Social norms begin to break down between classes when the mean time of outsider wealth creation is > than the mean time of nouveau riche class cooption

From Highlights From The Comments On Bobos In Paradise by Scott Alexander.  

Melvin writes:

I'm sure that in the United States it's possible to write a whole book about a global trend without remembering the existence of other countries, but when read from another country . . .

Britain is a good example; not because it's the most illustrative, but just because it's the only country with whose popular culture the average American might be expected to be somewhat familiar. And it's a similar story, old moneyed elite getting kicked down by a new and supposedly-more-meritocratic elite. The process was perhaps a bit slower and a bit less complete (e.g. the new Prime Minister might be an Indian but he still went to Winchester). Among the many trends explaining this, I don't think admissions at Oxford/Cambridge are really close to the top, nor even admissions at Eton etc.

One thing that_would seem to be important is new money. For centuries, the only way to be rich was to own a lot of land, and the only way to own a lot of land was to inherit it. The Industrial Revolution started a phenomenon of non-U people suddenly becoming rich, which made life complicated for the old upper class, but at first they could absorb these new money richers slowly into their ranks (and more importantly, the new money richers aspired to emulate the old money). But eventually the rate of wealth creation got so out of hand that new millionaires were being minted faster than the upper class could co-opt them, and the wealth of the unassimilated non-U rich started to outweigh the wealth of the true Upper Class. And eventually the whole thing came tumbling down and everyone is lining up to get a glimpse of the Beatles instead of the Queen.

 I like this because it is a further example of the phenomenon which arises when the mean time of assimilation/adaption > mean time of innovation.  I usually speak about it in terms of technology where our innovations of new technology are occurring at a faster rate than we assimilate those technologies into our cultural norms, our regulations and our laws.  But it works for social classes as well as illustrated here.

Social norms begin to break down between classes when the mean time of outsider wealth creation is > than the mean time of nouveau riche class cooption.

Which prompts a further thought.

I have commented observationally that countries, even those with a strong immigrant history and cultural openness, seem to struggle when the percent of foreign born are greater than 15% of the whole population.  The US has flirted with that number a few times in our history and are currently just above that threshold.  

I have never put it this way but it makes sense to do so.  Countries can anticipate social discordance when the mean rate of immigration > mean rate of absorption.  Countries with great openness where rights and privileges of full citizenship are accorded easier and earlier will have greater discord at a lower population percentage (15% for the US).  Countries which are more authoritarian and which withhold rights and privileges from immigrants will have a higher flash point depending on exactly how authoritarian and repressive they are willing to be (man of the Middle Eastern countries having very high immigrant levels but whose immigrants have virtually no rights.)