I love when I can find a new source of information with whom I likely disagree on at least some important things but with whom I am in agreement on other, as important things. They are more likely to challenge my thinking, logic, reasoning, and evidence but can be trusted to bring strong arguments to the table.
This potential for discovery is one of the few redeeming graces of Twitter, properly managed.
In this instance, I am discovering Michael Bang Petersen from Arhus University in Sweden. I first come across him through his paper (with others) Transparent communication about negative features of COVID-19 vaccines decreases acceptance but increases trust. In researching that, I find Petersen's twitter account and find other pertinent and intriguing papers on topics in which I am interested. Its like receiving an unexpected present in the mail.
From the Abstract of the linked paper:
By all appearances this is a well designed experiment with well-discussed findings both for and against their expectations. In contrast to many research reports, the paper is well worth a read.During the rapid development and rolling out of vaccines against COVID-19, researchers have called for an approach of “radical transparency,” in which vaccine information is transparently disclosed to the public, even if negative information can decrease vaccine uptake. Consistent with theories about the psychology of conspiracy beliefs, these calls predict that a lack of transparency may reduce trust in health authorities and may facilitate the spread of conspiracy theories, which may limit the long-term capabilities of health authorities during and after the pandemic. On the basis of preregistered experiments conducted on large, representative samples of Americans and Danes (N > 13,000), the current study contrasts the effects of vague vaccine communication with transparent communication, which discloses either positive or negative vaccine features. The evidence demonstrates that transparent negative communication may indeed harm vaccine acceptance here and now but that it increases trust in health authorities. Furthermore, the alternative of vague, reassuring communication does not increase vaccine acceptance either and leads to both lower trust and higher endorsement of conspiracy theories.
The results show that vaccine skepticism is not associated with a need for cognitive closure (bCombined = −0.01 [−0.04; 0.02], P = 0.50) or by concerns related to realistic threats from COVID-19 (bCombined = −0.02 [−0.04; 0.01], P = 0.20). There is only little evidence that people who are on the ideological (bCombined = −0.03 [−0.05; −0.01], P < 0.001) or electoral (bCombined = −0.02 [−0.02; 0.00], P = 0.007) right-wing are less supportive of the COVID-19 vaccine. Nor are demographics consistently important. Overall, the key correlates of vaccine skepticism are concerns about symbolic threats from COVID-19 (e.g., its potential impact on democratic freedoms; bCombined = −0.16 [−0.19; −0.14], P < 0.001) and, in particular, a general distrust of the political system reflected in the measure of political cynicism (bCombined = −0.30 [−0.33; −0.27], P < 0.001). Overall, political cynicism is the strongest predictor of vaccine skepticism across both the United States and Denmark.
Political orientation (right versus left) is very weakly associated with vaccine skepticism. The mainstream media in the US usually characterizes vaccine skepticism as primarily a function of Republicans, conservatives, libertarians, rural residents and the poor. On this report, we can rule out political orientation.
The two variables most associated with vaccine skepticism are concerns about symbolic threats (does the response to Covid-19 threaten democratic norms) and general distrust of the political system. Both of those positions make sense.
There is a whole discussion to be had about the differences between the Danish and US participants. On many aspects, they are virtually identical while in others they are directionally similar but to different degrees. For example, the responses are virtually the same for Realistic Threat, Vote Choice, and Ideology.
On the other hand, political cynics in both Denmark and the US are both strongly vaccine skeptic but Danish political cynics and dramatically more vaccine skeptical than are American political skeptics. There is a whole paper to be written on just that one topic it is so intriguing.
I cannot speak the communication effectiveness of the Danish authorities during Covid-19.
Here in the US, given our federal system, there is of course no singular authority. We have Fauci at the Federal level, CDC leaders, leading voices in both the House and the Senate, etc. Then there are the state and local level political leaders, medical authorities, etc. Then there are the academics, the radio talk show hosts, popular figures, and so on.
There is a complete babble of communication. Whatever one's preferences or biases, there is opportunity for them to be confirmed.
But is there a single voice or institution which most Americans trust? Not many. Journalists threw away their credibility some years ago both out of economic need and due to ideological monotheism. Politicians tautologically are not to be trusted. Fauci had a chance at the beginning to be a trusted figure but given his flip flops on major issues such as masks, goal post moving, and latterly the revelation (through the FOIA on his emails) that he often chose to mislead on key issues (such as the viable proposition that Covid-19 originated in a lab), he quickly lost that possible role as a trusted advisor.
I think our three branches of government further divided by the three levels of federalism, plus our general cultural orientation (reflected in the constitution) that all authority resides with the individual, makes it very, very challenging for national institutions, governmental or otherwise, to establish a trusted voice.
It can be done, and has in the past been done. But it is challenging to maintain that over time.
But with the past decade of Critical Race Theory, Social Justice Theory, Intersectionality, Third Wave Feminism, etc. there has been a bonfire of institutional credibility and trustworthiness.
Following are, in order of relative trustworthiness as perceived by the public, the various institutions in the US as measured by Gallup. Ranked highest to lowest as measured by a Great Deal of Trust and Quite a lot of Trust. The first number is the most recent result in 2020 and the second number is from the earliest time when this was first measured, typically in 1973 of 1975. The third number is the average over the 45 years. The fourth number is the percent increase or decline in trust over the fifty years. The fifth number is sum of those with a Great Deal of Trust, Quite a Lot of Trust and Some Trust. The full range is Great Deal of Trust, Quite a Lot of Trust, Some Trust, Very Little Trust, No Trust, and No Opinion.
Small Business - 75% in 2020, 63% in 1997, 65% average, rising trust. 15% increase in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some 94% in 2020.
Military - 72% in 2020, 58% in 1975, 68% average, sharply rising trust. 24% increase in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some 92% in 2020.
Medical System - 51%; 80%; 41%; sharply falling trust. 36% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 83%
Police - 48%; 52%; 57%; fluctuating trust. 8% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 81%
Church/Organized Religion - 42%; 65%; 53%, sharply falling trust. 35% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 73%
Public Schools - 41%; 58%; 40%; declining trust. 15% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 77%
Supreme Court - 40%; 45%, 43%; slightly falling trust. 11% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 81%
Presidency - 39%; 52%; 42%; falling trust. 25% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 62%
Banks - 38%; 60%; 39%; falling trust. 37% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 81%
Organized Labor - 31%; 30%; 26%; fluctuating trust. 3% rise in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 76%
The Criminal Justice System - 24%, 17%, 24%; rising trust. 41% increase in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 64%
Newspapers - 24%; 39%; 31%; falling trust. 38% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 60%
Big Business - 19%; 26%; 24%; declining trust. 27% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 64%
TV News - 18%; 46%; 28%; falling trust. 71% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some - 51%
News on the internet - 16%; 21%; 19%; falling trust. 24% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some 39%
Congress - 13%; 42%; 23%; significant falling trust. 69% decline in trust. Great Deal/Quite a Lot/Some 55%
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