Friday, August 3, 2012

I must conclude, however unlikely the conclusion seems, that you have a taste for middle-aged moralising.

From The Inner Ring by C. S. Lewis, Memorial Lecture at King’s College, University of London, in 1944.

A very manageable address that I recommend in its entirety.
When you invite a middle-aged moralist to address you, I suppose I must conclude, however unlikely the conclusion seems, that you have a taste for middle-aged moralising. I shall do my best to gratify it. I shall in fact, give you advice about the world in which you are going to live. I do not mean by this that I am going to talk on what are called current affairs. You probably know quite as much about them as I do. I am not going to tell you—except in a form so general that you will hardly recognise it—what part you ought to play in post-war reconstruction.

It is not, in fact, very likely that any of you will be able, in the next ten years, to make any direct contribution to the peace or prosperity of Europe. You will be busy finding jobs, getting married, acquiring facts. I am going to do something more old-fashioned than you perhaps expected. I am going to give advice. I am going to issue warnings. Advice and warnings about things which are so perennial that no one calls them “current affairs.”

And of course everyone knows what a middle-aged moralist of my type warns his juniors against. He warns them against the World, the Flesh, and the Devil. But one of this trio will be enough to deal with today. The Devil, I shall leave strictly alone. The association between him and me in the public mind has already gone quite as deep as I wish: in some quarters it has already reached the level of confusion, if not of identification. I begin to realise the truth of the old proverb that he who sups with that formidable host needs a long spoon. As for the Flesh, you must be very abnormal young people if you do not know quite as much about it as I do. But on the World I think I have something to say.

In the passage I have just read from Tolstoy, the young second lieutenant Boris Dubretskoi discovers that there exist in the army two different systems or hierarchies. The one is printed in some little red book and anyone can easily read it up. It also remains constant. A general is always superior to a colonel, and a colonel to a captain. The other is not printed anywhere. Nor is it even a formally organised secret society with officers and rules which you would be told after you had been admitted. You are never formally and explicitly admitted by anyone. You discover gradually, in almost indefinable ways, that it exists and that you are outside it; and then later, perhaps, that you are inside it.

There are what correspond to passwords, but they are too spontaneous and informal. A particular slang, the use of particular nicknames, an allusive manner of conversation, are the marks. But it is not so constant. It is not easy, even at a given moment, to say who is inside and who is outside. Some people are obviously in and some are obviously out, but there are always several on the borderline. And if you come back to the same Divisional Headquarters, or Brigade Headquarters, or the same regiment or even the same company, after six weeks’ absence, you may find this secondary hierarchy quite altered.

There are no formal admissions or expulsions. People think they are in it after they have in fact been pushed out of it, or before they have been allowed in: this provides great amusement for those who are really inside. It has no fixed name. The only certain rule is that the insiders and outsiders call it by different names. From inside it may be designated, in simple cases, by mere enumeration: it may be called “You and Tony and me.” When it is very secure and comparatively stable in membership it calls itself “we.” When it has to be expanded to meet a particular emergency it calls itself “all the sensible people at this place.” From outside, if you have dispaired of getting into it, you call it “That gang” or “they” or “So-and-so and his set” or “The Caucus” or “The Inner Ring.” If you are a candidate for admission you probably don’t call it anything. To discuss it with the other outsiders would make you feel outside yourself. And to mention talking to the man who is inside, and who may help you if this present conversation goes well, would be madness.


Thursday, August 2, 2012

Anyone who cannot cope with mathematics is not fully human

You know, I really should carve out some time to read some Robert Heinlein. I keep running across quotes from him that ring true but he just was never a part of my library growing up. Some of the things I come across seem militaristic or over-the-top judgmental but they also are sometimes admirably plain-spoken. For example.
Anyone who cannot cope with mathematics is not fully human. At best he is a tolerable subhuman who has learned to wear shoes, bathe and not make messes in the house.
From Time Enough for Love by Robert Heinlein.

Too strident by far but also scarily true in today's complex global economy. If you don't have a fundamental grasp of mathematics, and particularly statistics, you are almost perforce not part of the conversation.

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

The English language hasn't got where it is by being pure

From The Miracle of Language by Richard Lederer, page 24. A couple of passages touch on elements pertinent to my suspicion that language is subject to many of the same types of forces such as variation and selection as described by Darwin. In this instance, Lederer first addresses the catholicity of English. On the one hand, there is an immense vocabulary that lends itself to exquisite nuance and precision.
It is often said that what most immediately sets English apart from other languages is the richness of its vocabulary. Webster's Third New International Dictionary lists 450,000 words, and the compendious Oxford English Dictionary lists 615,000, but that is only part of the total. Technical and scientific terms, family words, slang and argot, and spanking-new creations, unenshrined in ordinary dictionaries, would add hundreds of thousands more, bringing the total of entries to as high as two million. In comparison, German, according to traditional estimates, has a vocabulary of about 185,000, Russian 130,000, and French fewer than 100,000.

One reason English has accumulated such a vast word hoard is that it is the most hospitable and democratic language that has ever existed. English has never rejected a word because of its race, creed, or national origin. Having welcomed into its vocabulary words from a multitude of other languages and dialects, ancient and modern, far and near, English is unique in the number and variety of its borrowed words. Fewer than thirty percent of our words spring from the original Anglo-Saxon word stock; the rest are imported. As the poet Carl Sandburg once said, "The English language hasn't got where it is by being pure."
On the other hand, English is also extremely efficient.
The great nineteenth-century linguist Jakob Grimm wrote, "In richness, good sense, and terse convenience, no other living language may be put beside English." By "terse convenience" Grimm meant that ours is a strikingly direct and concise tongue. Translate a document from English into French or Spanish or German or Russian, and the translation, if true to the original, will emerge about twenty-five percent longer. Examine bilingual signs and messages and you will find that the English half is inevitably more compact.

[snip]

A careful count of the number of syllables needed to translate the Gospel according to Mark into various languages indicates that, compared to other tongues, brevity is the soul of English:
English 29,000
Teutonic languages (average) 32,650
French 36,500
Slavic languages (average) 36,500
Romance languages (average) 40,200
Indo-Iranian languages (average) 43,100
So English is both a language of great precision as well as brevity. It is much easier to communicate an exact message more efficiently. Nearly 30% more efficiently compared to Indo-Iranian languages. Does that make a difference? Could do. Assume that the effort in communicating is directly proportionate to productivity (as a hypothetical). In that case, 30% more efficient communication translates into 30% greater productivity. Is the English language farmer who sets aside 130 baskets of wheat more likely to make it through the winter than the Indo-Iranian farmer with only 100 baskets? Sure.

Now all that is built on a fairly weak foundation of assumptions but the underlying principle that efficiency of communication likely has a material impact on both productivity as well as on survival is, I think, sound. Certainly in manufacturing and business management, when you design processes to optimize efficiency and effectiveness (precision), you usually see a compounding effect. One small improvement here allows a slightly larger improvement over there - pretty soon you see a cascade of productivity improvement. Is language the same? I favor the idea that it is.

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

Children are beautifully adapted to learn about many possible worlds

From The Wisdom of Not Being Too Rational by Michael Balter.
The children were allowed five trials per experiment lasting 2 minutes each to learn the tasks. As might be expected, the older children did better than the younger children: By age 8, most children were able to successfully perform all three tasks during the first trial, and younger children required more trials, the researchers report today in PLoS ONE. But their performance contrasted in an important way with that of the birds. While the jays were able to learn the first two tasks by trial and error, they could not master the third experiment, in which the solution was not obvious and even counterintuitive.

Cheke and her colleagues conclude that this suggests a fundamentally different learning process between the birds and the children. Whereas the birds were put off by a seemingly physically impossible setup and couldn't learn the third task, children weren't stymied by the apparent impossibility of the task, but forged ahead and learned to raise the tokens anyway—even if it wasn't obvious how it was happening or the solution didn't seem to make intuitive sense.

"Children start off with no idea of what is possible and what is not possible," Cheke says. "If they did, they would never be able to learn. This is why children like magic, and why they will believe you when you tell them all kinds of fanciful things."

Alison Gopnik, an expert in child developmental psychology at the University of California, Berkeley, calls the study "fascinating and illuminating." The main difference between the birds and the children, Gopnik says, is that members of the crow family "have sophisticated but specific knowledge about how physical causal relationships work in the world," whereas children "seem to have broader and more wide-ranging causal learning abilities."

As a result, Gopnik adds, the birds "are beautifully adapted to learn about this world," but "children are beautifully adapted to learn about many possible worlds."
This strikes me as relevant to Stuart Kauffman's concept of adjacent possible. It would seem in this case that the adjacent possible for crows is simply a direct extension of acquired physical knowledge (put in a pebble and water rises) whereas for children the adjacent possible consists not only of extended knowledge but actually an extrapolation using imagination, analogy and metaphor. So that might prompt the question, does extensive childhood reading increase one's capacity to imagine, to think analogously and to think metaphorically and does that in turn improve one's problem solving capability?

Monday, July 30, 2012

It will incur a revision of belief

From The Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas Taleb. A great explication about the differences between risk and uncertainty as well as an epistemological discussion about what is knowable and how we know it.
Consider a turkey that is fed every day. Every single feeding will firm up the bird’s belief that it is the general rule of life to be fed every day by friendly members of the human race “looking out for its best interests,” as a politician would say. On the afternoon of the Wednesday before Thanksgiving, something unexpected will happen to the turkey. It will incur a revision of belief.

Sunday, July 29, 2012

Distinguishing fish from bubbles

From Do dolphins think nonlinearly? from e! Science News, an excellent example of Kauffman's Adjacent Possible concept in play.
Research from the University of Southampton, which examines how dolphins might process their sonar signals, could provide a new system for human-made sonar to detect targets, such as sea mines, in bubbly water. When hunting prey, dolphins have been observed to blow 'bubble nets' around schools of fish, which force the fish to cluster together, making them easier for the dolphins to pick off. However, such bubble nets would confound the best human-made sonar because the strong scattering by the bubbles generates 'clutter' in the sonar image, which cannot be distinguished from the true target.

Taking a dolphin's sonar and characterising it from an engineering perspective, it is not superior to the best human-made sonar. Therefore, in blowing bubble nets, dolphins are either 'blinding' their echolocation sense when hunting or they have a facility absent in human-made sonar.

The study by Professor Tim Leighton, from the University's Institute of Sound and Vibration Research (ISVR), and colleagues examined whether there is a way by which dolphins might process their sonar signals to distinguish between targets and clutter in bubbly water.

In the study, published in Proceedings of the Royal Society A, Professor Leighton along with Professor Paul White and student Gim Hwa Chua used echolocation pulses of a type that dolphins emit, but processed them using nonlinear mathematics instead of the standard way of processing sonar returns. This Biased Pulse Summation Sonar (BiaPSS) reduced the effect of clutter by relying on the variation in click amplitude, such as that which occurs when a dolphin emits a sequence of clicks.

Professor Leighton says: "We know that dolphins emit sequences of clicks and the amplitude of each click can vary from one to the next, so that not all the clicks are the same loudness. We asked, what if this variation in amplitude was not coincidental, but instead was key to distinguishing fish from bubbles.

"These clicks were shown to identify targets when processed using nonlinear mathematics, raising the question of whether dolphins also benefit from such mathematics. The variation in amplitude of these clicks is the key: it produces changes in the echoes which can identify the target (fish) in the bubble net, where human-made sonar does not work.

"Although this does not conclusively prove that dolphins do use such nonlinear processing, it demonstrates that humans can detect and classify targets in bubbly water using dolphin-like sonar pulses, raising intriguing possibilities for dolphin sonar when they make bubble nets."
The frontiers of knowledge and the leaps of innovation, advancing a sonar click at a time.

Saturday, July 28, 2012

Complex ideas transmitted across time

From The limits of universalism by Henry A. Kissinger
Such an effort must be based on an awareness of our cultural heritage—the preservation of which is a vast challenge in our social media and Internet age. The generations brought up on books were obliged to internalize concepts and think through complex ideas transmitted across time. When information is acquired by being “looked up” on the Internet, a surfeit of information may inhibit the acquisition of knowledge, and respect for it. When facts are disaggregated from their context and called up only when needed, they risk losing the coherence of historical perspective. As Burke wrote, “People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors.”

When identity is established by a consensus of episodic “friends” on social media pages, the immediate may overwhelm the important. Reaction to stimuli may transcend reflection on substance. Overcoming this danger may be the ultimate cultural task for the Burkean conservative.

Friday, July 27, 2012

Inheritance and a point of departure

From The limits of universalism by Henry A. Kissinger
Burke confronted the conservative paradox: Values are universal, but generally have to be implemented as part of a process, that is to say, gradually. If they are implemented without respect for history or circumstance, they invalidate all traditional restraints. Burke sympathized with the American Revolution because he considered it a natural evolution of English liberties. Burke opposed the French Revolution, which he believed wrecked what generations had wrought and, with it, the prospect of organic growth.

For Burke, society was both an inheritance and a point of departure. As he wrote in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, “[T]he idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a principle of improvement.” A society proceeding in this spirit will discover that “in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete.”

Hence prudence is “in all things a virtue, [and] in politics the first of virtues.” Its practice yields a politics which, as Burke wrote in November 1789,

lead[s] us rather to acquiesce in some qualified plan that does not come up to the full perfection of the abstract idea, than to push for the more perfect, which cannot be attained without tearing to pieces the whole contexture of the commonwealth.

Thursday, July 26, 2012

The gaps between our assumptions and reality

The Science of Expectation: Using Humor To Understand Creativity by Sam McNerney.

There is a trade-off between heuristic knowledge that is readily available and can be deployed at the drop of a hat and analytical knowledge that requires time and diligence and that is more likely to be useful. Heuristic assumptions yield answers that are usefully right but not reliably right, the answer is good enough most of the time. For many less consequential issues, that is sufficient. Still it would be nice if our heuristic assumptions had a means of becoming more accurate over time so that we had both speedy decision-making as well as better decision-making.

In this article, it is posited that humor is the means by which the brain refines and improves heuristic assumptions.
In the book Inside Jokes cognitive scientists Matthew Hurley, Dan Dennett and Reginald Adams explore humor, jokes, and mirth with an evolutionary lens. They begin with the premise that the brain simplifies the world by creating and relying on a never-ending series of assumptions. This cognitive shortcut allows us to comfortably exist in the day-to-day without having to worry about trivial matters, but mistakes are inevitable and the brain sometimes guesses incorrectly. Mirth, according to the scientists, is an evolutionary adaptation that evolved to reward the brain when it corrects a mistaken assumption about the world; it helps our neurons stay on the lookout for the gaps between our assumptions and reality.

Humor takes advantage of this cognitive system by delivering super normal stimuli in the same way Big Macs and pornography deliver super normal stimuli for our appetite and libido. Like a good chef or porn star, a good comedian reverse engineers the mind to create jokes that generate the most mirth.

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

These results falsify the claim that Morton physically mismeasured crania based on his a priori biases

Scientists Measure the Accuracy of a Racism Claim by Nicholas Wade. This is disappointing. I had a long run of reading Stephen Jay Gould's articles and books and found them erudite and entertaining. I particularly enjoyed his The Mismeasure of Man and have occassionally used his example of measuring brain capacity to illustrate the subtle influence of unconscious bias.

And now it appears that it was Gould who was biased.
Scientists have often been accused of letting their ideology influence their results, and one of the most famous cases is that of Morton’s skulls — the global collection amassed by the 19th-century physical anthropologist Samuel George Morton.

In a 1981 book, “The Mismeasure of Man,” the paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould asserted that Morton, believing that brain size was a measure of intelligence, had subconsciously manipulated the brain volumes of European, Asian and African skulls to favor his bias that Europeans had larger brains and Africans smaller ones.

But now physical anthropologists at the University of Pennsylvania, which owns Morton’s collection, have remeasured the skulls, and in an article that does little to burnish Dr. Gould’s reputation as a scholar, they conclude that almost every detail of his analysis is wrong.

“Our results resolve this historical controversy, demonstrating that Morton did not manipulate his data to support his preconceptions, contra Gould,” they write in the current PLoS Biology.

Dr. Gould, who died in 2002, based his attack on the premise that Morton believed that brain size was correlated with intelligence. But there is no evidence that Morton believed this or was trying to prove it, said Jason E. Lewis, the leader of the Pennsylvania team. Rather, Morton was measuring his skulls to study human variation, as part of his inquiry into whether God had created the human races separately (a lively issue before Darwin decreed that everyone belonged to the same species).

In his book, Dr. Gould contended that Morton’s results were “a patchwork of fudging and finagling in the clear interest of controlling a priori convictions.” This fudging was not deliberate, Dr. Gould said, but rather an instance of unconscious doctoring of data, a practice he believed was “rampant, endemic and unavoidable” in science. His finding is widely cited as an instance of scientific bias and fallibility.

But the Penn team finds Morton’s results were neither fudged nor influenced by his convictions. They identified and remeasured half of the skulls used in his reports, finding that in only 2 percent of cases did Morton’s measurements differ significantly from their own. These errors either were random or gave a larger than accurate volume to African skulls, the reverse of the bias that Dr. Gould imputed to Morton.

“These results falsify the claim that Morton physically mismeasured crania based on his a priori biases,” the Pennsylvania team writes.

Dr. Gould did not measure any of the skulls himself but merely did a paper reanalysis of Morton’s results. He accused Morton of various subterfuges, like leaving out subgroups to manipulate a group’s overall score. When these errors were corrected, Dr. Gould said, “there are no differences to speak of among Morton’s races.”
Gould was always something of a lightning rod but that was part of what made him fun to read. You felt that here was someone unconstrained by convention, willing to tackle anything and bringing an inspiring breadth and depth of knowledge to every inquiry.

So I am left a little disillusioned to find a hero's reputation tarnished. What is particularly striking to me though are two items. I do not recall being aware at the time of reading The Mismeasure of Man, that Gould's analysis was not based on a physical replication of Morton's measurements. I think I must have assumed that he did. That assumption combined with his credibility made for a powerful argument. Back to the old time religion - Trust but verify even from trusted sources, Never assume, etc.

The second striking item is the time frame. The Mismeasure of Man was published in 1981, excited much comment, was quite influential and among the reasons for its influence was the striking claim of Gould that Morton had been subtly and unconsciously influenced by his own biases. 31 years later, someone actually tests the data by reproducing the experiment.

Sometimes it seems as if we don't deserve the scientific method because we are so casual about it. Gould had a good story and we ran with that for a whole generation before anyone bothered to validate the data - Step 1 for any significant claim.

Oh dear.

UPDATE: This article, When Bad Theories Happen to Good Scientists by Matt Ridley would seem to suggest that the 31 year lag between proposition and testing might be because we want to believe that in the olden days, scientists were biased and racially prejudiced. When Gould came along with a good story confirming that assumption, we allowed our confirmation bias to play so well that we never got around to testing Gould's assertion for thirty one years. Someday we will learn to be humble. But not today.