Why Obama Was Never Going to Be the Next FDR by Megan McArdle. McArdle's central thesis is that macro events in the external environment tend to be a better predictor of whether a particular politician comes to be considered a "great" politician. The policy choices of a politician and how they choose to sell those choices can have some marginal impact, both pro and con, on an outcome but the impact is marginal and the great luster of reputation is a matter of timing. If a recession is going to average four years based on identifiable predicate circumstances, you might be able to shorten it by a year with good policies or lengthen it by a year with bad policies but you are still going to have a 3-5 year recession. If you come in at the beginning of the recession, you have a tough row to hoe. If you come in at the end (and don't do anything stupid), you almost have a free ride. If you are dealt a bad hand, it helps to play the hand well but it doesn't override that you were dealt a bad hand.
This immutability of external circumstances ties in to the second article, China's Imminent Collapse by John Quiggin. Quiggin is not really focusing on the coming collapse of China so much as highlighting the importance of the consent of the governed. He doesn't put it in those terms but that is how I am reading it. When we seek to propose that democracy leads to prosperity, or alternatively that prosperity leads to democracy, we are focusing on the wrong issue.
Democracy is simply a means to an end - the consent of the governed. What Quiggin's article is pointing out is that as long as prosperity is increasing faster than expectations, the greater majority of people will tend to consent to their government, whatever form that might take. The challenge is to stay ahead of expectations and even more critically, to adjusting when expectations begin to outstrip performance.
The people of China, with a long recent history of famine and repression, appear for the past twenty years to consent to the continued form of government because of the delivery of near continuous disproportionate growth. The concern is that, with a fairly insular ruling cadre, there is little mechanism for the interests and concerns of the average citizen to be reflected in the policies of government and as more time passes, distancing individuals from the excesses of the past, there is less and less to hold expectations in check. What happens when the country's growth hits a road bump? Will the citizens continue to consent?
My conclusion from the article is that prosperity and democracy are independent variables. What links them together is the Darwinian outcome arising from external events. Centralization and repression are not completely incompatible with economic growth. However, over the longer run and through constant testing by external events, systems are more likely to survive repeated external disruptions where there is some mechanism for obtaining the consent of the governed and while there are many short-term ways to do that, the only longer term means of obtaining that consent is via some consequential form of democracy.
What I take away from these two articles is threefold:
1) Centralized authority is usually poor at micromanagement and poor at speedy execution of policies. There are some things that can be done well centrally, and with proper motivation, there are a few things that can be done speedily. Politicians (or anyone at the center) tend to overestimate both the magnitude of their policy impact as well as their capacity to execute effectively and speedily.
2) It is better to acknowledge the external reality and trim one's message to the real potential for change than to flail about trying anything till something works.
3) Every government has to find some means for accomplishing the consent of the governed whether that is through superior services (Singapore), consistent growth (China), cultural cohesion (Japan) or through some agreed mechanism for individual input (elections).
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