Modern elite behaviour is objectively maladaptive in a strictly biological sense

Clever Sillies - Why the high IQ lack common sense by Bruce G. Charlton.

Discusses (in different terms) the contest between heuristic decision-making and conceptual abstract problem-solving. Both are excellent and necessary capabilities but horses for courses. You have to match the right decision-making capability to the proper form of problem.

An interesting and incendiary article but at least sourced. I am surprised he has not utilized the research of the fellow with a Greek last name who has done some quite excellent work documenting the fact that experts tend to have a higher error rate than non-experts (and whose work I can't place my hands on at the moment). Some of the ideas advanced:

The over-use of abstract reasoning may be most obvious in the social domain, where normal humans are richly equipped with evolved psychological mechanisms both for here-and-now interactions (e.g. rapidly reading emotions from facial expression, gesture and posture, and speech intonation) and for ‘strategic’ modelling of social interactions to understand predict and manipulate the behaviour of others [16]. Social strategies deploy inferred knowledge about the dispositions, motivations and intentions of others. When the most intelligent people over-ride the social intelligence systems and apply generic, abstract and systematic reasoning of the kind which is enhanced among higher IQ people, they are ignoring an ‘expert system’ in favour of a non-expert system.

[snip]

But getting answers to problems in science involving human social behaviour is something which is already done very well by evolved human psychological mechanisms [13], [14], [15] and [16]. In this situation it is difficult to improve on common sense, and – even without being taught – normal people already have a pretty good understanding of human motivations, incentives and deterrents, and the basic cause and effect processes of society. Because psychological and social intelligence expertise is so widespread and adaptive; in order to advertise his intelligence the social scientist must produce something systematically-different from common sense, something novel and (necessarily) counter-intuitive. And because it goes against evolved psychology, in this instance something different is likely to be something wrong. So, the social scientist professional deploying abstract reasoning on social problems is often less likely to generate a correct answer than the average member of the public who is using the common sense of evolved, spontaneous social intelligence.

In the human and social sciences there is therefore a professional incentive to be perversely wrong – to be silly, in other words. And this is indeed what we see. The more that the subject matter of an academic field requires, or depends on, common sense; the sillier it will be.

[snip]

Because, as well as political correctness being systematically dishonest [33] and [34]; in relation to absolute and differential fertility, modern elite behaviour is objectively maladaptive in a strictly biological sense. It remains to be seen whether the genetic self-annihilation of the IQ elite will lead-on towards self-annihilation of the societies over which they rule.

Somehow Rudyard Kipling's The Gods of the Copybook Headings comes to mind. He acknowledges the presence of the Gods of the Market Place (fads and fashions) but pays obeisance to the Gods of the Copybook Headings (immutable deep truths that last forever).

Charlton's essay is worth mulling over. Some other sources on related themes.
Principles or Expediency? F. A. von Hayek

It's Hard to Make Predictions, Especially About the Future by Ronald Bailey

How Accurate Are Your Pet Pundits? by Philip E. Tetlock

While I think Charlton is probably right about the dynamics as to why conceptual thinkers generate such a large portion of nonsense, I suspect he undervalues that nonsense. For innovation to occur, we need to constantly vary the factors and equations. Abstract conceptual thinking generates a rational for trying new things, which, while likely to be wrong, does provide the occassion to be right.

I visualize it as such:

In normal times, one is always faced with some portfolio mix of routine decisions that occur daily (which route should I drive to work?) and uncommon novel decisions (which university should I attend?) The first class of decisions can usually be answered with experiential heuristics. I have driven to work so often, I know all the alternatives and what affects the selection of those alternatives (weather, day of the week, time of day, etc.) I can make the decision almost without thinking. The second category of decision requires deep thought, research and reflection; abstract and conceptual decision making.

Uncommon but traditional problems are usually addressed via indirect heuristics, i.e. through reading and storytelling. I may never have been lost in the wilderness but by reading Coral Island, Hatchet, Mysterious Island, etc. or by having heard stories from someone who has, I have at least some prototype decision-making heuristics even in the absence of my own experience.

Likewise, novel but common problems arise all the time. How will the internet change how children research and write papers, what will the ubiquity of cell phones do to people's capacity to concentrate? These are novel circumstances for which we do not have much data. We cannot accurately predicate how we ought to make decisions, all we can do is pay attention and gather that data.

In some circumstances, principally where there is deep tradition and continuity, decision making is dominated by heuristics (particularly linguistic heuristics).

In other circumstances, change is so prevalent that abstract conceptual decision making is appropriately the dominant mode of decision making.