Friday, September 30, 2022

'Round, 'round, 'round, I get around - The medieval Anglo-Saxon anthem

Putin has declared that the Anglo-Saxons are to blame for the explosions in the Nord Stream pipelines.  He is using Anglo-Saxons in the disparaging sense of the Anglophone - US and UK with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand sometimes thrown in as well.

But those in the know can read between the lines.  One twitter account has done some deep research and found some evidence in the Bayeux Tapestry.  These were out-takes omitted in the final version.

















Click to enlarge.

This is backed up by history in the Black Sea region.  Russia can carry a chip on the shoulder for centuries.  

New England (medieval) was a colony established after the Norman invasion of Anglo-Saxon Britain.

New England (Latin: Nova Anglia, Old English: Nīwe Englaland) was a colony allegedly founded, either in the 1070s or the 1090s, by English refugees fleeing William the Conqueror. Its existence is attested in two much later sources, the French Chronicon Universale Anonymi Laudunensis (which ends in 1219) and the 14th-century Icelandic Játvarðar Saga. They tell the story of a journey from England through the Mediterranean Sea that led to Constantinople, where the English refugees fought off a siege by heathens and were rewarded by the Byzantine Emperor Alexius I Comnenus. A group of them were given land to the north-east of the Black Sea, reconquering it and renaming their territory "New England".

So really, Putin's beef is with the Normans.  They started the ball rolling.

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Which one has more command presence?

I'm sorry.  It just popped into my head.















Click to enlarge.

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Factual knowledge beats blind speculation

The two Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic exploded this week.  There has been much speculation in the press.  The cast of actors who could or might have had a motive to destroy them is long but none of the storylines make much sense.  

Too far from home and too complex a mission for the otherwise most likely suspects, the Ukrainians.  

The destruction is well within the capabilities of the US, and President Biden did make some Delphic warning comments to the Russians back in February (in the context of a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine) regarding shutting down the pipelines.  But the US has been extremely careful about not overstepping a line.  They will supply weapons to the Ukrainians but not engage in acts of war on behalf of the Ukrainians.  Blowing up the Nord Stream pipelines would be an act of war.  America is both a conceivable suspect but also an unlikely candidate.

The Germans?  Probably could do it but why?  To cover for their bad energy policy and the possibility of a catastrophic winter?  Conceivable but far-fetched.  

The Russians?  Well . . . the Russians.  Crazy Ivan and all that.  Yes, possibly they could have intentionally blown the pipelines but the reasoning would be incredibly convoluted.  But there is always the Churchillian "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma: but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."  Just because we don't understand how they might interpret their own national interest doesn't mean that this event doesn't fit.  But again, it seems improbable.

Someone else?  The Baltic states?  Sweden or Denmark?  Britain?  China?  Terrorists?  Means and motives are both questionable.  

Everyone is claiming that this was a deliberate act.  No one is identifying who committed the act.  Everyone is implying or speculating.  A typical mainstream media account is here: The Mysterious Attack on Two Major Gas Pipelines Connecting Europe and Russia by Kevin T. Dugan

In all the news accounts I have seen, everyone seems to have dismissed what seems the most likely scenario to me.  Russia has a spectacular record of bad maintenance of complex equipment (just ask the soldiers tasked with the Ukrainian invasion) and the operation of complex systems (Hello! Chernobyl?; Hello! Kursk? Hello! Andreev Bay Nuclear Accident?).  

Why is everyone dismissing accidental destruction?  One very good reason is that there were two separate explosions seventeen hours and 30 miles apart.  That does seem to suggest a non-accident.  At the same time, who would commit two acts of sabotage in the same proximity within a day.  Within an hour or two, perhaps.  But the first accident will obviously attract intense attention to the vicinity.  Why wait seventeen hours, increasing the prospect of identification?  Perhaps they were to have gone off simultaneously but there was a problem in execution.  But now we are piling speculation on speculation.

Occam is our friend.

I have read perhaps a dozen mainstream news media accounts, all certain that it is intentional sabotage.

I come across only one account which fleshes out what I suspect is the more likely scenario.  The post is Nordstream by LawDog.  LawDog apparently has some background in the oil industry, as do I.  My father's career was in the international oil industry.  We lived in Sweden for several years.  He was involved in operations in the Baltic.  Very early in my career, I worked as an oilfield hand which included tangential involvement in distributed small scale oil collection pipelines.  Later, in my career, I was involved in consulting to clients with national natural gas collection and transportation operations.  

I make no claim to expertise in gas pipeline operation or maintenance procedures, but I have more than a passing knowledge of them.  Everything I know matches what LawDog describes which gives me confidence in his analysis in the areas with which I am not familiar.

The Nord pipelines weren’t in use. To me, that means it’s time for maintenance! Hard to maintain pipes when product is flowing.

Pipelines running methane, under saltwater, require PMCS* [Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services] quicker than you’d think, and more often than you’d believe.

I would bet a cup of coffee that any of the required weekly and monthly checks and services since the Russians took over have been pencil-whipped. (See Andreev Bay 1982.)

They officially shut it down in July of 2020 for maintenance, and had cornbread hell getting it back on-line, and “issues” with maintaining flow throughout the next year; shut it down again in July of 2021, with bigger “issues” — we say “issues” because the Russians won’t explain what these issues were — and even more problems, including unexplained, major disruptions in gas flow in Dec21/Jan22; Feb 22; and April 22.

He has a lot of good detail about natural gas pipeline operations and hydrate plugs.  Then gets to the crux.

“So, LawDog,” I hear you say, “What do you think happened?”

Honestly, I suspect someone in the Russian government pinged Gazprom, and said, “The EU is about to have a cold winter. make sure those pipelines sodding well work, so we can sell someone natural gas at massively increased prices.”

So, Somebody In Charge started running checks — and came up with hydrate slurry in both pipelines. After the running in circles, hyperventilating, and shrieking of curse-words stopped, somebody started trying to remediate both lines. Of course they didn’t tell folks down stream — no Russian want to look weak, and besides, there’s been a nasty uptick in failed Russian oligarchs getting accidentally defenestrated — they just unilaterally tried to Fix Things.

It’s methane hydrate. Trust me, if there’s a hydrate plug, there’s more than one. With both pipes having no movement for months, if not a year, there were a metric butt-ton of hydrate plugs, slurry, and rime in both pipelines.

The Fixing of Things went bad. One went Paws Up, and they started trying to stop the other — but pressurisation (both ways) is a weeks-long process, and the second went bad, too. 

I suspect LawDog is correct and that this non-mainstream news source is far more likely to be close to the mark than anything else I have seen.  And for relatively good reasons based on real world operational knowledge of pipelines and an awareness of Russian operational history.

His scenario matches what we have know has happened in the past.  The whole Chernobyl tragedy was the product of lax maintenance and poor adherence to safe practices.  The Kursk sinking highlighted the Russian aversion to involving foreign countries in an emergency, even if that involvement might have saved Russian lives.  And both of those incidents as well as the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 tragedy highlight the Russian practice of hiding the facts of what happened.  

Nothing is certain yet.  All scenarios remain viable.  But it is notable that the only account which I have seen which includes actual knowledge and familiarity with the relevant circumstances and with the past pattern of man-made disasters in Russia is from outside the mainstream media.

If you want to know what the Establishment wants to think, read the MSM.  If you want to know what actually happened, read widely among select trusted sources.  

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August, 1958 by Ronald Lampitt

August, 1958 by Ronald Lampitt





















Click to enlarge.

Thursday, September 29, 2022

Measuring the drip of poisonous division from academia

Very interesting.  From Where did the Great Awokening come from? by David Rozado.  I think The Closing of the American Mind by Allan Bloom was the original and perhaps best explanation but Rozado adds some empirical rigor.  

Basically, the jewel of our civilizational crown, our universities, became the fifth column which threatens our great Classical Liberal experiment, the finest achievement of the Age of Enlightenment.

The birth of the Great Awokening is said to be around 2010-2014. The abrupt surge in prejudice-denouncing terms such as racism, sexism and homophobia in the media preceded the political emergence of Donald Trump and has continued since he left office. Further work confirmed similar dynamics in UK and Spanish news media.

More recently, I have investigated the prevalence of the same terms in the academic literature. What I found is that in contrast to news media content, where the number of references to different prejudice types has been fairly flat since the 1970s and then rises sharply post-2010, in academic literature the prominence of prejudice terms has been steadily rising for several decades.

The figure below shows how academic focus on ethnic prejudice has been growing for almost a century through four distinct waves. The first wave occurred right after World War II, the second one after 1968, the third during the so-called “politically correct” 1990s and the fourth wave takes place post-2010. Notice also how after each wave, the base level remains elevated, thus establishing a new normal.

Very revealing throughout.  It took two or three decades for this philosophical illness to take root.  It will take awhile to choke it off.  

It is especially notable that there is one form of ethnic hatred in which academics have displayed little interest over the decades.  It is among the most ancient of prejudices and the one most entrenched in the Left, anti-semitism.  Interest in every other prejudice has sky-rocketed in the past couple of decades and is orders of magnitude greater than interest in anti-semitism.  Perhaps because most academics lean left and the left is the most persistently hospitable to anti-semitism (see Jeremy Corbyn for an extreme example.)

There is no apparent shortage of housing. All data is within expected norms

I see many pieces and reports to the effect that there is a housing shortage in the United States.  But all these such reports are in service of a larger argument that seems to usually have two components - 1) we need to densify our cities and 2) we need to dismantle single family residential neighborhoods.  The language is all about social justice, equity, DEI and ESG.  

Densification and obliterating SFRN are clearly merely social justice central planning trying to sneak in under the guise of a housing shortage crisis.  

Planning norms that have been in place for decades and widely supported are being proposed to be jettisoned with little actual analysis of what the impacts might be from the proposed changes.  It certainly feels like ideological opportunism rather than a real crisis.  

But what is the reality?  I see a lot of articles about what we might do because of a housing crisis but none demonstrating that there is a crisis.  What are the facts?

The housing market always has ebbs and flows, particularly in recent decades as the Federal government has become more involved from a social policy perspective.  One factoid off the top of my head is that the US has long run had roughly a 65% home ownership rate (comparable to the UK but much higher than continental Europe).  Another is that US housing is about 25-50% larger than that in most OECD countries.  We run about 2,500 square feet per residence in the US whereas in Europe it is more like 1,500 square feet.  A further observation is that the number of people in a residence has also been falling over the decades from 3.5 to 2.5 people.  Finally, despite our currently low fertility rate, the US population is still growing owing to immigration.  Larger populations create a demand for new housing.

So where are we now?  From working recollection, when the GIs came home after World War II there was an infamous housing shortage due to nearly zero construction during the war, five years of family formation suddenly occurring at the close of the war, the post war baby boom, massive economic growth, etc.  Housing demand exceeded supply for some years.

After that, demand ebbed and flowed based on general market fluctuations.  In the early 2000s there was a massive Federal government effort to make home ownership easier to achieve which led to the crisis of 2008 with tracts of abandoned new home construction all across the nation but especially concentrated in some sunshine states like Nevada.  That crisis was an economic/financial crisis wrapped up in a social policy misstep rather than a housing supply issue per se.  

In the past two years of the crisis arising from public health policy responses to Covid-19, there have been massive movements of populations.  In general, there has been a movement of people out of cities into suburbs, exurbs and smaller cities or towns.  There has also been a movement from high Covid-19 restriction states to lower restriction states.  To what degree either of these migrations are permanent is debated.  Likely there will be some swing back but almost certainly not a complete reversion in the near term.

As a consequence, along with some financial considerations, there has been a recent escalation in housing prices over the past year but that frenzy appears to have burst.

There is a further consideration.  People's perceptions of what a home environment is/should be have evolved over time, independent of whatever modifications might have been adopted under Covid.  Virtually every house has heating and air-conditioning in a way not true fifty years ago.  Kitchens and their fittings are larger and more elaborate.  Many homes have entertainment centers.  All of these are costs associated with new desires for the functions homes should support rather than changes in the actual cost of housing per se.  There is no easy way to disaggregate rising housing costs (a possible indication of shortages) from rising feature demands.  

So what would be a good measure, or good measures, of whether there is a housing supply crisis?  Not price.  That merely reflects short term economic and financial considerations as well as the impact of large population movements creating demand in some places and reducing it in others.  

It seems like there are a couple of measures that might be indicative of whether there is truly a housing shortage justifying jettisoning longstanding zoning practices and explicitly using the regulatory hand of government to attempt to densify cities.  

One would be the long run ratio of housing costs to income and the second would be housing and rental vacancy rates today versus the long run average.  If housing supply is indeed in crisis, then housing costs should be increasing sharply and vacancy rates should be sharply below the long run average.  These are crude measures but perhaps indicative.

Even without ideological calls to fundamentally transform cities by densifying them, the real estate market is substantially self-correcting when allowed to operate without intervention.  If there is truly a sustained shortage of housing, allowing for 3-7 years of permitting and construction, the shortage will rectify itself, often with an over-correction.

So what are the numbers?

For housing costs as a ratio of household income, there does indeed appear to be a rise in the Covid-19 period.













Click to enlarge or click on the above link for an interactive chart.

In 1946, home price/household income was a ratio of 6.5 for the reasons mentioned above.  There was indeed a housing shortage.  By 1960, the shortage was resolved and the ratio settled to a long term stable rate of about 4.7-5.0.

This normal range was broken in 2001 based on financial services industry changes and government policy home ownership social policies and rose to a peak of 7.03 just before the Great Recession.  Indeed, the collapse of financial market in residential real estate was among the catalysts for the recession.  

The post Great Recession led to a recovery in real estate but at a higher ratio of about 5.5-6.0 for a decade.  And then came inflation and deficits of 2021.  As of May 2022, the ratio of housing price to household income in a near eighty year record of a ratio of 7.78.  

That would indicate a dramatic shortage of housing.  Except that that number is at the peak of a financially induced hot real estate market when many people are relocating and adding real estate assets.  There are good reasons to believe that that ratio has collapsed in the past three months.

None-the-less, the data does seem to support that there is a rise in the ratio of home costs to income from the long term norm of 5.5.  How much is short term noise due to financial market volatility and how much is real housing shortage is hard to discern.  Add in the issue of larger homes with greater accoutrements and it gets harder and harder to see the ratio as indicative of a fundamental housing shortage.  

What about occupancy rates?  If there is a real housing shortage, then current occupancy rates ought to be very high compared to the long term norm.  The data is here, tables 1 and 2 for rental and for owner occupied.  

For owner occupied homes, the vacancy rate for the second quarter of 2022 was 0.8%, both in cities and in the country as a whole.  The 66 year average is 1.5% though it has been on occasion as high as 3.0%.  If a normal equilibrium of supply and demand is 1.5% vacancy and we are at 0.8%, then there is evidence of a housing shortage.

For rentals, however, the story is more moderate.  The vacancy rate for the second quarter of 2022 was 5.6%.  The 66 year average vacancy rate is, however, 7.2% though it has been on occasion as high as 11.1% and as low as 4.5%.  

In sum, from a vacancy rate perspective, it does seem as if there is something of a shortage in the homes for purchase market.  The rental market is tighter than the long run norm but not unusually so.  

In terms of both vacancy rates and in terms of housing costs, and especially when taking into account the disruptions of Covid-19 as well as the gradual enlargement and improvement in quality of homes in the past two decades, it just doesn't seem as if there is compelling evidence of a shortage.  The numbers are within historical norms, even if indicative of some near term constraints.

Is there a data based argument that cities need to densify and that single family residential neighborhoods need to be revamped to allow for more housing to bring down costs?  Not in terms of a sixty year view of market and data norms.  There is a short term tightness in the market for reasons related to population movements and to increasing demands for higher quality housing.  There is little evidence of a sustained shortage of housing.  

How little they really know about what they imagine they can design

I know I have cited this in the past but it is certainly evergreen.

From The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism by Friedrich Hayek.

The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design. To the naive mind that can conceive of order only as the product of deliberate arrangement, it may seem absurd that in complex conditions order, and adaptation to the unknown, can be achieved more effectively by decentralizing decisions and that a division of authority will actually extend the possibility of overall order. Yet that decentralization actually leads to more information being taken into account.

Our current governance demonstrates repeatedly and conclusively how little they actually do know as they imagine the outcomes they intend to achieve through the most predictably bad executions imaginable.  

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When we use language to change the focus

From Race gaps in SAT scores highlight inequality and hinder upward mobility by Richard V. Reeves and Dimitrios Halikias.  The report is from 2017.  Nothing new in the report which hasn't been found dozens of time here in the US and internationally over several decades.  

I only came across the report because I was checking a citation in another analysis.  But having clicked through, and scanned the text, I came across this intriguing statement.  They are discussing the material and persistent SAT gaps recorded between different ethnic groups in the US.  

These gaps have a significant impact on life chances, and therefore on the transmission of inequality across generations. As the economist Bhashkar Mazumder has documented, adolescent cognitive outcomes (in this case, measured by the AFQT) statistically account for most of the race gap in intergenerational social mobility.

I am not disputing their data.  I am intrigued by the linguistic formulation.  There is great sensitivity of course around this field owing to people often being unable to distinguish between the individual and the average for any arbitrarily chosen category of identity.  There are genius and dullards at the end of every spectrum in every identity group.  Only the averages and the distributions differ and the averages and distributions say nothing about the individual.

Look at that first statement.  "These gaps have a significant impact on life chances."  That is substantially not true.  The gaps are a product of the measurement of an underlying set of capabilities.  That measurement of capabilities is useful because, for the individual, they are usefully predictive of future capability in several domains.  Not all domains and not a perfect correlation.  But usefully true.

It is the individual differences in capabilities which have a significant impact on life chances.  Not the gaps themselves between groups.  

Life outcomes are substantially a product of capability (physical and mental), cultural (what are appropriate and useful life goals), and behavioral (what are useful and appropriate means of achieving those goals) within a particular context and set of circumstances.  

Any student in the US scoring an 800 on the math SAT is going to have dramatically better opportunities than everyone else.  And the difference in life outcomes for all those scoring 800, regardless of race, are not likely great and almost certainly entirely accounted for when you control for Culture and Behavior.

The researchers almost certainly know all this.  So why do they claim that it is the existence of gaps between groups and outcomes when they know that it is the difference in capabilities which explain differences in outcomes.

I suspect this is primarily a combination of sensitivity and almost willful fuzzy thinking.  If we obscure the distinction between gaps in individual performance based on differences in individual capabilities and the reality of differences (gaps) in group averages (regardless of a category type; it doesn't have to be race),  then we create the illusion of agency and policy outcome.

In other words, if we acknowledge the role of capabilities, cultures, and behaviors in the achievement of individual life outcomes, then we acknowledge that eliminating differences in life outcomes requires the elimination of differences in capabilities, cultures and behaviors.  An almost impossible agenda.

But if we can pretend that the differences in life outcomes are due to something other than differences in capabilities, cultures and behaviors, then we have an entirely different set of possible solutions.  Maybe the tests aren't accurate in terms of measuring capability.  Maybe they aren't as predictive as we think.  Maybe they are susceptible to different social policies.

By focusing on abstract concepts like group test performance gaps and inequality, it allows us to focus on social policies which are more fun to implement than were we to try and change inherent capabilities, cultures and behaviors.  

Which is fine if our goal is to make the feelings and self-esteem of researchers and policy mavens the measure of success.

But if we are concerned with making the individual lives of individual people better, then all we are doing is avoiding that which could make a positive difference.

Data Talks

 

La forêt de Paimpont, 1963 by René Magritte

La forêt de Paimpont, 1963 by René Magritte



















Click to enlarge.

Wednesday, September 28, 2022

Intensity and focus subvert general democratic sentiment.

 From Links to Consider by Arnold Kling.

The polls do not tell you the intensity of feeling. A minority of voters who really care about an issue can overwhelm a majority who are mildly on the other side.

A perpetual issue in resolving public discourse.  Tightly tied to the issue of fanaticism.  In fact, I think there are three linked issues which traditional polling cannot pick up.

Which way do you feel about the particular issue (traditional polling)?

How strongly are you committed to your response?

How singular is your focus (how many other issues are there which you consider important)?

If there are one hundred people who are roughly ambivalent (say 48:52) about the proposal, are only lightly committed to it and have a broad range of other things they consider important, you will end up with a dramatically different dynamic and outcome than if ninety-five people are as described but five people are very strongly committed to their position and are monomaniacal in their focus.  

In the latter case, the fanaticism and monomaniacal focus can lead the group decision-making to entirely different outcomes than would be acceptable to the ninety-five.

I was once on a neighborhood board and there was a very pleasant member absolutely committed to, and and only interested in, converting 15% of road surface into designated bike paths.  He was persistent year over year and even though 99% of all traffic in the neighborhood is by car, 15% of the road surface was converted into designated bike paths.  Which remain virtually unused because they are not particularly safe and virtually no one bicycles anywhere (more people walk to work or walk to stores than bicycle.)

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We are always chasing the illusory Best and ignoring the usefully Good.

From The Economists Self-Censored and Inflation Is a Result by Jayanta Bhattacharya and Mikko Packalen.  

Philip Tetlock has done interesting and good work on the nature and reliability of "expert" forecasting (and it is poor) and forecasting in general.  The fundamental un-nuanced take away on "experts" is that they aren't.  More specifically, they are full of confident but generic or ambiguous forecasts.  When they accidentally get specific and measurable, they are as bad at forecasting at the public and worse than the informed public.

Covid-19 pandemic has proven to be an interesting test-case.  The government and its experts quickly focused on being seen to be doing something, anything, about the pandemic.  In that pursuit, they ditched much or most of their established pandemic playbook, essentially winging their decisions.  Their decisions ended up being almost consistently wrong at every decision branch.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the chosen policies were far more detrimental to public health and economic performance than was anticipated by the government experts.

Outside of government and universities however, there were some voices that spoke up, generally calling for us to abide by well-established public health protocols and to adhere to the balanced drug approval processes.  Many, if not most, of those voices suffered career and reputational damage from government, mainstream media, and academia.  Despite being right.

Now we have a similar issue.  We had a new administration as of 2020, in the midst of the pandemic, which also had major economic, ideological and policy goals to implement in the midst of trying to navigate the response to the pandemic.

The consequence was a raft of spending measures far out of the norm, dramatically increasing the national debt.  By all normal rubrics, increased federal spending, deficit spending, and consumption spending ought to drive up inflation, particularly in the context of the global economic environment.  And there were some saying that that was what would happen.

But, as with Covid, most of the experts in academia bowed to the government messaging, disparaging any concerns about inflation or the need to take precautionary measures (such as cutting back on rampant spending.)

But again, the experts were notable for their silence in the face of the obvious or their complicity in parroting public messaging which was improbable to the point of being false.

Consumer inflation rate in the US has remained above 4% since April 2021, 5% since June 2021, and 8% since March 2022. This last month’s inflation report came in at 8.4%, above analysts’ forecasts, disappointing hopes that the inflation rate might start to subside.

[snip]

High inflation is forcing people to adjust their lifestyles and consumption patterns and accept a diminished standard of living. Consumers’ widespread and deep frustration has linked inflation with a stiff political cost. The public has good reasons to ask whether politicians should have pursued more prudent policy measures that would have avoided high inflation.

But politicians are not the only group facing questions about inflation. The economics profession is also under scrutiny. The one profession tasked with evaluating and informing the public about the pros and cons of different policies failed to raise the alarm about inflation.

Did economists not see inflation coming? Or, if inflation was not a surprise, why did economists not raise the alarm about the policies that led to it?

The answer to these questions is disheartening. Many in the economics profession did see that government policies of the last couple of years would result in high inflation. But most who saw it coming chose not to inform the public or raise the alarm until it was too late. 

We are seeing this time and again across multiple fields.  Knowledgeable people do not have the courage to make their case to the public.  Cases which are well established with empirical foundations.  This isn't about uncertainty about ideologically driven policies.  This is about not doing what we know needs to be done.

Examples:

We know that schools should focus on educating children against established standards but we are backing away from doing so.

We know that vaccine mandates were morally, legally and scientifically suspect but we imposed them anyway.

We know that school lockdowns entail major learning lost but we did so anyway and without any supporting evidence as their effectiveness vis-a-vis containing the spread of Covid-19.

We know that shrinking police departments lead to increasing crime, but we have done so anyway.

We know that decarceration leads to increased crime but we have done so anyway.

We know that phonics and directed learning work lead to improved learning results but we keep focusing on unproven teaching fads.

We know that printing money leads to inflation but we did so anyway.

We know that Head Start makes no sustained difference but we keep investing in it.

We know that IQ tests (or any of its variants) are predictive of academic outcomes but we keep trying to move away from them.

We know that raising taxes (above a minimum) reduces economic prosperity but we keep doing so.

We know that regulation reduces economic prosperity but we keep multiplying the regulatory processes.

And so on.  The list is almost infinite.  Of course there are always exceptions.  We know that there are differences at the margin.  But for the most part and for most people, the above heuristics are simple, known, and reliably true.

But we keep avoiding them in the hope of achieving best results instead of just better results.  We are always chasing the illusory Best and ignoring the usefully Good.

And experts, who should know better and who should be educating the public and reminding us of what actually does work, instead go with the flow and cheer on whatever the fad of the moment might be.  And get proven wrong despite their actual intelligence and knowledge.

Data Talks

 

The Sleeping Beauty, 1921 by John Collier (English, 1850-1934)

The Sleeping Beauty, 1921 by John Collier (English, 1850-1934)


















Click to enlarge.

Tuesday, September 27, 2022

Long-Stranded African Roller Bird

From The Metropolitan Museum.  Plate 25: from "Histoire Naturelle des perroquets", 1801-1806 by Francois Levaillant.  A Long-Stranded African Roller Bird.




























From the Met:

Their strong three-dimensional quality was achieved not only through accurate drawing, but also through the combination of color printing and further additions of bright colors and shading, done by hand in watercolor. 

We’re nowhere close to that.


If there were an internationally-applicable, culturally-agnostic, decade-to-decade-portable, low-risk-and-high-reward recipe for development, the West certainly has not discovered it. If it had, economic development would be a Newtonian physics of basic rules and formulas. We’re nowhere close to that. The apocryphal apple is still in mid-air and we’ve yet to feel it bonk us on the head, let alone recognize, formalize, and proof the importance of that incident.

There are a few things we do know.  Systems that are effective at involving citizens (consent of the governed) tend to work better than compliance systems.  Systems that encourage open knowledge transfer tend to work better than managed knowledge systems.  Systems that recognize the value of emergent systems (like prices in a competitive market) work better than closed and planned systems.  

But there is still much we don't know.  

Past is not prologue

I have been more confident and less concerned than others about China's rise over the past thirty years.  Yes, they are far richer than they were and they are the second largest economy in the world.  And that is good.  We want all the world to be more prosperous; for people to have more choices; for people to be more free.  

But of course the Chinese people aren't free and under existing conditions unlikely to be so in the near future.  And the reasons why relate to six key challenges.

Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, launched by Deng Xiaopeng, has an inherent challenge.  The longer it is not resolved, the more dangerous it becomes.  A free competitive market delivers increasing prosperity and efficiency.  However, to do so, it needs a free flow of information, particularly when it comes to activities which affect prices.  China's Socialism with Chinese Characteristics sought to achieve some of the prosperity and efficiency of an open market place without relaxing controls on the political side of the equation.  In the long run, the more competitive the economy becomes, the more complex, the more it depends on free and open exchange of information but free and open exchange of information is anathema to political control.  This paradox is still unresolved.  China will likely face either declining economic efficiency (if political control is emphasized) or increasing political competition with the Chinese Communist Party if economic efficiency is emphasized.  Or both.  There are potential rough waters ahead owing to hard choices by those in power.

Military spending has risen dramatically over three decades of increasing economic prosperity and rising industrial complexity and technological sophistication.  Ground forces, the air force and the navy have all been upgraded and will continue to be upgraded.  Billions are being sunk into the creation of a Blue Water Navy with the intent of expanding China's force projection.  

In several countries, military spending and wartime emergencies have been a catalyst to technological innovations which ultimately trickle as a productivity multiplier into the civilian economy.  That is innovation at the knowledge frontier and it is not characteristic of China's spending.  China is largely seeking to deploy already established technology.  

For a good while yet, China will not be getting much bang for its military buck.  To play in the big leagues requires not only the volume of equipment but the sophistication of the equipment.  Complex weapon platforms such as air defense systems, aircraft carriers, and advanced fighters and bombers don't just represent dollars and units.  They are effectively complex eco-systems of knowledge, training, financing, logistics, culture, maintenance, etc.  All the pieces have to seamlessly function together.  If you just buy an aircraft carrier, you don't effectively have anything at all until all the other pieces come together.  China is making progress on the funding and the units but is still very much in the early stages of building the support structures for complex systems.  And it is spending a lot of money in the meantime.   

Demographics is easy to both exaggerate and underemphasize.  I think the challenges are still not fully appreciated outside of China.  An aging and shrinking population is not necessarily the kiss of death.  The cautionary example is Japan which has both an aging and shrinking population since 2008 but has still maintained an acceptable level of economic growth.  But Japan is culturally homogenous and already long prosperous.  They have a lot of cultural, financial, and technological capital to draw on.  

China is not there yet.  Its population is rapidly aging but not yet shrinking.  Between the combined effects of the old and now abandoned one-child policy with the recent move into cities in the past three decades, the Chinese labor force is guaranteed to get smaller, more expensive, less productive and less reliable.  These are not good trends in a country trying to get rich before it gets old.  

There will also inevitably be some social, class, and regional tensions that go along with this aging.  I understand that there are still some 4-600 million people still living in the countryside but I also understand that it has been demographically stripped, with the young disappearing into cities which are a demographic sink holes.  The cities are aging and the countryside is already grey.  Further, while the Chinese have been admirable savers over the thirty year boom, there are troubles on that front (see below) which will be compounded if they manifest in old age.  

Construction and misallocated capital is a larger issue likely to get larger.  We are seeing it right now with the residential home and apartment building crisis but I suspect it extends into multiple sectors.  And misallocation of capital at a national level can directly affect individual savings.  Chinese data and statistics are so murky and prone to manipulation that things might be much better or much worse than they appear but I have an abiding concern that they are worse.  Empty cities, empty apartment buildings, unused rail lines and highways, dramatically underused industrial capacity - I suspect in some or all these areas we are going to discover deep issues of misallocated capital.

If your economy is growing by 10% a year, it is easy to cover that misallocation as just one of the inherent risks of breakneck growth.  If you grow at 5% it becomes more painful.  If growth drops to 1-3% it really becomes concerning.  

Belt and Road Program.  This is a special aspect of misallocation of capital.  China has sunk more than a trillion dollars into its global Belt and Road Program.  This has been in pursuit of diplomatic objectives, in support of its Blue Water Naval aspirations, and as part of a longer term commitment to access to international resources.  From an engineering perspective some of the accomplishments are truly impressive and from a diplomatic perspective some of them are concerning in their possible effectiveness (at least in the near term).  But in terms of actual financial viability and long term operational effectiveness, many of the projects have a lot of question marks attached to them.  Will China see a real return on its financial and diplomatic investments?  To be seen.  But the financial costs are not trivial.

Food.  In the end, there is always food.  The most fundamental of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.  At 1.4 billion, there are a lot of mouths to feed.  There is the same amount of cultivatable land.  Soil quality has been perhaps eroded though industrialization.  Protein has largely come from pork which has proven to be vulnerable to diseases requiring drastic and repeated culling.  There is dramatic opportunity for improved agricultural production through applied technology but this has been counterbalanced by the dramatic changes in the rural agricultural population.  The young population has drained into the cities leaving an older and less adaptable farming population.  Can China feed itself into the future?  Certainly yes.  To a degree.  Can it feed itself in a fashion to which it has become accustomed or would want?  That answer cannot be answered as confidently.

For a great power, these six issues are more than passing threats and constraints.  I think they significantly constrain the options and choices of the Chinese CCP and of the Chinese people.  China has achieved a startling and masterful outcome with their thirty years of rapid growth and sociological modernization.

But I worry that they are pushing at those above constraints.  Any one of them could engender massive setbacks in any five year window and were there to be degradations in more than one of those six risk factors?  Then we are talking about bad scenarios.  

History

 

An Insight

 
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I see wonderful things

 

They should set corn every man for his own particular; This had very good success, for it made all hands very industrious

The Mayflower landed in September 1620 and the first few years were difficult.  High death rates (forty-five of the one hundred and two passengers died in the first winter), delicate diplomacy with the Native Americans who were at war with one another, and adaptation of agricultural practices in new conditions were among the challenges.  

Initially, given the perils, there was much centralized decision-making as everyone worked collectively to assure the bare minimum needs.  It took a full year to build eleven houses/shelters for the surviving (and newly arrived) Pilgrims.  Planting and hunting were undertaken communally.  

However, very quickly, the Pilgrims realized that central decision-making with an equal distribution of all proceeds of efforts was not going to see them through the challenges.  In 1623, the community decided to switch from a communitarian system of production and distribution to an individualistic (based on the individual or family) approach.  

I sort of knew this but had not realized that the decision was so explicit and so early.  From Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620--1647 by William Bradford. Edited by Samuel Eliot Morison. New York: Modern Library, 1967.  Pages 120-21.  That is Governor William Bradford, 1590-1657.  The Pilgrims decided that food production could and should now be done by individuals and families for their own benefit.  Having done so, they discovered that supplies increased and became more reliable than under the communal system.  

1623

All this while no supply was heard of, neither knew they when they might expect any. So they began to think how they might raise as much corn as they could, and obtain a better crop than they had done, that they might not still thus languish in misery. At length, after much debate of things, the Governor (with the advice of the chiefest amongst them) gave way that they should set corn every man for his own particular, and in that regard trust to themselves; in all other things to go on in the general way as before. And so assigned to every family a parcel of land, according to the proportion of their number, for that end, only for present use (but made no division for inheritance) and ranged all boys and youth under some family. This had very good success, for it made all hands very industrious, so as much more corn was planted than otherwise would have been by any means the Governor or any other could use, and saved him a great deal of trouble, and gave far better content. The women now went willingly into the field, and took their little ones with them to set corn; which before would allege weakness and inability; whom to have compelled would have been thought great tyranny and oppression.

The experience that was had in this common course and condition, tried sundry years and that amongst godly and sober men, may well evince the vanity of that conceit of Plato's and other ancients applauded by some of later times; that the taking away of property and bringing in community into a commonwealth would make them happy and flourishing; as if they were wiser than God. For this community (so far as it was) was found to breed much confusion and discontent and retard much employment that would have been to their benefit and comfort. For the young men, that were most able and fit for labour and service, did repine that they should spend their time and strength to work for other men's wives and children without any recompense. The strong, or man of parts, had no more in division of victuals and clothes than he that was weak and not able to do a quarter the other could; this was thought injustice. The aged and graver men to be ranked and equalized in labours and victuals, clothes, etc., with the meaner and younger sort, thought it some indignity and disrespect unto them. And for men's wives to be commanded to do service for other men, as dressing their meat, washing their clothes, etc., they deemed it a kind of slavery, neither could many husbands well brook it. Upon the point all being to have alike, and all to do alike, they thought themselves in the like condition, and one as good as another; and so, if it did not cut off those relations that God hath set amongst men, yet it did at least much diminish and take off the mutual respects that should be preserved amongst them. And would have been worse if they had been men of another condition. Let none object this is men's corruption, and nothing to the course itself. I answer, seeing all men have this corruption in them, God in His wisdom saw another course fitter for them.

I love that William Bradford, there at the dawning of the Age of Enlightenment but on a far distant shore, scratching out a new civilization, harkens backs to 

that conceit of Plato's and other ancients applauded by some of later times; that the taking away of property and bringing in community into a commonwealth would make them happy and flourishing.

Communism.  Fine in theory but not in practice.   It took the Pilgrims two hard years to find that communal effort was self-defeating and private property necessary for flourishing.  We have known that ever since but keep having to learn it again every few years or decades as the dream of an unburdened existence off of the labor of others always returns.  

Way out on the distant shore four hundred years ago, the Pilgrims experienced what Kipling described.

Then the Gods of the Market tumbled, and their smooth-tongued wizards withdrew
And the hearts of the meanest were humbled and began to believe it was true
That All is not Gold that Glitters, and Two and Two make Four
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings limped up to explain it once more. 

As it will be in the future, it was at the birth of Man
There are only four things certain since Social Progress began. 
That the Dog returns to his Vomit and the Sow returns to her Mire, 
And the burnt Fool's bandaged finger goes wabbling back to the Fire; 

And that after this is accomplished, and the brave new world begins
When all men are paid for existing and no man must pay for his sins, 
As surely as Water will wet us, as surely as Fire will burn, 
The Gods of the Copybook Headings with terror and slaughter return!

Offbeat Humor

 

Data Talks

 

Summer, 1966 by Eyvind Earle

Summer, 1966 by Eyvind Earle
























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Always wrong but never in doubt

Oh dear.  The establishment pundit who is always wrong and whom everyone loves to mock is back in the game.  36 hours before the British Pound crashes, he has this prognostication.
The thread of responses and replies are the internet equivalent of a jeering crowd.   

Avolition


Avolition, as a symptom of various forms of psychopathology, is the decrease in the ability to initiate and persist in self-directed purposeful activities.[1] Such activities that appear to be neglected usually include routine activities, including hobbies, going to work and/or school, and most notably, engaging in social activities. A person experiencing avolition may stay at home for long periods of time, rather than seeking out work or peer relations.

Monday, September 26, 2022

The pandemic is over. Long live the Public Health Emergency.

 Heh.  From Covid 9/29/22: TBD by Zvi Mowshowitz.

The pandemic is over. Long live the Public Health Emergency.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

Still Life With Cat by Alexandre Francois Desportes (French, 1661-1743).  Just as with the frequent cat and dog paw marks on Roman tiles which were stepped upon by wandering pets 2,000 years ago, I love paintings from 2-500 years ago which capture moments which we still experience.  Such as your cat trying to make off with the meal.





















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Non-instructional activities are 67% of the cost structure of universities

Everyone knows it is true but no one is willing to tackle the problem.  From Academic Administrators Are Strangling Our Universities by John Londregan, Sergiu Klainerman, and Bernard Haykel.  The subheading is A parasitic class of self-righteous bureaucrats has taken over campus life.

While the antics of a relatively small cohort of post-modernist professors have distracted public attention, especially on the right, a new cohort of administrators zealous to reshape life on campus and off has fastened itself on institutions of higher learning—promoting their own welfare and power as a class through bureaucratic fads and mindsets that are far removed from the values of critical thinking and free inquiry. The speed of this hostile takeover is astounding. To take just one prominent example, the number of administrators employed by Yale University has risen three times faster than the undergraduate student body since 2003, while new managerial jobs have risen by 150% compared with a 10.6% increase in tenure-track jobs in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. The National Center for Education Statistics estimates that “noninstructional activities such as admissions, student activities, libraries, and administrative and executive activities” now make up 67% of the expenses of private for-profit four-year institutions.

[snip]

Indeed, much of what looks to outsiders like student-led protests and campaigns is in fact the product of the determination of the new administrative class to shape campus norms and priorities according to their own beliefs and preferences—which not coincidentally make the case for the importance of their own jobs. The power of this class, which is parasitic on the mission of the university, is quite considerable: first, they select who gets onto campus, with students who at least pretend to hold the “correct” social attitudes at an advantage for admission. Once students arrive on campus, they are pressured to think in approved ways, with those who dissent in particularly visible or annoying ways being subject to star chamber-like proceedings overseen by the administrators themselves.

History