Interventions in a complex system have effects well beyond the direct target of the initial action, effects that shape the evolution of the system itself, for better or worse

From Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Action Fails by Christopher J. Coyne. Page 150. Three key implications emerge from an appreciation of systems-type thinking.

Third, actions and outcomes in the present period will contribute to changes in the system environment itself, which will in turn change actions and behaviors in future periods. That is, system effects emerge because the initial intervention shifts incentives, generating unintended results not just in the present period but also in future periods. A powerful example of this logic is evident in the work of Alan Kuperman, a political scientist, who highlights how the Responsibility to Protect norm creates a moral hazard problem that may unintentionally foster future rebellions and violnece against innocent civilians.

Kuperman notes that genocidal violence is often a response by governments against a substate group engaged in rebellion and that the R2P doctrine creates a form of insurance for potential substate groups considering rebellion because the international community has indicated that it will, in principle, intervene to stop genocidal violence. This lowers the cost of rebellion, leading to overly risky behavior by rebel groups. The problem, as Kuperman points out, is that genocidal violence often spills over to innocent civilians outside the government and the rebel group. Even when the international community intervenes to stop genocide, he points out, there is a time lag wherein civilian bystanders can incur significant harms due to the overly risky behavior of rebels. To the extent that Kuperman’s logic is accurate, the R2P doctrine has unintentionally influenced the system environment, resulting in changes in future behaviors by substate groups considering rebellion. The broader point is that interventions in a complex system have effects well beyond the direct target of the initial action, effects that shape the evolution of the system itself, for better or worse.

Linear thinking necessarily overlooks or denies these three effects. This is evident from a consideration of some of the major negative system effects emerging from humanitarian action. In each instance the dominance of linear-type thinking results in negative system effects, the larger result being that humanitarian actions have the perverse effect of imposing harms on the very people they intend to help, as well as on other innocent civilians.