This shift requires a move from thinking in terms of “what should we do” to thinking in terms of “what can we do.

From Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Action Fails by Christopher J. Coyne. Page 163.

Another implication of this chapter is that a fundamental shift in the way that we think about humanitarian action is needed. This shift requires a move from thinking in terms of “what should we do” to thinking in
terms of “what can we do.” The former approach, which is currently the dominant way of thinking about state-led humanitarian action, begins with the premise that those external to the problem situation must “do something” to alleviate human suffering. This is understandable given the immense human suffering involved in many humanitarian crises. However, problems emerge because the strong pull to do something results in linear thinking as a solution is perceived, designed, and implemented to address the crisis. Linear thinking fails to appreciate negative system effects and leads to overly ambitious interventions, with humanitarians neglecting the very real possibility that their actions can do more harm than good.

In stark contrast to the dominant approach to framing humanitarian action, thinking in terms of system effects implies that discussions of humanitarianism should begin by focusing on the limits of what can be achieved. Thus a third, related, implication for humanitarian action is as follows: recognizing the limits of human reason is just as important as, if not more than, recognizing what can be done within those limits. This is crucial because, as this and previous chapters indicate, failing to appreciate the constraints on the ability to do good can result in irretrievable harm in terms of wasted humanitarian resources and, what is more important, in terms of additional pain and suffering incurred either by those who are already suffering or by other innocent victims who suffer from unintended negative spillovers. It is in fact such linear thinking, coupled with the inadaptability of political institutions, that helps explain the high variance in the outcomes of state-led humanitarian efforts. For every instance of successful intervention—such as the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in Libya—there are numerous subsequent negative system effects—for example, the power vacuum and ongoing conflict in Libya, and the negative regional effects currently playing out in Mali—that generate an entirely new set of humanitarian problems and crises.