We need systems thinking where linear deterministic thinking prevails

From Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Action Fails by Christopher J. Coyne. Page 146.

In contrast to purely technological problems, which are largely isolated, most humanitarian action takes place within a broader context of complex economic, political, and social relationships grounded in a long chain of historical experiences that cannot be grasped by the human mind. As the political scientist Robert Jervis writes, “To claim that we can be certain of how each actor will respond, how the different behaviors will interact, and how people will then adjust to the changed circumstances goes beyond the knowledge we can have.” When one moves from problem solving in isolated situations to intervening in complex systems, linear thinking generates unintended consequences because decision makers cannot possibly anticipate the range of indirect effects emerging from the initial action. So while the act of building infrastructure or delivering humanitarian assistance is in itself a purely technological problem, predicting the unintended and unanticipated effects of these activities on these complex systems is not.

This is problematic because, in the context of state-led humanitarian action, linear technocratic thinking is the norm. Indeed, this type of thinking is a defining characteristic of the man-of-the-humanitarian system mentality, which, as indicated by the Adam Smith quotation in Chapter 1, treats the world as a board game that can be manipulated at will by supposed experts who are assumed, whether by themselves or by others, to hold superior knowledge relative to those they seek to manipulate. From this perspective, solving humanitarian problems is closer to the engineering exercise of constructing a bridge: problem situations can be neatly defined, appropriate solutions can be devised by experts, the relevant inputs to achieve the desired outcomes can be determined, and the plan can be implemented as designed.