in cities such as Shanghai rallied to the Japanese cause. But so did many collaborators who were also covert Communist agents, with instructions to direct the Japanese against their Nationalist rivals. While Chiang’s armies fought the Japanese, Mao’s Communists avoided main-force encounters, even when urged to fight them by Stalin, who feared that the Soviet Union could be crushed between the Japanese and German onslaughts. Mao’s caution and evasiveness rankled with the Soviet leader and the only ‘battle’ against the Japanese, at Pingxingguan in September 1937, hardly features in the annals of warfare.

Communist guerrillas did have an impact in Manchuria, historically a lawless place which contained the world’s densest concentration of villages run by outlaws. But it was also the most industrialized region in China, which was why the Japanese had conquered it. The guerrillas who fought the Japanese in this wild, grey-brown place were ethnic Koreans, who also made up 90 per cent of the local ‘Chinese’ Communist Party. The ethnic Chinese Communists claimed to be fighting the Japanese as they husbanded their resources in their northern regional redoubt of Yenan for the anticipated showdown with Chiang.

Mao’s forces were sustained by subsidies from Stalin as well as by a revived opium industry, which they wisely kept secret from the ‘Dixie Mission’ sent to Yenan by the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in July 1944 out of frustration with KMT military incompetence and venality and in order to glean actionable intelligence on Japanese strength in northern China from POWs taken by the Communists. While a large pool of 2,000 American advisers stationed in Chongqing by turns publicly lauded and privately denounced Chiang Kai-shek, some of the Yenan Americans became admirers of the iron discipline of the Communists.
Chinese Communist guerillas who are actually Korean. Capitalists who are actually communists. The KMT doing a better job of advancing Soviet goals than the Chinese Communists. The American advisors undermining their KMT allies while admiring the Chinese Communists. And on and on. Nothing was what it seemed.

Friday, March 4, 2016

Training people to think analytically causes them to form more liberal opinions, whereas training them to think holistically causes shifts to more conservative opinions

From Liberals Think More Analytically (More “WEIRD”) Than Conservatives by Thomas Talhelm, et al.

I am tired of research papers that attempt to show that, variously, Liberals are more, pick one, Intelligent, Empathetic, Collaborative, Social, etc. or that Conservatives are more, Intelligent, Competitive, Dutiful, Goal Oriented, etc. A) The studies usually betray a deep streak of motivation, B) Are virtually always shoddily constructed, and C) Have effect sizes on the order of magnitude of a mite. In addition, since the field of sociology is so overwhelmingly skewed Liberal, the results almost always betray deep ignorance of anyone to the right of Extreme Left and usually are structured to make conservatives appear less than human.

But there are plenty such studies to choose from and you never know when one might actually be real, so I usually check. I popped open the link to Liberals Think More Analytically (More “WEIRD”) Than Conservatives by Thomas Talhelm, et al just to see. Here is the abstract.
Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan summarized cultural differences in psychology and argued that people from one particular culture are outliers: people from societies that are Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD). This study shows that liberals think WEIRDer than conservatives. In five studies with more than 5,000 participants, we found that liberals think more analytically (an element of WEIRD thought) than moderates and conservatives. Study 3 replicates this finding in the very different political culture of China, although it held only for people in more modernized urban centers. These results suggest that liberals and conservatives in the same country think as if they were from different cultures. Studies 4 to 5 show that briefly training people to think analytically causes them to form more liberal opinions, whereas training them to think holistically causes shifts to more conservative opinions.
There are so many red flags (cross-cultural comparisons, definitional issues, sample sizes, etc.) that I immediately closed it.

As soon as the screen was vanishing from sight, though, there was a nagging sense of something. I reopened. All the criticisms remain valid but that last line is interesting: "briefly training people to think analytically causes them to form more liberal opinions, whereas training them to think holistically causes shifts to more conservative opinions."

That actually, and obliquely, is consonant with findings by Jonathan Haidt in The Righteous Mind. His working hypothesis is known as Moral Foundations Theory and posits that there are six foundations of moral reasoning: Care, Fairness, Liberty, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. More pertinently here, Haidt argues that progressives/liberals emphasize only two of these foundations, Care and Fairness whereas Conservatives focus on all six foundations. In addition, Haidt observes that progressives tend to define fairness as "equal outcomes" whereas conservatives tend to define fairness as equal treatment or equal application of the rules.

In the progressive dualistic construct, moral decisions appear easier as you are only dealing with two trade-offs, that between caring and fairness. For conservatives, any decision is much more difficult as there are tradeoffs between six equally valid goals. This dualistic simplicity is likely one of the root causes of the frequent failure and ever more frequent unintended consequences of progressive policies. Something that passes muster on the grounds of Caring and Fairness, is inadequately vetted without taking into account the larger range of issues of Liberty, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. Dualism is too reductive.

This is part, I think, of the critique of John Ralston Saul in Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West. Saul's argument is that governments in the West have exhibited a detrimental over-reliance on pure reason in arriving at policies. Saul is an opaque writer given to assertion where explication is needed but when I read the book, my conclusion was that his real criticism was not against reason per se but simplistic reason married to absolutism. In other words, governments tend to apply reason too narrowly and then use the coercive power of the state to implement ill-founded policies.

That resonates with Haidt and now Talhelm. If progressives are concerned only with Caring and Fairness, it is far easier to apply the tools of reason to an equation and come up with an over-simplified answer that is actually wrong and fails in reality. The tools of reason need to be applied to the whole spectrum of moral decision-making, including Liberty, Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity.

That would seem to support the closing sentence of Talhelm et al. Teaching people to think more analytically (rationally) does tend to force an individual towards dualism - making trade-offs between two equally valid goals. Why? Because the more goals there are and the more complex the trade-offs between and among the goals, the less easy it is to apply rationalism. It becomes just too complicated. Consequently, the use of reason precludes complex decision-making and biases individuals towards simplistic outcomes which also skew towards what are stereotypically characterized as liberal positions.

On the other hand, "training them to think holistically causes shifts to more conservative opinions." It would if thinking more holistically means taking into account more variables in greater complexity. By dealing with more variables, particularly with more moral positions, simple dualistic rationalism is inadequate. You have to take a more holistic approach and are more likely to end up with outcomes that are more stereotypically "conservative."

As an example, consider some of the many progressive failed public policies such as busing, affirmative action and racial hiring quotas. In each case, there is a good, rational case to be made for the policy based on Caring and Fairness. Absolutely. But these policies, requiring coercive implementation against the will of the people, ignore the equally important values of Liberty, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. If you have to take into account the other four values, these policies no longer make sense. They can only make sense in a decision-making environment dominated by naive rationalism applied to simplistic dualism. Thus is failure born.

I still think that Talhelm's work is suspect but it is interesting to see it as being consistent, almost against its will, with the work of Haidt and Saul. The work of Saul and Haidt make the context of decision-making far more complex and therefore less conducive to the naive rationalism applied to simplistic dualism of progressives. However, it might lead us towards better outcomes in the longer term.

I show up. I listen. I try to laugh.

From A Short Guide to a Happy Life by Anna Quindlen, page 15.
Here is my resume. It’s not what my professional bio says, proud as I am of all that:

I am a good mother to three good children. I have tried to never let my profession stand in the way of being a good parent. I no longer consider myself the center of the universe. I show up. I listen. I try to laugh.

I am a good friend to my husband. I have tried to make my marriage vows mean what they say. I show up. I listen. I try to laugh.

I am a good friend to my friends, and they to me. Without them I would have nothing of interest to say to anyone, because I would be a cardboard cutout. But I call them on the phone, and I meet them for lunch. I show up. I listen. I try to laugh.

Related: You can pretend to care but you can't pretend to show up.

Thursday, March 3, 2016

They concluded the way most Mongol celebrations concluded, with everyone simply too drunk to continue

Hat tip to Language Log for uncovering this passage. The original passage is in Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World by Jack Watherford.
The Mongols loved competitions of all sorts, and they organized debates among rival religions the same way they organized wrestling matches. It began on a specific date with a panel of judges to oversee it. In this case Mongke Khan ordered them to debate before three judges: a Christian, a Muslim, and a Buddhist. A large audience assembled to watch the affair, which began with great seriousness and formality. An official laid down the strict rules by which Mongke wanted the debate to proceed: on pain of death “no one shall dare to speak words of contention.”

Rubruck and the other Christians joined together in one team with the Muslims in an effort to refute the Buddhist doctrines. As these men gathered together in all their robes and regalia in the tents on the dusty plains of Mongolia, they were doing something that no other set of scholars or theologians had ever done in history. It is doubtful that representatives of so many types of Christianity had come to a single meeting, and certainly they had not debated, as equals, with representatives of the various Muslim and Buddhist faiths. The religious scholars had to compete on the basis of their beliefs and ideas, using no weapons or the authority of any ruler or army behind them. They could use only words and logic to test the ability of their ideas to persuade.

In the initial round, Rubruck faced a Buddhist from North China who began by asking how the world was made and what happened to the soul after death. Rubruck countered that the Buddhist monk was asking the wrong questions; the first issue should be about God from whom all things flow. The umpires awarded the first points to Rubruck.

Their debate ranged back and forth over the topics of evil versus good, God’s nature, what happens to the souls of animals, the existence of reincarnation, and whether God had created evil. As they debated, the clerics formed shifting coalitions among the various religions according to the topic. Between each round of wrestling, Mongol athletes would drink fermented mare’s milk; in keeping with that tradition, after each round of the debate, the learned men paused to drink deeply in preparation for the next match.

No side seemed to convince the other of anything. Finally, as the effects of the alcohol became stronger, the Christians gave up trying to persuade anyone with logical arguments, and resorted to singing. The Muslims, who did not sing, responded by loudly reciting the Koran in an effort to drown out the Christians, and the Buddhists retreated into silent meditation. At the end of the debate, unable to convert or kill one another, they concluded the way most Mongol celebrations concluded, with everyone simply too drunk to continue.
Now that's the way to bring civility back to debate.

Scotland became Europe's first modern literate society.

From How The Scots Invented the Modern World by Arthur Herman. Page 22.

Scotland in the 1700s displayed one of those moments in history of startling concentrations of civilizational effervescence - Athens in 500BC, The American colonies in the late 1700s - so much talent on so many fronts. Scotland at that point in history was not an obvious location for such a flowering. Poor, remote, dominated by England and burdened by a clan culture.
In 1696, ironically the same year Thomas Aikenhead was arrested, Scotland's Parliament passed its "Act for Setting Schools," establishing a school in every parish in Scotland not already equipped with one. Each parish was now to supply a "commodious house for a school" and a salary for a teacher of not less than a hundred marks (or about sixty Scottish pounds or five pounds in English money) and no more than two hundred.

The reason behind all this was obvious to any Presbyterian: boys and girls must know how to read Holy Scripture. Knox's original 1560 Book of Discipline had called for a national system of education. Eighty years later Parliament passed the first statute to this effect. The 1696 act renewed and enforced it. The result was that within a generation nearly every parish in Scotland had some sort of school and a regular teacher. The education must have been fairly rudimentary in some places: the fundamentals of reading and grammar and nothing more. But it was available, and it was, at least in theory if not always in practice, free.

Historians are still arguing about how many Scots really learned to read and write as a result of the School Act. In this, as in so many things, the Highlands lagged far behind. But one thing is certain: Scotland's literacy rate would be higher than that of any other country by the end of the eighteenth century. An English observer noted with astonishment that "in the low country of Scotland ... the poorest are, in general, taught to read." In 1790 nearly every eight-year-old in Cleish, in Kinross-shire, could read, and read well. By one estimate male literacy stood at around 55 percent by 1720; by 1750 it may have stood as high as 75 percent, compared with only 53 percent in England. It would not be until the 1880s that the English would finally catch up with their northern neighbours.

Scotland became Europe's first modern literate society. This meant that there was an audience not only for the Bible but for other books as well. As the barriers of religious censorship eventually came down in the eighteenth century, the result was a literary explosion. Intellectuals such as Adam Smith and David Hume wrote not just for other intellectuals but for a genuine reading public. Even a person of relatively modest means had his own collection of books, and what he couldn't afford he could get at the local lending library, which by 1750 virtually every town of any size enjoyed.

A good example is Innerpeffray, near Crieff in Perthshire. Its library's records of book borrowing run from 1747 to 1800. They show books loaned out to the local baker, the blacksmith, the cooper, the dyer and the dyer's apprentice and to farmers, stonemasons, quarriers, tailors, and household servants. Religious books predominated; but more than half of the books borrowed were on secular themes, and included works by John Locke, the French Enlightenment naturalist George Louis Leclerc de Buffon, and Scotland's own Enlightenment historian, William Robertson. Literacy opened up new cultural choices, and reinforced others: a specifically Scottish reading public developed, with an appetite for the new as well as the familiar and well-worn.

But Dangers that are past, are pleasant to be thought on

Echoes across time.

From Colloquies of Erasmus, Volume I, Shipwreck.
Antony: You tell dreadful Stories: Is this going to Sea? God forbid that ever any such Thing should come into my Mind.

Adolph: That which I have related, is but a Diversion, in Comparison to what you'll hear presently.

Antony: I have heard Calamities enough already, my Flesh trembles to hear you relate them, as if I were in Danger myself.

Adolph: But Dangers that are past, are pleasant to be thought on.
Reminds me of a Churchill quote. From The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War (1898), Chapter X.
Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result.

Wednesday, March 2, 2016

Accurately forecasting predictably bad consequences

It's so easy to lose track of things that it becomes difficult to track back to forecasts from the past to see if they match the future that they predicted. As research by Philip E. Tetlock has demonstrated, pundits, experts, and talking heads survive based on the infrequency with which their forecasts are matched to outcomes. When you make those comparisons, the experts and talking heads are often spectacularly wrong and in aggregate perform worse than the market and worse than the informed public.

I came a across a reference to this article this morning, From The Trillion-Dollar Bank Shakedown That Bodes Ill for Cities by Howard Husock. Husock was writing sixteen years ago. His is the opposite circumstance. He is an expert who specifically identified the likely consequences of bad (though well intended) government policy. Kudos to him for correctly identifying the underlying government policies that then led to the Great Recession which he predicted.

The salient details are in the opening paragraphs but read the whole thing for the history and details of his argument.
The Clinton administration has turned the Community Reinvestment Act, a once-obscure and lightly enforced banking regulation law, into one of the most powerful mandates shaping American cities—and, as Senate Banking Committee chairman Phil Gramm memorably put it, a vast extortion scheme against the nation's banks. Under its provisions, U.S. banks have committed nearly $1 trillion for inner-city and low-income mortgages and real estate development projects, most of it funneled through a nationwide network of left-wing community groups, intent, in some cases, on teaching their low-income clients that the financial system is their enemy and, implicitly, that government, rather than their own striving, is the key to their well-being.

The CRA's premise sounds unassailable: helping the poor buy and keep homes will stabilize and rebuild city neighborhoods. As enforced today, though, the law portends just the opposite, threatening to undermine the efforts of the upwardly mobile poor by saddling them with neighbors more than usually likely to depress property values by not maintaining their homes adequately or by losing them to foreclosure. The CRA's logic also helps to ensure that inner-city neighborhoods stay poor by discouraging the kinds of investment that might make them better off.

The Act, which Jimmy Carter signed in 1977, grew out of the complaint that urban banks were "redlining" inner-city neighborhoods, refusing to lend to their residents while using their deposits to finance suburban expansion. CRA decreed that banks have "an affirmative obligation" to meet the credit needs of the communities in which they are chartered, and that federal banking regulators should assess how well they do that when considering their requests to merge or to open branches. Implicit in the bill's rationale was a belief that CRA was needed to counter racial discrimination in lending, an assumption that later seemed to gain support from a widely publicized 1990 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston finding that blacks and Hispanics suffered higher mortgage-denial rates than whites, even at similar income levels.

In addition, the Act's backers claimed, CRA would be profitable for banks. They just needed a push from the law to learn how to identify profitable inner-city lending opportunities. Going one step further, the Treasury Department recently asserted that banks that do figure out ways to reach inner-city borrowers might not be able to stop competitors from using similar methods—and therefore would not undertake such marketing in the first place without a push from Washington.

None of these justifications holds up, however, because of the changes that reshaped America's banking industry in the 1990s. Banking in the 1970s, when CRA was passed, was a highly regulated industry in which small, local savings banks, rather than commercial banks, provided most home mortgages. Regulation prohibited savings banks from branching across state lines and sometimes even limited branching within states, inhibiting competition, the most powerful defense against discrimination. With such regulatory protection, savings banks could make a comfortable profit without doing the hard work of finding out which inner-city neighborhoods and borrowers were good risks and which were not. Savings banks also had reason to worry that if they charged inner-city borrowers a higher rate of interest to balance the additional risk of such lending, they might jeopardize the protection from competition they enjoyed. Thanks to these artificially created conditions, some redlining of creditworthy borrowers doubtless occurred.

The insular world of the savings banks collapsed in the early nineties, however, the moment it was exposed to competition. Banking today is a far more wide-open industry, with banks offering mortgages through the Internet, where they compete hotly with aggressive online mortgage companies. Standardized, computer-based scoring systems now rate the creditworthiness of applicants, and the giant, government-chartered Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have helped create huge pools of credit by purchasing mortgage loans and packaging large numbers of them together into securities for sale to bond buyers. With such intense competition for profits and so much money available to lend, it's hard to imagine that banks couldn't instantly figure out how to market to minorities or would resist such efforts for fear of inspiring imitators. Nor has the race discrimination argument for CRA held up. A September 1999 study by Freddie Mac, for instance, confirmed what previous Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation studies had found: that African-Americans have disproportionate levels of credit problems, which explains why they have a harder time qualifying for mortgage money. As Freddie Mac found, blacks with incomes of $65,000 to $75,000 a year have on average worse credit records than whites making under $25,000.
This dynamic is what led to the outcomes that I posted on a few days ago, Everyone is 30% poorer than they were. As happens too often with utopianist statists, well intended policy deployed without knowledge and understanding of the complex system, led to unexpected and detrimental outcomes. African American households with poor credit were lured by government policy into making real estate purchases they could not afford resulting in widespread bankruptcies when the recession hit and the consequent reduction in African American household wealth from $19,00 to $11,000.

Husock specifically outlines as a forecast what actually did happen.
Looking into the future gives further cause for concern: "The bulk of these loans," notes a Federal Reserve economist, "have been made during a period in which we have not experienced an economic downturn." The Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of America's own success stories make you wonder how much CRA-related carnage will result when the economy cools. The group likes to promote, for instance, the story of Renea Swain-Price, grateful for NACA's negotiating on her behalf with Fleet Bank to prevent foreclosure when she fell behind on a $1,400 monthly mortgage payment on her three-family house in Dorchester. Yet NACA had no qualms about arranging the $137,500 mortgage in the first place, notwithstanding the fact that Swain-Price's husband was in prison, that she'd had previous credit problems, and that the monthly mortgage payment constituted more than half her monthly salary. The fact that NACA has arranged an agreement to forestall foreclosure does not inspire confidence that she will have the resources required to maintain her aging frame house: her new monthly payment, in recognition of previously missed payments, is $1,879.
It is not much good being right if everyone with a vested interest in the corrupt status quo chooses to ignore you. But the magic of the internet does provide the opportunity to go back and check.

The Great Abbreviators

Aldous Huxley wrote an extended new introduction to the 1958 edition of his Brave New World. It is worth reading in its entirety but the opening paragraphs are a great insight.
The soul of wit may become the very body of untruth. However elegant and memorable, brevity can never, in the nature of things, do justice to all the facts of a complex situation. On such a theme one can be brief only by omission and simplification. Omission and sim­plification help us to understand -- but help us, in many cases, to understand the wrong thing; for our compre­hension may be only of the abbreviator's neatly formu­lated notions, not of the vast, ramifying reality from which these notions have been so arbitrarily abstracted.

But life is short and information endless: nobody has time for everything. In practice we are generally forced to choose between an unduly brief exposition and no exposition at all. Abbreviation is a necessary evil and the abbreviator's business is to make the best of a job which, though intrinsically bad, is still better than nothing. He must learn to simplify, but not to the point of falsification. He must learn to concentrate upon the essentials of a situation, but without ignor­ing too many of reality's qualifying side issues. In this way he may be able to tell, not indeed the whole truth (for the whole truth about almost any important sub­ject is incompatible with brevity), but considerably more than the dangerous quarter-truths and half-truths which have always been the current coin of thought.
With the dense complexity of our productive lives and the plethora of cheap informational fodder via the internet, brevity is at an ever greater premium.

I think we have a long ways to go to master the art of pertinent abbreviation, the reduction of the complex to its fewest elements without losing predictive value. The simple model is only useful to the extent that it provides easier access to an idea that is still useful in its simplified form.

I suspect that for this reason (difficulty of reducing complex ideas to simple models), that the more complex a society, the more important that there be a shared culture. That shared culture makes the rendering of complex ideas into still useful simple models much easier because of shared knowledge and values. Absent that shared orientation and knowledge, every step towards reduction requires discursive explanation, defeating the goal of simplification.

Is it then true that increased societal complexity must also be yoked to increased consistency within the culture? I have a suspicion that there is some feedback mechanism going on between productivity, complexity, and cultural homogeneity. Increased productivity is dependent on increased complexity and increased complexity is dependent on increased cultural consistency. Perhaps.

Tuesday, March 1, 2016

The world in which we live is very nearly incomprehensible to most of us

From Informing Ourselves to Death by Neil Postman.

This was written 26 years ago in 1990, just before the global adoption of the internet. Some of it reads in a dated fashion and I think some of Postman's argument comes across as nannying ludditism. However, I think there is merit to the core of his argument and some of it is even more pertinent today than at the time.
Now, I think I can begin to get at this by telling you of a small experiment I have been conducting, on and off, for the past several years. There are some people who describe the experiment as an exercise in deceit and exploitation but I will rely on your sense of humor to pull me through.

Here's how it works: It is best done in the morning when I see a colleague who appears not to be in possession of a copy of {The New York Times}. "Did you read The Times this morning?," I ask. If the colleague says yes, there is no experiment that day. But if the answer is no, the experiment can proceed. "You ought to look at Page 23," I say. "There's a fascinating article about a study done at Harvard University." "Really? What's it about?" is the usual reply. My choices at this point are limited only by my imagination. But I might say something like this: "Well, they did this study to find out what foods are best to eat for losing weight, and it turns out that a normal diet supplemented by chocolate eclairs, eaten six times a day, is the best approach. It seems that there's some special nutrient in the eclairs - encomial dioxin - that actually uses up calories at an incredible rate."

Another possibility, which I like to use with colleagues who are known to be health conscious is this one: "I think you'll want to know about this," I say. "The neuro-physiologists at the University of Stuttgart have uncovered a connection between jogging and reduced intelligence. They tested more than 1200 people over a period of five years, and found that as the number of hours people jogged increased, there was a corresponding decrease in their intelligence. They don't know exactly why but there it is."

I'm sure, by now, you understand what my role is in the experiment: to report something that is quite ridiculous - one might say, beyond belief. Let me tell you, then, some of my results: Unless this is the second or third time I've tried this on the same person, most people will believe or at least not disbelieve what I have told them. Sometimes they say: "Really? Is that possible?" Sometimes they do a double-take, and reply, "Where'd you say that study was done?" And sometimes they say, "You know, I've heard something like that."

Now, there are several conclusions that might be drawn from these results, one of which was expressed by H. L. Mencken fifty years ago when he said, there is no idea so stupid that you can't find a professor who will believe it. This is more of an accusation than an explanation but in any case I have tried this experiment on non-professors and get roughly the same results. Another possible conclusion is one expressed by George Orwell - also about 50 years ago - when he remarked that the average person today is about as naive as was the average person in the Middle Ages. In the Middle Ages people believed in the authority of their religion, no matter what. Today, we believe in the authority of our science, no matter what.

But I think there is still another and more important conclusion to be drawn, related to Orwell's point but rather off at a right angle to it. I am referring to the fact that the world in which we live is very nearly incomprehensible to most of us. There is almost no fact - whether actual or imagined - that will surprise us for very long, since we have no comprehensive and consistent picture of the world which would make the fact appear as an unacceptable contradiction. We believe because there is no reason not to believe. No social, political, historical, metaphysical, logical or spiritual reason. We live in a world that, for the most part, makes no sense to us. Not even technical sense. I don't mean to try my experiment on this audience, especially after having told you about it, but if I informed you that the seats you are presently occupying were actually made by a special process which uses the skin of a Bismark herring, on what grounds would you dispute me? For all you know - indeed, for all I know - the skin of a Bismark herring could have made the seats on which you sit. And if I could get an industrial chemist to confirm this fact by describing some incomprehensible process by which it was done, you would probably tell someone tomorrow that you spent the evening sitting on a Bismark herring.

Perhaps I can get a bit closer to the point I wish to make with an analogy: If you opened a brand-new deck of cards, and started turning the cards over, one by one, you would have a pretty good idea of what their order is. After you had gone from the ace of spades through the nine of spades, you would expect a ten of spades to come up next. And if a three of diamonds showed up instead, you would be surprised and wonder what kind of deck of cards this is. But if I gave you a deck that had been shuffled twenty times, and then asked you to turn the cards over, you would not expect any card in particular - a three of diamonds would be just as likely as a ten of spades. Having no basis for assuming a given order, you would have no reason to react with disbelief or even surprise to whatever card turns up.

The point is that, in a world without spiritual or intellectual order, nothing is unbelievable; nothing is predictable, and therefore, nothing comes as a particular surprise.

[snip]

The situation we are presently in is much different. And I should say, sadder and more confusing and certainly more mysterious. It is rather like the shuffled deck of cards I referred to. There is no consistent, integrated conception of the world which serves as the foundation on which our edifice of belief rests. And therefore, in a sense, we are more naive than those of the Middle Ages, and more frightened, for we can be made to believe almost anything. The skin of a Bismark herring makes about as much sense as a vinyl alloy or encomial dioxin.


[snip]

And something else, which once was our friend, turned against us, as well. I refer to information. There was a time when information was a resource that helped human beings to solve specific and urgent problems of their environment. It is true enough that in the Middle Ages, there was a scarcity of information but its very scarcity made it both important and usable. This began to change, as everyone knows, in the late 15th century when a goldsmith named Gutenberg, from Mainz, converted an old wine press into a printing machine, and in so doing, created what we now call an information explosion.

[snip]

The tie between information and action has been severed. Information is now a commodity that can be bought and sold, or used as a form of entertainment, or worn like a garment to enhance one's status. It comes indiscriminately, directed at no one in particular, disconnected from usefulness; we are glutted with information, drowning in information, have no control over it, don't know what to do with it.

[snip]

Now, into this situation comes the computer. The computer, as we know, has a quality of universality, not only because its uses are almost infinitely various but also because computers are commonly integrated into the structure of other machines. Therefore it would be fatuous of me to warn against every conceivable use of a computer. But there is no denying that the most prominent uses of computers have to do with information. When people talk about "information sciences," they are talking about computers - how to store information, how to retrieve information, how to organize information. The computer is an answer to the questions, how can I get more information, faster, and in a more usable form? These would appear to be reasonable questions.

[snip]

The message is that through more and more information, more conveniently packaged, more swiftly delivered, we will find solutions to our problems. And so all the brilliant young men and women, believing this, create ingenious things for the computer to do, hoping that in this way, we will become wiser and more decent and more noble. And who can blame them? By becoming masters of this wondrous technology, they will acquire prestige and power and some will even become famous. In a world populated by people who believe that through more and more information, paradise is attainable, the computer scientist is king. But I maintain that all of this is a monumental and dangerous waste of human talent and energy. Imagine what might be accomplished if this talent and energy were turned to philosophy, to theology, to the arts, to imaginative literature or to education? Who knows what we could learn from such people - perhaps why there are wars, and hunger, and homelessness and mental illness and anger.

As things stand now, the geniuses of computer technology will give us Star Wars, and tell us that is the answer to nuclear war. They will give us artificial intelligence, and tell us that this is the way to self-knowledge. They will give us instantaneous global communication, and tell us this is the way to mutual understanding. They will give us Virtual Reality and tell us this is the answer to spiritual poverty. But that is only the way of the technician, the fact-mongerer, the information junkie, and the technological idiot.

Here is what Henry David Thoreau told us: "All our inventions are but improved means to an unimproved end." Here is what Goethe told us:
"One should, each day, try to hear a little song, read a good poem, see a fine picture, and, if it is possible, speak a few reasonable words." And here is what Socrates told us: "The unexamined life is not worth living." And here is what the prophet Micah told us: "What does the Lord require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God?" And I can tell you - if I had the time (although you all know it well enough) - what Confucius, Isaiah, Jesus, Mohammed, the Buddha, Spinoza and Shakespeare told us. It is all the same: There is no escaping from ourselves. The human dilemma is as it has always been, and we solve nothing fundamental by cloaking ourselves in technological glory.
It is not clear to me that philosophy, theology, the arts, imaginative literature and education are an alternative, and as Postman implies, a better path to glory. But I do think that Postman makes a strong argument that information out of context is no real panacea either.

A man may surely be allowed to take a glass of wine by his own fireside.

From London Historians' Blog, Disaster at Drury Lane. From a February 24th post.
On this day in 1809, the Theatre Royal Drury Lane was destroyed by fire. Theatres were always burning down, so nothing really unusual in fact. What made this conflagration different, is the involvement of the magnificent Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Dublin-born, Harrow-educated Sheridan is one of my favourite Londoners. A duellist, MP, playwright, impresario and much besides, he obtained full ownership of Drury Lane in 1778. In 1791 he demolished the 120 year old building which had opened in 1674 (replacing the short-lived 1663 original), and built a fabulous modern theatre more to his liking and ambition. Designed by Henry Holland, it opened in 1794, apparently with the latest fire-prevention features. Here is Rowlandson and Pugin’s depiction of its interior, only a year before disaster struck.

Sheridan himself witnessed the destruction of his beloved theatre from the street, glass of wine in hand, remarking laconically: “A man may surely be allowed to take a glass of wine by his own fireside.”