Sumter was not a strategist, although he was unaware of it.

From The Road to Guilford Courthouse by John Buchanan. Page 291.

And on the day that he instructed Kosciuszko, Greene turned to deal with a man who would be a source of trouble throughout the campaign. Thomas Sumter was still recuperating from the terrible wounds he had suffered at Blackstocks. Governor John Rutledge of South Carolina, who was in Greene’s camp at Charlotte, wrote to Sumter on 3 December informing him of Greene’s arrival and urging that he “come to or near this place as fast as your Health and the Weather permit.” “Rutledge even sent his carriage and driver for him. Given Sumter’s personality, his failure to accept the invitation is suspect, but let us allow him the benefit of the doubt because we do know that he could not yet mount a horse or wield a sword. He controlled too many men to be ignored, and on 8 December Greene and Governor Rutledge mounted and rode west to Tuckasegee Ford on the Catawba, where Sumter was recuperating in the fortress-like stone house of his armorer, John Price.

The three men had a long discussion on strategy. Sumter’s recommendation, which he urgently pressed on Greene, was to attack Cornwallis. This is not surprising. Sumter was not a strategist, although he was unaware of it. His strategy, if it can be called that, was always to attack, and his favorite tactic was the frontal assault, although it is ironic that his greatest victory, at Blackstocks, was scored by deploying into a strong defensive position and allowing Banastre Tarleton, another devotee of headlong frontal assaults, to charge into defeat. But that lesson was lost on Sumter. Given the state of Greene’s army, it would have been suicidal of him to attack Cornwallis. His Lordship had at hand about twice as many men as Greene, most of them were regulars, and although their supply situation could have been better they were by the standards of the wretched American army well fed, fit, and snug in warm winter quarters.