Just what are we measuring

From The Einstein effect: Global evidence for scientific source credibility effects and the influence of religiosity by Suzanne Hoogeveen, et al.  From the Abstract.  When there are so many obvious pitfalls in the approach at the abstract level, it is hard to muster enthusiasm for reading the study.  

People tend to evaluate information from reliable sources more favourably, but it is unclear exactly how perceivers' worldviews interact with this source credibility effect. Here, we present data from a cross-cultural study in which individuals (N = 10,195) from a religiously and culturally diverse sample of 24 countries were presented with obscure, meaningless statements attributed to either a spiritual guru or a scientist. The data indicate a robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities, which we dub "the Einstein effect": across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, nonsense from a scientist was considered more credible than nonsense attributed to a spiritual guru. Additionally, individual religiosity predicted a weaker relative preference for the statement from the scientist vs. the spiritual guru, and was more strongly associated with credibility judgments for the guru than the scientist. Independent data on explicit trust ratings across 143 countries mirrored the experimental patterns. These findings suggest that irrespective of religious worldview, science is a powerful and universal heuristic that signals the reliability of information.

People trust those whom they judge trustworthy within their domain of competence.  I trust my dentist when he recommends a procedure for my teeth.  I do not when he offers investment advice.  The approach here is far too crude.

It is not collective scientists who are trusted, it is individual scientists.  For example, who would trust a single forecast of Paul R. Ehrlich at this point given his storied record of unrealized predictions?

What really popped into my mind was a recollection of some psych study in the late 70s or very early 80s.  The scientists were looking at the role of optimism in life outcomes - do optimistic people end up faring better than those who are chronically pessimistic?

Their experiment for testing this hypothesis?  Raise one group of rats in healthy, plentiful surroundings.  Plenty of food, plenty of sex, comfortable non-threatening environment, etc.  The second group of rats were raise in a lean, meager environment.  When faced with a life or death situation affected by their own motivation for survival, would the comfortable optimistic rats survive longer (or shorter) than the miserable rats?

They raised to crops of rats and then one-by-one tossed them into a large pool of water and measured how long they persisted in swimming before they drowned.  Indeed, happy rats swam longer than miserable rats.

My response, as a callow youth, was not the joy of new evidence or discovery.  It was "no matter the circumstances, all the rats were drowned."

It was among my earliest intimations that there might be something fundamentally wrong with the field of psychology.  

Similarly with this study - "it was all meaningless gibber."  Just what are we measuring when we ask people about their degree of trust of someone who is spouting gibberish?