They saw themselves as leaders of the “Bandung” powers

From Trying to Please by John Julius Norwich.  Page 192. 

 And so the even tenor of our life went on until the autumn of 1956, when two things occurred: the singularly ill-advised reaction on the part of Britain, France, and Israel to Gamal Abdul Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal and, almost simultaneously, the invasion of Hungary by Soviet tanks. The news reached us at Lake Ochrid in Macedonia; we drove lickety-split back to Belgrade, where we found the Embassy in a state of near panic: Tito and Nasser were, at least diplomatically speaking, close colleagues who saw themselves as leaders of the “Bandung” powers, or what we should now call the Third World. The Anglo-French action over Suez was, as far as they were concerned, unprovoked aggression. Not only had two apparently friendly countries betrayed their friendship, which was bad enough; they had done it on the backs of the Israelis, which was far, far worse. This was an offense that would not easily be forgiven. Again and again we tried to divert Yugoslav attention away from the distant Canal to the atrocities that the Russians were perpetrating on their very doorstep, but they scarcely seemed interested. They hated the Russians certainly, but they hated their Hungarian neighbors too—there were nasty wartime stories about several hundred Serbian families having been made to stand in the middle of the frozen Danube while the Hungarians machine-gunned the ice—and felt little sympathy for their present sufferings. As for the Israelis, they were the worst of the lot; no friend of Israel could be a friend of theirs. We all worked hard over the next year to minimize the damage, but where the Canal was concerned most of us secretly shared their views and we had little success. Suez had been a disaster, and dealt a blow to British prestige across the world from which it would take a long time to recover.