We are all the same in our moral decision-making except by degree.

From Universals and variations in moral decisions made in 42 countries by 70,000 participants by Edmond Awad, Sohan Dsouza, Azim Shariff, Iyad Rahwan, and Jean-François Bonnefon. From the Abstract

Significance

We report the largest cross-cultural study of moral preferences in sacrificial dilemmas, that is, the circumstances under which people find it acceptable to sacrifice one life to save several. On the basis of 70,000 responses to three dilemmas, collected in 10 languages and 42 countries, we document a universal qualitative pattern of preferences together with substantial country-level variations in the strength of these preferences. In particular, we document a strong association between low relational mobility (where people are more cautious about not alienating their current social partners) and the tendency to reject sacrifices for the greater good—which may be explained by the positive social signal sent by such a rejection. We make our dataset publicly available for researchers.

Abstract

When do people find it acceptable to sacrifice one life to save many? Cross-cultural studies suggested a complex pattern of universals and variations in the way people approach this question, but data were often based on small samples from a small number of countries outside of the Western world. Here we analyze responses to three sacrificial dilemmas by 70,000 participants in 10 languages and 42 countries. In every country, the three dilemmas displayed the same qualitative ordering of sacrifice acceptability, suggesting that this ordering is best explained by basic cognitive processes rather than cultural norms. The quantitative acceptability of each sacrifice, however, showed substantial country-level variations. We show that low relational mobility (where people are more cautious about not alienating their current social partners) is strongly associated with the rejection of sacrifices for the greater good (especially for Eastern countries), which may be explained by the signaling value of this rejection. We make our dataset fully available as a public resource for researchers studying universals and variations in human morality.

This compares three trolley scenarios, Switch, Loop and Footbridge.

Switch - A trolley is about to kill five workers, but can be redirected to a different track, in which case it will kill one worker.

Loop - The trolley can be redirected to a different track, where it will kill one worker whose body will stop the trolley before it can kill the five.

Footbridge - A large man can be pushed in front of the trolley. The large man will die, but his body will stop the trolley before it can kill the five workers on the track.

With the Switch decision, there is a mathematical analysis (one life for five) but the agent must choose, accepting moral accountability for the outcome.

With the Loop decision, there is an inclination to shift the view to the one worker's body (as opposed to the tram) as the instrument of outcome.

With the Footbridge decision, the agency becomes personal, the decision-maker must push the person.

In terms of outcomes, it is always the same, one person dies, five live. The difference is the who and the how.

What they are finding is that everyone around the world is inclined to find these acceptable in the same order.

As shown in Fig. 2, every country in our dataset showed the same pattern of responses: Participants endorsed sacrifice more for Switch (country-level average: 81%) than for Loop (country-level average: 72%), and for Loop more than for Footbridge (country-level average: 51%).

While the order of preference remains the same across all countries, the measured level can differ materially within countries.

We are all the same in our moral decision-making except by degree.