Considered and then probably plunged ahead anyway.

From The Illustrious Dead by Stephan Talty.  Page 96.

Had Napoleon known (or acknowledged to himself) the true reason for the astonishing casualty rate, he might have considered a winter rest in Smolensk.

Considered and then probably plunged ahead anyway. There is little in Napoleon’s record to indicate he would have interrupted the invasion and then resumed the campaign the next year. Allowing disease to stop a campaign would have been particularly galling to him, as the experience of Egypt showed. To the emperor, it would have been succumbing to an unforgivable weakness. But, in Haiti when yellow fever had proved too lethal for his army, he withdrew and then promptly sold off the Louisiana Territory, believing it to be infected with the same microbe. And he did seriously consider the wintering option along the road to Moscow, a move Caulaincourt and others backed. A correct estimation of typhus’s rising strength would have certainly argued against a long march (228 miles as the crow flies, 310 miles by road) to Moscow.

Across the book, time and again, I encounter statements that prompt a revision of my prior estimation of Napoleon.  

Obviously, he was some form of military genius.  But what type?

His invasion of Egypt was a catastrophe which led to the loss of an entire army.  His invasion of Haiti in 1802 was a catastrophe which led to the loss of an entire army.  His invasion of Spain led to a running sore, sapping the strength of the empire over many years.  His invasion of Russia led to the loss of an entire army, the largest army since Xerxes in Ancient Greece.  

Napoleon fought and won or lost battles brilliantly but strategically, he was disposed to a carelessness with his armies and the lives of his men inconsistent with his reputation for caring for them.  

In the case of Haiti though, Napoleon's loss was America's gain, doubling in size for a low cost and no conflict.