We conduct trust games in three villages in a northeastern Romanian commune. From 1775-1919, these villages were arbitrarily assigned to opposite sides of the Habsburg and Ottoman/Russian border despite being located seven kilometers apart. Russian and Ottoman fiscal institutions were more rapacious than Habsburg institutions, which may have eroded trust of outsiders (relative to co-villagers). Our design permits us to rigorously test this conjecture, and more generally, whether historically institutionalized cultural norms are transmitted intergenerationally. We find that participants on the Ottoman/Russian side are indeed less likely to trust outsiders but more likely to trust co-villagers.
Monday, June 26, 2017
Russian and Ottoman fiscal institutions were more rapacious than Habsburg institutions
Interesting. From The Cultural Transmission of Trust Norms: Evidence from a Lab in the Field on a Natural Experiment by Elira Karaja and Jared Rubin. Abstract