The science is much more clear and the emotional/ideological revulsion is strong as ever.

From The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex by Charles Darwin, published in 1871. Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859 was only the opening shot of the long discussion of evolution, a discussion which continues today. The Descent of Man explored many issues through the lens of the idea of evolution.

The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts (5. Sir B. Brodie, after observing that man is a social animal ('Psychological Enquiries,' 1854, p. 192), asks the pregnant question, "ought not this to settle the disputed question as to the existence of a moral sense?" Similar ideas have probably occurred to many persons, as they did long ago to Marcus Aurelius. Mr. J.S. Mill speaks, in his celebrated work, 'Utilitarianism,' (1864, pp. 45, 46), of the social feelings as a "powerful natural sentiment," and as "the natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality." Again he says, "Like the other acquired capacities above referred to, the moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural out-growth from it; capable, like them, in a certain small degree of springing up spontaneously." But in opposition to all this, he also remarks, "if, as in my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason less natural." It is with hesitation that I venture to differ at all from so profound a thinker, but it can hardly be disputed that the social feelings are instinctive or innate in the lower animals; and why should they not be so in man? Mr. Bain (see, for instance, 'The Emotions and the Will,' 1865, p. 481) and others believe that the moral sense is acquired by each individual during his lifetime. On the general theory of evolution this is at least extremely improbable. The ignoring of all transmitted mental qualities will, as it seems to me, be hereafter judged as a most serious blemish in the works of Mr. Mill.), the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man. For, FIRSTLY, the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them. The services may be of a definite and evidently instinctive nature; or there may be only a wish and readiness, as with most of the higher social animals, to aid their fellows in certain general ways. But these feelings and services are by no means extended to all the individuals of the same species, only to those of the same association. SECONDLY, as soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, images of all past actions and motives would be incessantly passing through the brain of each individual: and that feeling of dissatisfaction, or even misery, which invariably results, as we shall hereafter see, from any unsatisfied instinct, would arise, as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always present social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time stronger, but neither enduring in its nature, nor leaving behind it a very vivid impression. It is clear that many instinctive desires, such as that of hunger, are in their nature of short duration; and after being satisfied, are not readily or vividly recalled. THIRDLY, after the power of language had been acquired, and the wishes of the community could be expressed, the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good, would naturally become in a paramount degree the guide to action. But it should be borne in mind that however great weight we may attribute to public opinion, our regard for the approbation and disapprobation of our fellows depends on sympathy, which, as we shall see, forms an essential part of the social instinct, and is indeed its foundation-stone. LASTLY, habit in the individual would ultimately play a very important part in guiding the conduct of each member; for the social instinct, together with sympathy, is, like any other instinct, greatly strengthened by habit, and so consequently would be obedience to the wishes and judgment of the community. These several subordinate propositions must now be discussed, and some of them at considerable length.

While discursive, this paragraph articulates a still central and unsettled issue. Is man, in terms of moral and social development, born a blank slate to be written upon and developed as needed? Or is man subject to inherited and heritable dispositions? Mills argues for the blank slate and Darwin is proposing that moral and social instincts are heritable and a key element in the long cycle of evolution.

It is fascinating to see these brilliant minds arguing the point nearly a century before we had even the beginning of a comprehension of the mechanisms by which these outcomes might be achieved (genes and DNA).

I believe The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature by Steven Pinker to be a good summary of our current state of knowledge. Yes, physical attributes, IQ, personality traits, and behavioral dispositions are all heritable to a greater or lesser degree. Genes are not destiny but they establish parameters within which we have to work.

These conclusions are viscerally rejected by philosophical utopianists (primarily the various offspring of Marx: neo-marixsts, postmodernists, critical theorists, Frankfurt School, Maoism, Leninism, social justice theorists, deconstructionists, etc.) All utopias depend on the predictable perfectibility of man. They have no place in their imagined world for the variance and fallibility that comes with man as an instrument of evolution and man as a product of inherited dispositions.

We are approaching the sesquicentennial of Darwin's words in the paragraph above. The science is much more clear and the emotional/ideological revulsion is as strong as ever.

As an aside, I do love the gentle discourse represented by "It is with hesitation that I venture to differ at all from so profound a thinker, . . . " The passions were as strong then as now but it seems there was perhaps a greater margin of occasional graciousness.