Sunday, February 28, 2021

When a differend is in play between two parties, any presumption of a common ground of reference necessarily confers privilege on one party and censors the other.

From What’s the Differend? by Sinéad Murphy.  Murphy is addressing the difficult position of independent thinkers when addressing a received wisdom which is at least implausible and at worst, wrong.  His specific target is the public discourse around lockdowns.  All the received opinion from the Mandarin Class Media is that of course Covid-19 has been among the worst natural disasters on record, fully warranting bad public policies which had already been rejected in past similar events, i.e. lockdowns and isolation.  

Murphy's criticism can be extended though to include such matters as Anthropogenic Global Warming, Social Justice, Critical Race Theory.  In each case there is an Eric Hoffer True Believer ideology which precludes effective communication.  The subscribers to the ideology tautologically preclude engagement with empirical rationalists.  

So as to rise to something better than mere scorn at this degrading display, I began to consider the question: What is it that has given Owen Jones such assuredness, such an implicit sense of immunity from censure, that he puts himself abroad in this way – so full of his own opinions, so lacking in respect, so unmoderated, so misjudged? If it is the style of a mean-spirited child sticking out his tongue from behind his mother’s skirts, then from what does Jones’s extraordinary sense of security stem? Whence his heady experience of standing on ground that is so protected from counter-argument or criticism that he can throw aside established forms of reasonable and respectful exchange of ideas and indulge himself in childish antics?

When I arrived at an answer to this question, I found that it explained something of far greater moment than the misjudged outburst of a high-profile journalist. In fact, it solved a problem that many of us opposed to Government lockdowns have repeatedly encountered during this year: the problem of negotiating that title – ‘Denier’ – which is flung at us with such vitriol and whose heavy weight of judgement has been infuriatingly difficult to defend against.

Are we “Covid Deniers” or are we not? We have been squirming under versions of this question for months. Because the truth is that we are neither – not because we are something in-between, but because our experiences and analyses of the events of this past year simply do not fall within the ‘Covid’ framework. If we are dragged into that framework, as we so often are by the sheer volume and persistence of its promotion everywhere, we inevitably flounder and appear weak and become easy targets for the likes of Owen Jones.

Murphy gets to the heart of the matter:

The French philosopher, Jean-François Lyotard, describes a radical kind of divide in outlook and opinion, which does not consist in disagreement about something but in the absence of any shared ground on which to establish disagreement. This divide is not merely a difference, then, but what Lyotard calls a “differend”. When there is a differend between people, there are no terms on which any differences between them can be meaningfully identified, discussed, compromised on, resolved. Any attempt to engage in debate works in favour of one of the parties (the one whose terms of debate are used to frame the encounter) and so profoundly against the other party that they are of necessity stripped of the means even of representing their position, let alone of having it prevail.

Bill Readings identified a good example of a differend in Werner Herzog’s film Where The Green Ants Dream (1984), in which an Australian mining company seeks to quarry on land that is of traditional significance to the Aboriginal people. A court case is held to arbitrate between the claims of the mining company and those of the Aborigines. Its remit: to determine who owns the land. The problem, however, is that the Aborigines do not have a concept of land ownership; any court that seeks to determine whether or not they own land has established the terms within which justice is be done in a manner that is necessarily unjust to their assertions of entitlement.

Readings describes the divide between the Aborigines and the mining company as a differend because there is no common framework of relationship to land within which their opposing interests can be compared and arbitrated on. Even if the court decides in favour of the Aborigines, it will do so in the mode of finding against them, imposing on them a relationship of ownership of land that is anathema to their culture and so alien to their ways of living that they would have no means of acting upon it or fulfilling it, leaving them ripe for subsequent exploitation – say, by a mining company, expert in negotiating the terms of property rights with which the Aborigines are utterly unfamiliar.

When a differend is in play between two parties, any presumption of a common ground of reference necessarily confers privilege on one party and censors the other. The party that is privileged is the one whose framework is presumed to be the neutral or common one. 

That is a deep and valuable insight.  It is easy to assume that the rhetorical skill of True Believers is due to their frequent reliance on the motte-and-bailey fallacy.  

The motte-and-bailey fallacy (named after the motte-and-bailey castle) is a form of argument and an informal fallacy where an arguer conflates two positions which share similarities, one modest and easy to defend (the "motte") and one much more controversial (the "bailey").  The arguer advances the controversial position, but when challenged, they insist that they are only advancing the more modest position.  Upon retreating to the motte, the arguer can claim that the bailey has not been refuted (because the critic refused to attack the motte) or that the critic is unreasonable (by equating an attack on the bailey with an attack on the motte).

The appearance of a motte-and-bailey fallacy is a strong indicator that the proponent lacks the evidence or logic to support his or her position.  In the climate change debate, early on, the climate change promoters led with Anthropogenic Global Warming with the claim that manmade CO2 would lead to runaway global warming over the next hundred years and stark claims about the disappearance of glaciers and snow winters and polar bears and other wild claims which were quickly demonstrated to be wrong.  Not just wrong, but repeatedly wrong.   AGW is a classic bailey rhetorical position.  It is extreme and non-obvious.

As scientists and the general public began unpicking the errors of AGW, the AGW advocates pivoted from their bailey to the motte - global climate change.  Again, a classic rhetorical dodge.  Virtually no one claims that climate is static and unchanging.  It obviously so and has always been understood to be so.  

The motte-and-bailey fallacy is a useful but dishonest rhetorical device, but it is deployed in the context of a differend.  Those looking for logic, evidence, empirical data are usually not working with the same, almost religious, precepts of the AGW advocates and therefore it is hard to reach a meeting of minds.

Read the whole essay for interesting insights.

 

History

 

An Insight

 

The Mandarin Class Media says what they need to say, regardless of the documented reality.

From the ever increasing practice of Mandarin Class Media to report what they wish had happened versus what did happen.  From News management means never having to say you’re sorry by Natalie Solent. 

This has to do with some tweeting and reporting in Britain.  Basically, the published and available underlying reality was diametrically the opposite of how the Mandarin Class Media chose to report it.  

What the BBC story looked like 41 minutes after it was published:

The hashtag #FireGinaCarano trended on Twitter for hours following an anti-Semitic story the actress shared on her Instagram.

The link to the Wayback Machine does not seem to be working at the moment, so until it comes back online you will just have to trust me when I say that was the wording that caused me to notice the story a few days ago, though I was too busy to do anything about it at the time. I have only watched a few episodes of The Mandalorian and could not have named Gina Carano. But I knew from the mealy-mouthed paraphrase that was all the BBC gave us of her exact words that something was up.

What the BBC story looks like now:

The hashtag #FireGinaCarano trended on Twitter for hours following a story shared on her Instagram, that some branded anti-Semitic.

Well they corrected it, didn’t they? What’s the problem?

The second part of the problem is that the correction is scarcely less slanderous than the original and is more cowardly. All the “correction” does is allow the BBC to make the accusation of anti-semitism via un-named proxies rather than in its own voice.

The first part of the problem is how did the BBC writer ever come to think Carano’s words were anti-semitic at all? Here is what she actually said, reported by The Scotsman, which unlike the BBC provided a screenshot of Carano’s own words:

“Jews were beaten in the streets, not by Nazi soldiers but by their neighbors…. even by children. 🙁

“Because history is edited, most people today don´t realize that to get to the point where Nazi soldiers could easily round up thousands of Jews, the government first made their own neighbors hate them simply for being Jews.

“How is that any different from hating someone for their political views?”

Overblown, yes, melodramatic yes, self-indulgent in the comparison of current political spats to the Holocaust, yes, and someone needs to tell her that when discussing mass murder sad-face emojis are not helpful – but nothing in what she said was hostile to Jews. I can answer my own question of how the BBC’s un-named reporter came to announce as fact that those words were anti-semitic. It is because BBC journalists have got out of the habit of reading the tweets and Instagram posts that prompt so much of their reporting nowadays. Oh, they scan them to check that the link isn’t dead and does not refer to some completely unrelated person in Iowa, but the idea of reading, of mentally processing the words and weighing what the author meant, is beyond their pay grade.

I do not complain about the fact that most BBC stories are repackagings of stories that were first reported somewhere else: that is inevitable. My complaint is that the BBC increasingly no longer bothers to undo the package and take a look at what lies inside. The only check the BBC really does take care over is the postmark: does this come to us from a reputable source, such as the New York Times or angry people on Instagram.


I see wonderful things

 

Offbeat Humor

 

Data Talks

 

Adolphe Monet Reading in the Garden, 1866 by Claude Monet

Adolphe Monet Reading in the Garden, 1866 by Claude Monet

Click to enlarge.

Saturday, February 27, 2021

Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts.

 From What is Science? by Richard Feynman

We have many studies in teaching, for example, in which people make observations, make lists, do statistics, and so on, but these do not thereby become established science, established knowledge. They are merely an imitative form of science analogous to the South Sea Islanders' airfields--radio towers, etc., made out of wood. The islanders expect a great airplane to arrive. They even build wooden airplanes of the same shape as they see in the foreigners' airfields around them, but strangely enough, their wood planes do not fly. The result of this pseudoscientific imitation is to produce experts, which many of you are. [But] you teachers, who are really teaching children at the bottom of the heap, can maybe doubt the experts. As a matter of fact, I can also define science another way: Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts.

When someone says, "Science teaches such and such," he is using the word incorrectly. Science doesn't teach anything; experience teaches it. If they say to you, "Science has shown such and such," you might ask, "How does science show it? How did the scientists find out? How? What? Where?"

It should not be "science has shown" but "this experiment, this effect, has shown." And you have as much right as anyone else, upon hearing about the experiments--but be patient and listen to all the evidence--to judge whether a sensible conclusion has been arrived at.

 

The spirit of Star Trek speaks to us still

 

Emergent order via cultural evolution

From How Culture Makes Us Smarter by Steve Stewart-Williams.  Successful cultures of self-generated prosperity are few and far between and the result of decades and centuries of culling of bad ideas and norms and the cultivation and refinement and mixing and matching of successful ideas and norms.  

Idealists seeking complete transformations are always naive and ignorant.  The magnitude of their ignorance apparent only after the destruction caused by their unsophisticated simplistic designs.  Emergent order, i.e. culture, is far more powerful than school house designs.

A growing contingent of scholars argue that our “superpower” as a species is not so much our intelligence as our collective intelligence and our capacity for what’s called cumulative culture: that is, our ability to stockpile knowledge and pass it down from generation to generation, tinkering with it and improving it over time.

To illustrate, consider Plato and Aristotle. Plato and Aristotle were almost certainly more intelligent than most people living today. And yet most people living today have a vastly more accurate view of the universe than these Ancient Greek philosophers. In fact, most preschool children have a more accurate view, because most preschool children know that we live on a spinning rock orbiting a great big ball of fire. In a certain sense, then, today’s preschoolers are smarter than the greatest thinkers of the ancient world.

This has nothing to do with biological evolution, and everything to do with our ability to stockpile knowledge and add to the common pool of knowledge over time. Biological evolution can give rise to the eye. But cumulative cultural evolution can give rise to entities every bit as complex as the eye: airplanes and smartphones, legal systems and the Internet. 


This was followed by one of the most remarkable noises I have ever heard

 From Trying to Please by John Julius Norwich.  Page 80. 

I have noticed over the years that mention of fags and fagging tends to raise a few eyebrows among my American friends; so perhaps it may be worthwhile to put on record that at Eton—where the system has by now long been abolished—the words carried no questionable connotation. This is not to say, of course, that homosexuality did not exist. There is a celebrated verse, which I suspect once again of being by A.P. Herbert (no relation of my housemaster), in which the name in the penultimate line could be replaced by any number of others: 
 
Long and extensive researches
By Morgan and Huxley and Ball
Have conclusively proved that the hedgehog
Can never be buggered at all;
But further extensive researches
Have incontrovertibly shown
That comparative safety at Eton
Is enjoyed by the hedgehog alone. 
 
Some years ago, when the House of Lords was discussing whether to decriminalize homosexuality, Field Marshal Lord Montgomery of Alamein confidently assured Their Lordships that nothing “of that sort” had ever occurred in any unit for which he was responsible. For a moment there was silence; this was followed by one of the most remarkable noises I have ever heard, as some thousand Peers of the Realm simultaneously bared their teeth and sucked the air in through them. On the other hand the lines quoted above are—at least where Eton in the 1940s was concerned—a wild exaggeration. At the Hopgarden I am fairly confident that actual buggery was virtually non-existent. There was inevitably a certain amount of moderately innocent fiddling and fondling: when some fifty or sixty normal teenage boys, all desperately trying to cope with puberty, maddened and bewildered by that first terrifying surge of testosterone, are closeted together for three months at a stretch with absolutely no female company, how could there possibly not be? It seems to me astonishing that the school authorities appeared to have no understanding of this, not only threatening as they did with instant expulsion any boy found in a remotely compromising situation, but saddling many of them with an almost intolerable burden of guilt by telling them that even if a little mild masturbation did not—as some believed—make your ears fall off or cause a long, black hair to grow out your left palm, it certainly put you straight on the road to hell.

 

History

 

An Insight

 

I see wonderful things

 

Offbeat HUmor

 

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Data Talks

 

Birches, 1907 by Johan Krouthén (Swedish, 1858-1932)

 Birches, 1907 by Johan Krouthén (Swedish, 1858-1932)

Click to enlarge.


Friday, February 26, 2021

I hated games, particularly during the autumn half.

From Trying to Please by John Julius Norwich.  Page 78. 

I hated games, particularly during the autumn half. (Terms at Eton were always called halves, doubtless because there were three of them to a year.)

 

The natural history of pluralism in an open society

The Omni-Americans by Albert Murray.

American culture, even in its most rigidly segregated precincts, is patently and irrevocably composite. It is, regardless of all the hysterical protestations of those who would have it otherwise, incontestably mulatto. Indeed, for all their traditional antagonisms and obvious differences, the so-called black and so-called white people of the United States resemble nobody else in the world so much as they resemble each other. And what is more, even their most extreme and violent polarities represent nothing so much as the natural history of pluralism in an open society.

 

David Hume's argument on miracles

From Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  On miracles.

In Section X of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume tells us that it is not reasonable to subscribe to any “system of religion” unless that system is validated by the occurrence of miracles; he then argues that we cannot be justified in believing that a miracle has occurred, at least when our belief is based on testimony—as when, for example, it is based on the reports of miracles that are given in scripture. (Hume did not explicitly address the question of whether actually witnessing an apparent miracle would give us good reason to think that a miracle had actually occurred, though it is possible that the principles he invokes in regard to testimony for the miraculous can be applied to the case of a witnessed miracle.) His stated aim is to show that belief in miracle reports is not rational, but that “our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason” (Enquiries, p. 130). Hume surely intends some irony here, however, since he concludes by saying that anyone who embraces a belief in miracles based on faith is conscious of “a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding” (Enquiries, p. 131); this seems very far from an endorsement of a faith-based belief in miracles.

There is some dispute as to the nature of Hume’s argument against miracles, and the Enquiry seems to contain more than one such argument. The most compelling of these is the one I will call the Balance of Probabilities Argument. (For a brief discussion of some of the other arguments, see the entry “David Hume: Writings on Religion.”) Hume tells us that we ought to proportion our certainty regarding any matter of fact to the strength of the evidence. We have already examined some of the considerations that go into assessing the strength of testimony; there is no denying that testimony may be very strong indeed when, for example, it may be given by numerous highly reliable and independent witnesses.

Nevertheless, Hume tells us that no testimony can be adequate to establish the occurrence of a miracle. The problem that arises is not so much with the reliability of the witnesses as with the nature of what is being reported. A miracle is, according to Hume, a violation of natural law. We suppose that a law of nature obtains only when we have an extensive, and exceptionless, experience of a certain kind of phenomenon. For example, we suppose that it is a matter of natural law that a human being cannot walk on the surface of water while it is in its liquid state; this supposition is based on the weight of an enormous body of experience gained from our familiarity with what happens in seas, lakes, kitchen sinks, and bathtubs. Given that experience, we always have the best possible evidence that in any particular case, an object with a sufficiently great average density, having been placed onto the surface of a body of water, will sink. According to Hume, the evidence in favor of a miracle, even when that is provided by the strongest possible testimony, will always be outweighed by the evidence for the law of nature which is supposed to have been violated.

Considerable controversy surrounds the notion of a violation of natural law. However, it would appear that all Hume needs in order to make his argument is that a miracle be an exception to the course of nature as we have previously observed it; that is, where we have had a substantial experience of a certain sort of phenomenon—call it A—and have an exceptionless experience of all As being B, we have very strong reason to believe that any given A will be a B. Thus given that we have a very great amount of experience regarding dense objects being placed onto water, and given that in every one of these cases that object has sunk, we have the strongest possible evidence that any object that is placed onto water is one that will sink. Accordingly we have the best possible reasons for thinking that any report of someone walking on water is false—and this no matter how reliable the witness.

While objections are frequently made against Hume’s conception of natural law, in fact no particularly sophisticated account of natural law seems to be necessary here, and Hume’s examples are quite commonsensical: All human beings must die, lead cannot remain suspended in the air, fire consumes wood and is extinguished by water (Enquiries p. 114). This may be a naive conception of natural law; nevertheless it is true that, all things being equal, we can assign a minimal probability to the occurrence of a counterinstance to any of these generalizations.

At times Hume sounds as though he thinks the probability of such an event is zero, given its unprecedented nature, and some commentators have objected that the fact that we have never known such an event to occur does not imply that it cannot occur. Past regularities do not establish that it is impossible that a natural law should ever be suspended (Purtill 1978). However, regardless of Hume’s original intent, this is a more extravagant claim than his argument requires. He is free to admit that some small probability may be attached to the prospect that a dense object might remain on the surface of a lake; it is sufficient for his purposes that it will always be more likely that any witness who reports such an event is attempting to deceive us, or is himself deceived. After all, there is no precedent for any human being walking on water, setting this one controversial case aside, but there is ample precedent for the falsehood of testimony even under the best of circumstances.

Accordingly Hume says (Enquiries p. 115ff) that “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish.” We must always decide in favor of the lesser miracle. We must ask ourselves, which would be more of a miracle: That Jesus walked on water, or that the scriptural reports of this event are false? While we may occasionally encounter testimony that is so strong that its falsehood would be very surprising indeed, we never come across any report, the falsehood of which would be downright miraculous. Accordingly, the reasonable conclusion will always be that the testimony is false.

Thus to return to Paul’s report of Jesus’ resurrection in 1 Corinthians: It may be highly unlikely that the original witnesses were wrong, for one reason or another, about whether they saw Jesus; it may be highly unlikely that the testimony of these witnesses may have been distorted before reaching Paul; it may be highly unlikely that Paul incorrectly reported what he heard about the event, and it may be highly unlikely that Paul’s original letter to the Christian community in Corinth has not been accurately preserved in our modern translations of the New Testament. Suppose the apologist can argue that a failure in the transmission of testimony at any of these points might be entirely without precedent in human experience. But the physical resurrection of a human being is also without precedent, so that the very best the apologist can hope for is that both alternatives—that the report is incorrect, or that Jesus returned to life—are equally unlikely, which seems only to call for a suspension of judgment. Apologetic appeals frequently focus on the strength of testimony such as Paul’s, and often appear to make a good case for its reliability. Nevertheless such an appeal will only persuade those who are already inclined to believe in the miracle—perhaps because they are already sympathetic to a supernaturalistic worldview—and who therefore tend to downplay the unlikelihood of a dead man returning to life.

Having said all this, it may strike us as odd that Hume seems not to want to rule out the possibility, in principle, that very strong testimony might establish the occurrence of an unprecedented event. He tells us (Enquiries p. 127) that if the sun had gone dark for eight days beginning on January 1, 1600, and that testimony to this fact continued to be received from all over the world and without any variation, we should believe it—and then look for the cause. Thus even if we were convinced that such an event really did take place—and the evidence in this case would be considerably stronger than the evidence for any of the miracles of the Bible—we should suppose that the event in question really had a natural cause after all. In this case the event would not be a violation of natural law, and thus according to Hume’s definition would not be a miracle.

Despite this possibility, Hume wants to say that the quality of miracle reports is never high enough to clear this hurdle, at least when they are given in the interest of establishing a religion, as they typically are. People in such circumstances are likely to be operating under any number of passional influences, such as enthusiasm, wishful thinking, or a sense of mission driven by good intentions; these influences may be expected to undermine their critical faculties. Given the importance to religion of a sense of mystery and wonder, that very quality which would otherwise tend to make a report incredible—that it is the report of something entirely novel—becomes one that recommends it to us. Thus in a religious context we may believe the report not so much in spite of its absurdity as because of it.

 

History

 

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I see wonderful things

 

Offbeat Humor

 

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View from the Lake Keitele by Akseli Gallen-Kallela (Finland)

View from the Lake Keitele by Akseli Gallen-Kallela (Finland)

Click to enlarge.


Thursday, February 25, 2021

Evolving exactitude

A forty year old reasonably simple epistemic question.  What percentage of the population are gay or lesbian?  I first came across this in the late seventies and was intrigued by the fact that most numbers were arrived at through broad estimation rather than methodologically rigorous enumeration.  Trans and bi- were added later as categories.

The uncertainty made sense.  LGBT civil rights were the junior partner of racial civil rights - a lot of momentous legislation and shifts in social perception emerging at the end of the 1960's (the Stonewall riots were in 1969) and being absorbed by the public in the 1970s.  All, ultimately for the better but the full implication of legislation frequently preceded public cognition and certainly preceded substantial change and far preceded any firm epestimic confidence in related numbers.  

When I was in college, I think the generally accepted estimate was that some 10% of the population was LGBT with the acknowledgement that there was a material margin of error though without consensus as to how big that margin of error might be.  My supposition was that the range might be 5-15% but the probability being that it was much more likely to be on the lower end of that range.  

All major legislation and policy change requires energetic mobilization of public opinion, at least in the appearance rather than the reality.  Advocates over claim on their numbers of beneficiaries and the value to those beneficiaries and under claim the number of those who will be negatively affected or are opposed to whatever the change might be.  True, no matter what the cause.

In the past decade or two, it has seemed that the consensus estimate has fallen to a lower estimation, i.e. about 5% of the population of the population is LGBT.

But now there is a new Gallup polling looking at the numbers and with a more refined approach than before, specifically in terms of definitional exactness which has always been a challenge.

What does it mean to be gay or lesbian or bi?  Is it demonstrated acts and lifestyles?  Is it self-identification?  Is it binary (i.e. if you sleep with a member of the same sex once, are you permanently in the category of lesbian or gay?)  All fair and important clarifications.  The new survey tries to clarify with finer distinctions and yields some striking results.

From LGBT Identification Rises to 5.6% in Latest U.S. Estimate by Jeffrey M. Jones.  In 2012, 3.5% identified as LGBT, rising to 5.6 in 2020.  But the headline is not what is so interesting.  It is the definitional detail.  

More than half of those who identify as LGBT, identify as bisexual rather than gay or lesbian.  Among all adults in the nation:

Lesbian - 0.7%

Gay - 1.4%

Bisexual - 3.1%

Transgender - 0.6%

Consequently, the implication is that only (0.7+1.4) 2.1% of the adults identify as traditional Lesbian or Gay.  

There is an age and gender angle on this as well.  Women are 31% more likely to identify as LGBT as men (6.4% versus 4.9%).   By age cohort for Generation Z (1997-2002) among all adults:

Lesbian - 1.4%

Gay - 2.1%

Bisexual - 11.5%

Transgender - 1.8%

My guess is that we have transitioned from a "No Orientation Discussion" environment to an "All Orientation Discussion All the Time" environment.   That simple opening of the Overton Window across the generations has driven some material amount of perceived changes.  

If you shift the question away from particular generations and modernizing social mores to something more fundamental, the answers are probably both more meaningful and more useful.  Something like "What percentage of people have a sustained and relatively unvarying orientation over a lifetime?"  Essentially you are getting to what is real and unvarying and avoiding the topical, the exploratory, the obfuscatory, the fashionable.  

It is probably too tight a formulation but I suspect the numbers might end up looking something like:

Lesbian - 1.0%

Gay - 2.0%

Bisexual - 5.0%

Transgender - 0.8%

Just a guess and with a significant adjustment on the Transgender number owing to a recent and sustained advocacy around Transgender as a last perceived underserved civil rights frontier.  

That leaves us with the traditional binary distinction of the 1970s "What percentage of the population are gay or lesbian?"  The answer is not 10% or 5%.  It is 3.0% (1.0 + 2.0).

There is nothing bad or good about the outcome, and it is still an estimate.  But it begins to clarify what we have been talking about and how sloppy that conversation has been for so long.


She told me that I was to be evacuated to America, and that I should be leaving in three days.

From Trying to Please by John Julius Norwich.  Page 55.  At his boarding school at the opening of the Second World War.

Soon after the summer term began, it became clear to a good many of us that the innocent young schoolmaster who had just arrived to teach us English was a German spy. We took turns to keep a watch on him, and it was one evening when two of us were shadowing him to what was clearly either a secret rendezvous or the hiding place of his short wave transmitter that I suddenly felt hideously sick and threw up in the bushes. I returned to the house, where I was found to be running a high temperature; and on the following day measles was diagnosed. Of the next fortnight I remember scarcely anything. The fall of France and the evacuation of the British army from Dunkirk made little impact; I preferred to listen over and over again to my favorite gramophone record, The Flies Crawl up the Window, sung (I think) by Jack Hulbert. Then one Sunday, when I was on my feet again but still shaky and I think technically in quarantine, my mother appeared and took me out to lunch at a Buckingham hotel.

From the moment we sat down I could see that she was worried; at one moment I thought she was going to cry. Then, when they brought the stewed apple and custard—the younger generation will never believe just how disgusting English restaurant food could be until well after the war—she told me that I was to be evacuated to America, and that I should be leaving in three days. Nanny, she was at pains to emphasize, would be with me. I would go to boarding school in Canada, where the educational system was closer to our own and would therefore give me a better chance of passing my Common Entrance exams in two years time; during the holidays I would stay with her friends Bill and Dorothy Paley—he was the founder-president of the Columbia Broadcasting System—on Long Island.

My reaction was far from what she had expected. She had expected me to burst into uncontrollable tears, fling my arms round her neck, and say that I wanted to stay with her for ever; but no—for me, America was simply the most thrilling place in the world. It meant New York and skyscrapers, and cowboys and Indians, and grizzly bears and hot dogs, and Hollywood, where I should at last meet my hero Errol Flynn. (My mother had actually sat next to him during the lecture tour a few months before and pronounced him a nightmare, but I refused to believe her.12) I couldn’t wait to be off. The next afternoon I was put on the train to London—a little nervous on my first unaccompanied journey by railway—and two nights later Nanny and I left Chapel Street on the first stage of our adventure (far more frightening for her than it was for me), first to Holyhead and then by the night ferry to Dublin. There, early the following morning, we were met by someone from the American Embassy and taken to have breakfast with the Ambassador, David Gray, an old friend of my parents. We were then bundled into another car and driven straight across Ireland—with the occasional stop for me to be sick—to Galway, where the SS Washington awaited us, a vast Stars and Stripes painted all over its hull in order to leave the German U-boats in no doubt of its neutrality.

 

Quote

 

History

 

Using faux discrimination charges as a fig leaf to cover punitory class discrimination

An excellent example of how race discrimination is virtually a chimera and is far overshadowed by class discrimination.  From "A student said she was racially profiled while eating in a college dorm. An investigation found no evidence of bias. But the incident will not fade away." by Ann Althouse.

Here, she is quoting a New York Times reporter:

"The New York Times, The Washington Post and CNN picked up the story of a young female student harassed by white workers. The American Civil Liberties Union, which took the student’s case, said she was profiled for 'eating while Black.' Less attention was paid three months later when a law firm hired by Smith College to investigate the episode found no persuasive evidence of bias. [Oumou] Kanoute was determined to have eaten in a deserted dorm that had been closed for the summer; the janitor had been encouraged to notify security if he saw unauthorized people there. The officer, like all campus police, was unarmed.

There was no racial bias or white privilege.  Instead there was class privilege, a high social status student bringing a baseless charge of bias against a blue collar working doing his job and following instructions.  Instructions predicated on applying to all, i.e. the dorm was closed for the Covid-19 duration and the complainant was the one breaking the campus instructions.   

Judging by the outcomes so far, Oumou Kanoute, apparently had good reason to assume that her class privilege would trump his blue collar race privilege.  

Not only this is an example of race being used as a fig leaf to disguise class bigotry, it is a further example of the issue mentioned in the preceding post of unequal administration of the law.  A member of the social status privileged pays no cost for her actions while working class members of the community are punished.  


An Insight

 

This was all light talk and mock heroics

Were I to assess the three greatest threats to our Constitution, our tradition of freedom and our form of government, I might propose these three.  

Universities

It seems compelling that Universities are a deep tap root for much of the intellectual rot of the past thirty of forty years.  Ideologies of racial bigotry (Critical Race Theory); reformulated Marxism (Equality of Outcome over Equality of Opportunity); and Mob Rule (Social Justice) are originated and sustained in Universities.  Their influence is felt through the mass production of apostles who go into News Media and Advocacy Foundations to influence public culture (so far unsuccessfully) and government policy (with some success). 

NewNeo has a piece up this morning, Why didn’t more professors oppose the Gramscian march or at least stick up for free speech? in which she quotes extensively from Allan Bloom in his Closing of the American Mind, published in 1987.

The [Cornell] provost was a former natural scientist, and he greeted me with a mournful countenance…there was nothing he could do to stop such behavior in the black student association. He added that no university in the country could expel radical black students, or dismiss the faculty members who incited them, presumably because the students at large would not permit it.

The provost had a mixture of cowardice and moralism not uncommon at the time. He did not want trouble. His president had frequently cited Clark Kerr’s dismissal at the University of California as the great danger. At the same time the provost thought he was engaged in a great moral work, righting the historic injustice done to blacks. He could justify to himself the humiliation he was undergoing as a necessary sacrifice. The case of this particular black student clearly bothered him. But he was both more frightened of the violence-threatening extremists and also more admiring of them. Obvious questions were no longer obvious. Why could not a black student be expelled as a white student would be if he failed his courses or disobeyed the rules that make university community possible? Why could the president not call the police if order was threatened? Any man of weight would have fired the professor who threatened the life of the student. The issue was not complicated. Only the casuistry of weakness and ideology made it so. No one who knew or cared about what a university is would have acquiesced in this travesty. It was no surprise that a few weeks later – immediately after the faculty had voted overwhelmingly under the gun to capitulate to outrageous demands that it had a few days earlier rejected – the leading members of the administration and many well-known faculty members rushed over to congratulate the gathered students and tried to win their approval. I saw exposed before all the world what had long been known, and it was at last possible without impropriety to tell these pseudo-universitarians precisely what one thought of them.

It was also no surprise that many of those professors who had been most eloquent in their sermons about the sanctity of the university, and who had presented themselves as its consciences, were among those who reacted, if not favorably, at least weakly to what was happening. They had made careers out of saying how badly the German professors [during the Nazi era] had reacted to violations of academic freedom. This was all light talk and mock heroics, because they had not measured the potential threats to the university nor assessed the doubtful grounds of academic freedom. Above all, they did not think that it could be assaulted from the Left or from within the university. These American professors were utterly disarmed, as were many German professors, when the constituency they took for granted, of which they honestly believed they were independent, deserted or turned against them. To fulminate against Bible Belt preachers was one thing. In the world that counted for these professors, this could only bring approval. But to be isolated in the university, to be called foul names by their students or their colleagues, all for the sake of an abstract idea, was too much for them. They were not in general strong men, although their easy rhetoric had persuaded them that they were – that they alone manned the walls protecting civilization. Their collapse was merely pitiful, although their feeble attempts at self-justification frequently turned vicious. In Germany the professors who kept quiet had the very good excuse that they could not do otherwise. Speaking up would have meant imprisonment or death. The law not only did not protect them but was their deadly enemy. At Cornell there was no such danger. There was essentially no risk in defending the integrity of the university, because the danger was entirely within it. All that was lacking was a professorial corps aware of the university’s purpose, and dedicated to it. That is what made the surrender so contemptible. 

 My wife and I have frequently thanked our lucky stars to have received our educations in the late seventies and early eighties under an education system still functionally focused on producing and transmitting knowledge.  That was the tail-end of that era of freedom, problem solving, and exploration of facts and ideas.  The focus shifted later to exacting fundamental national change and advancing a foreign and evil ideology of Social Justice and Critical Race Theory as exemplified by deplatforming, abolition of diversity of opinion, rejection of knowledge, rejection of natural rights, and, most startlingly, rejection of freedom of speech.  

 

Delegation to Agencies

The political parties are so polarized right now (in contrast to a much more united majority of the nation) to a large degree because they have delegated governance to unsupervised and significantly autonomous federal agencies.  Congress no longer speaks on behalf of the people, Congress no longer budgets in any meaningful fashion, Congress no longer negotiates across political divides and Congress no longer legislates.  They are suffering the vanity of small differences as articulated in Sayre's Law:

Sayre's law states, in a formulation quoted by Charles Philip Issawi: "In any dispute the intensity of feeling is inversely proportional to the value of the issues at stake." By way of corollary, it adds: "That is why academic politics are so bitter."

 The President governs via Executive Order.  Congress legislates via unsupervised federal agencies.  Consequently, the American citizen no longer controls its own government.  

 

Discretionary Prosecutions

Perhaps among the least reported or discussed threats.  A bedrock of our system of freedom is the Rule of Law.   Law which is applied consistently to all in the nation.  

Over thirty years we have drifted away from that.  More and more often, legislation is written only to be selectively applied, the selectiveness based on political expedience, ideological conviction, and contra the constitution.

Time and again you see instances of members of the Mandarin Class committing crimes for which they are never brought to justice despite the law being applied relentlessly to ordinary citizens.

Something similar happens if the court of public outrage.  Plutocrats like Bill Gates and John Kerry jet around the world to receive climate change awards in private jets while ordinary citizens are mocked and ostracized when they complain about being forced to pay more taxes, when they object to an anti-car national policy trend, when they are forced to live more circumscribed lives in service to the religion of Anthropogenic Global Warming.  

You see this when prosecutors choose selectively when to apply hate crime charges, not based on the similarity of actions but based on race. 

In 2020, we lived an entire year of prosecutorial discretion.   Or, in another sense, indiscretion.  Over hundreds of riots by BLM and Antifa with billions of dollars in property destruction, many thousands of crimes committed, many hundreds of thousands of physical threats, hundreds of assaults and a couple of dozens murders.  Virtually no prosecutions or convictions.  

In contrast, the FBI, Capitol Police and other agencies have invested tens of thousands of hours and millions of dollars to identify and bring prosecutions against as many January 6th protestors as possible despite zero protest deaths and very little property damage. 

There is an ironical equilibrium yet to be reached on the Capitol Hill Riot.  The more investigation which occurs, the more the MSM narrative has eroded.  The more Antifa and BLM participants are being identified.   The more obvious is the asymmetric prosecutions based on political allegiance.  My suspicion is we will see a steady decline in coverage of investigations.  

The issue is not the riots per se.   Those are illegal no matter who is involved in them.  The issue is that the law is being administered on a selective ideological basis.  

If the law is not equally applied to all, it is a milestone on the road to despotic rule.  As noted in Predatory Prosecutors

 

I see wonderful things

 

Offbeat Humor

 

Data Talks

 

Benkei Bridge, 1940 by Tsuchiya Koitsu (1870 - 1949)

Benkei Bridge, 1940 by Tsuchiya Koitsu (1870 - 1949)

Click to enlarge.

Wednesday, February 24, 2021

I bless her, too, for the enforced recitations.

From Trying to Please by John Julius Norwich.  Page 39.

“Sooner or later on these occasions I had to perform myself. Both my parents—but my mother in particular—had a passion for recitation. At no moment during my childhood was I ever given free pocket money; invariably it had to be earned, and it was earned by learning poetry. A poem once learnt must then be recited to my parents or, preferably, to a group of their friends; and it had to be word perfect. A single hesitation, the very suggestion of an “er” or “um,” was enough to disqualify. If, however, I got through to the end without mishap I was rewarded with sixpence or—if the poem was long or difficult enough—a shilling. The poems themselves varied; favorites in my very early years were those from my Kings and Queens screen. I still remember a good many of them today. I have quoted a couple already, but can’t resist adding a third. The poem on William the Conqueror began:

William the First was the first of our Kings,
Not counting Ethelreds, Egberts, and things;
And he had himself crowned and anointed and blest
In ten sixty—I needn’t tell you the rest.

I never cease to bless my mother for that screen; and I bless her, too, for the enforced recitations. What it was like for the unfortunate guests who were obliged to listen to this insufferable child droning on and on I dread to think; but for me the gains were immense. First of all—since anything memorized at a sufficiently tender age is so deeply embedded in the brain that it can never be entirely forgotten—I still retain in my head an enormous amount of poetry, by no means all of it childish; secondly, I have always been able to memorize quickly and, on the whole, painlessly—even though nowadays, without superhuman efforts, the piece is forgotten again in a week; finally I seem to be immune from stage fright, which means in its turn that public speaking and lecturing have never held any terrors.

 

History

 

An Insight

 

I see wonderful things

Offbeat Humor

 

Data Talks

 

Violet Bouquet by Albrecht Durer

Violet Bouquet by Albrecht Durer

Click to enlarge.

Tuesday, February 23, 2021

We still don't really understand yet what is going on with Covid-19

For several months early in the pandemic, I commented in posts "We really don't understand what is going on yet."

It remains true today though that is somewhat masked by the unexpected success of Operation Warp Speed to create a mass produced vaccine within a year.  Comparable in some ways to the Manhattan Project, it has been a stunning exemplar of what can happen with concentrated focus.

But it should not blind us to the fact that we still don't really understand yet what is going on with Covid-19.   I don't make the observation to encourage hysteria.  Indeed, when we don't understand, we should be more skeptical than ever about fanciful doctrinaire assertions.

All brought to mind by this piece in the New Yorker, updating us on the mysteries of what is happening in the developing world, dramatically against earlier forecasts and expert opinions.  

There was only one drawback to the Belloc descriptions: they bore not the slightest resemblance to what had actually occurred.

From Trying to Please by John Julius Norwich.  Page 38.

Most fun of all was Hilaire Belloc—“Hilary” to his friends. Broad and burly, with a huge close-cropped head, he always wore a black suit with stiff wing collar and black tie in memory of the wife he had lost many years before. His manner, on the other hand, was anything but funereal. He would arrive, having driven himself from his home near Horsham, in a beat-up old Standard car. Once—I must have been about ten—I tried to help him off with his cloak, and almost collapsed under its weight. It seemed to have pockets everywhere—and every pocket contained its flask. There was one of brandy, one of whisky, one of port—the man was a walking wine cellar. And how he held the table: most lunches and dinners ended up with his singing ancient and raucous French songs in his cracked old voice, sometimes little more than a stage whisper. Si la Garonne avait voulu was one of them, elle serait allée jusqu’ en Espagne; or Chevaliers de la table ronde, goûtons voir si le vin est bon. Sometimes, too, he would recite his own poems—Do you remember an inn, Miranda was a particular favorite. (The BBC has a wonderful recording of this; I wish they would broadcast it more often.) Yet another speciality of his was to describe any of the decisive battles of the world. Every object on the table would be commandeered and made to represent a wooded hill, a line of archers, a regiment of cavalry or a gun emplacement. His account of the chosen battle, once he got into his stride, was electrifying: you could hear the thudding arrows, smell the cordite, and see the smoke rising from the burning villages. My father—no mean historian himself—used to maintain that there was only one drawback to the Belloc descriptions: they bore not the slightest resemblance to what had actually occurred. But it hardly seemed to matter.

The poem/song:

Tarantella (1929)
by Hilaire Belloc 
 
Do you remember an Inn,
Miranda?
Do you remember an Inn?
And the tedding and the spreading
Of the straw for a bedding,
And the fleas that tease in the High Pyrenees,
And the wine that tasted of tar?
And the cheers and the jeers of the young muleteers
(Under the vine of the dark verandah)?
Do you remember an Inn, Miranda,
Do you remember an Inn?
And the cheers and the jeers of the young muleteeers
Who hadn't got a penny,
And who weren't paying any,
And the hammer at the doors and the Din?
And the Hip! Hop! Hap!
Of the clap
Of the hands to the twirl and the swirl
Of the girl gone chancing,
Glancing,
Dancing,
Backing and advancing,
Snapping of a clapper to the spin
Out and in --
And the Ting, Tong, Tang, of the Guitar.
Do you remember an Inn,
Miranda?
Do you remember an Inn? 
 
Never more;
Miranda,
Never more.
Only the high peaks hoar:
And Aragon a torrent at the door.
No sound
In the walls of the Halls where falls
The tread
Of the feet of the dead to the ground
No sound:
But the boom
Of the far Waterfall like Doom.

Notes:  The Miranda of Hilaire Belloc's "Tarantella" is Miranda Mackintosh whom Belloc met at an inn in the Pyrenean hamlet of Canranc on the River Aragon in 1909. The poem, written twenty years later, was a New Year's present to the Scottish Miranda. The holograph copy is inscribed: "For Miranda: New Year's 1929."

The tarantella is a dance (for two) that is supposed to be brought on by the intoxication induced by the sting of the tarantula, which is similar to that induced by falling in love. 


The warm comfort of a supportive press.

A great example of journalistic biasing in Ann Althouse's post, "At the 66-acre site, groups of beige trailers encircle a giant white dining tent, a soccer field and a basketball court."

The original reporting is in the Washington Post about a Biden era illegal alien retention camp.  The language is complimentary and supportive.  The alternative version is from one of Althouse's commenters, offering an example of how the same story would have been written of the same facility if it under a Trump administration.

Impossible to prove as it is a hypothetical but also ringing pretty loudly of truth.


When authoritarian instincts no longer bother to hide themselves

Fascinating.  All the things Democrats had claimed to be concerned about in terms of assaults on freedom, we now see them pursuing towards an authoritarian end.  For all their nominal support of anti-fascism, their emerging agenda is pretty clearly fascist (i.e. Government working hand-in-glove with major corporations to bring about changes not otherwise achievable in a democratic manner.  

Over dramatic?  I hope so, but the tea leaves are disturbing.

Some hopefully ephemeral and misleading indicators:

In 2017 as Trump staffed his administration, Democrats insisted we should all be concerned by the number of retired generals he was considering.  Most of them were not nominated or did not last long.  In 2021, the nation's capital is still occupied by 25,000 National Guardsman to counter some unarticulated and non-apparent risk.

Democrats in Congress, despite the first amendment, are seeking to suspend free speech by legislating against opinions with which they disagree.  Specifically, they claim that some broadcasters’ and cable networks’ demonstrate  an increasing reliance on conspiracy theories and misleading or patently false information.  This is pretty rich from a House which spent three years trying to breathe life into the Zombie Corpse of Russia Collusion and trying to hide that that whole effort was the product of Democratic efforts. 

Given the First Amendment bulwark, Congressional Democrats have a plan B.  Seeking to coerce media and technology companies into following suppressing free speech not sanctioned by the Democratic Party, and worse yet, targeting specific media outlets based on their viewpoints.  This sort of coercive power play based on Government and Corporations is the very definition of Fascism.

The effort to circumvent democratic checks and balances by governing through Presidential Edicts is part and parcel of this effort to suppress the voice of the people.

Glenn Greenwald has two excellent essays on these emerging trends; House Democrats, Targeting Right-Wing Cable Outlets, Are Assaulting Core Press Freedoms which includes numerous examples of instances where the Democratic playbook is a clear mirror of similar such actions among authoritarian regimes abroad; and Congress Escalates Pressure on Tech Giants to Censor More, Threatening the First Amendment.

Then there is the effort by Democrats to elevate an unruly mob at the Capitol on January 6th into an armed insurrection.  Initial, and continuing reporting, had it that one Capitol Police Officer was murdered, that there were guns and explosives carried into the Capitol, and that other paraphernalia was present indicating an effort to occupy the Capitol.  As investigations have proceeded, with very little reporting in the MSM, it seems increasingly clear that entry to the Capitol was in many areas permitted by the Capitol Police, that there has been no evidence of arms or explosives or occupation supplies, and that the only fatality was that of an Air Force Veteran shot and killed by a Capitol Hill Police officer.  Invented dangers are a frequent tool used by authoritarians to suspend Constitutional rights.

Then there is the media assault on privacy, aided and abetted by Democratic members of Congress, trying to turn private conversations into a threat to public safety.  The debate is centered around Apps which enable private and secure conversations.  Apps such as Clubhouse and encrypted platforms such as Signal and Telegram to Parler, even to Substack.  Matt Taibbi has good reporting on this controversy at The War on Privacy.  

And all this is on top of the routine deplatforming, cancellations of independent thinkers and speakers (See the NYT campaign against Slate Star Codex for no apparent reason other than they are free speech advocates), follow the experts despite their poor record for accuracy or forecasts and inconsistency of forecasts, obey government edicts (such as lock downs and sustained school closures) despite the absence of empirical data supporting those policies, etc.  

My alarm is not so much about the specific instances of infringement of freedoms.  My alarm is that what had been mere implications of authoritarian intent are now transforming into very transparently authoritarian actions.  A rejection of human rights and Constitutional freedoms are being treated as mere impediments to a powerful coalition of Mandarin interests seeking to work against both the Constitution and against the expressed interest of the public and usually towards an end which makes personal well-being much lower.


History