Tuesday, April 19, 2022

The corporate oligarchy and the regulatory clerisy against small business owners, the middle class and the working class.

From The working classes are a volcano waiting to erupt by Joel Kotkin.  The subheading is Workers across the world are being squeezed from all sides. They won’t put up with it forever.  

Whatever the final outcome, the recent French elections have already revealed the comparative irrelevance of many elite concerns, from genderfluidity and racial injustice to the ever-present ‘climate catastrophe’. Instead, most voters in France and elsewhere are more concerned about soaring energy, food and housing costs. Many suspect that the cognitive elites, epitomised by President Emmanuel Macron, lack even the ambition to improve their living conditions.

The French elections reflect the essential political conflict of our time. On one side, there is a powerful alliance between the corporate oligarchy and the regulatory clerisy. On the other, there are two beleaguered and angry classes – the small-business owners and artisans, and the vast, largely unorganised service class. The small-business class generally tends to favour the populist right, whether in America, Australia or Europe. These people want the government out of their business and to be left alone. Meanwhile, workers tend towards the populist left, which promises to relieve their economic pain.

Lots of good data, links and argument in the article, making it well worth a read.  

When pagans conduct their pursuit of the perfectibility of man as they conceive him.


The secularists have enjoyed such a long sequence of official victories, from, in President Ronald Reagan’s words, “expel[ling] God from our children’s classrooms,” to banishing references to the Almighty with the fervor of pest exterminators (the steady gains of the pro-life advocates being the only fly in this ointment), some of them must have imagined that they had finally killed the practice of the Christian faith. Numbers were diminished this Easter from what I remember, but it’s clear that everyone except the atheists understand that we are all sinners, and the failings of the clergy—those people bold enough to try to intercede between the terrestrial world we all know and the great beyond and hereafter that is a matter of speculation and much skepticism—are regrettable and in recent years have often been tragic and criminal. But they are failures of the practice of the faith, not of the faith itself.

The greatest danger of atheism is that in the expulsion of God from our minds and consciousnesses, a vacuum will be created that will inevitably be filled by ambitious men. It was one thing for Alexander the Great and Julius and Augustus Caesar to accept partial deification; none of them was an atheist. We saw with Robespierre and Hitler and Stalin what happens when pagans occupy the area of the human consciousness formerly inhabited by religious faith and conduct their pursuit of the perfectibility of man as they conceive him.

Christians are chastened and disappointed but not dispirited. It was not acceptable for a former Fox News commentator to say that Dr. Anthony Fauci reminded her of the Nazi Dr. Joseph Mengele, but Fauci has shown us the perils of “following the science.” Faith is logical but elusive; it will not be stamped out and there must be more to the world than the thin gruel of the atheists, or even the ambitious scientists.

Monday, April 18, 2022

Yet over somewhat longer periods they have probably never exercised so great an influence as they do today in those countries

From Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics by F. A. Hayek.  The particular essay is The Intellectuals and Socialism, first published in the University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, Spring 1949.

The opening lines are especially relevant given developments in academia, social media and mainstream media.

In all democratic countries, in the United States even more than elsewhere, a strong belief prevails that the influence of the intellectuals on politics is negligible. This is no doubt true of the power of intellectuals to make their peculiar opinions of the moment influence decisions, of the extent to which they can sway the popular vote on questions on which they differ from the current views of the masses. Yet over somewhat longer periods they have probably never exercised so great an influence as they do today in those countries. This power they wield by shaping public opinion.

In the light of recent history it is somewhat curious that this decisive power of the professional second-hand dealers in ideas should not yet be more generally recognised. The political development of the Western world during the last hundred years furnishes the clearest demonstration. Socialism has never and nowhere been at first a working-class movement. It is by no means an obvious remedy for the obvious evil which the interests of that class will necessarily demand. It is a construction of theorists, deriving from certain tendencies of abstract thought with which for a long time only the intellectuals were familiar; and it required long efforts by the intellectuals before the working classes could be persuaded to adopt it as their programme.

Intellectuals is too complimentary a term for these individuals and faux-intellectual is too derogatory.  But the latter is closer to the truth than the former.  The English term, chattering class, is perhaps the least derogatory, most descriptive, and closest in truth.  

Twitter has become the primary platform for the chattering class.  Only 20% of the population has a Twitter account and something like 80% of the content is generated by less than 10% of the accounts, with academia and mainstream media dominating that 10%.  It is a magnificent bubble in which the chattering class discuss glittering nonsense ideas.  Ideas with little or no prospect of surviving any contact with the real world.  

Hayek's foresight was astonishing.  We are in a dark world where we cannot define a woman but can imagine children being pansexuals; where it is supposedly non-racist to judge people's moral worth solely by the color of their skin; where all freedoms and property are contingent on the permission of a leviathan state.

To avoid the dark depths of inhumanity towards which these intellectuals' fads lead, we do need to resurrect the ideals of Classical Liberalism - natural rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom of self-defense; rule of law; due process; equality before the law; a world knowable through the scientific method; private property, etc  These were radical and fresh ideas a mere two centuries ago and have delivered a world of wondrous prosperity.  They are worth fighting for in intellectual terms, in moral and ethical terms, and in material terms.

As Hayek recommends.

Does this mean that freedom is valued only when it is lost, that the world must everywhere go through a dark phase of socialist totalitarianism before the forces of freedom can gather strength anew? It may be so, but I hope it need not be. Yet, so long as the people who over longer periods determine public opinion continue to be attracted by the ideals of socialism, the trend will continue. If we are to avoid such a development, we must be able to offer a new liberal programme which appeals to the imagination. We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is a liberal Utopia, a programme which seems neither a mere defence of things as they are nor a diluted kind of socialism, but a truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the susceptibilities of the mighty (including the trade unions), which is not too severely practical, and which does not confine itself to what appears today as politically possible. We need intellectual leaders who are prepared to resist the blandishments of power and influence and who are willing to work for an ideal, however small may be the prospects of its early realisation. They must be men who are willing to stick to principles and to fight for their full realisation, however remote. The practical compromises they must leave to the politicians. Free trade and freedom of opportunity are ideals which still may arouse the imaginations of large numbers, but a mere ‘reasonable freedom of trade’ or a mere ‘relaxation of controls’ is neither intellectually respectable nor likely to inspire any enthusiasm.

The main lesson which the true liberal must learn from the success of the socialists is that it was their courage to be Utopian which gained them the support of the intellectuals and therefore an influence on public opinion which is daily making possible what only recently seemed utterly remote. Those who have concerned themselves exclusively with what seemed practicable in the existing state of opinion have constantly found that even this has rapidly become politically impossible as the result of changes in a public opinion which they have done nothing to guide. Unless we can make the philosophic foundations of a free society once more a living intellectual issue, and its implementation a task which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds, the prospects of freedom are indeed dark. But if we can regain that belief in the power of ideas which was the mark of liberalism at its best, the battle is not lost. The intellectual revival of liberalism is already under way in many parts of the world. Will it be in time?
 

Those who accuse him to have wanted learning, give him the greater commendation: he was naturally learn’d.

From Shakespeare The World as Stage by Bill Bryson.  Chapter 5 page 109.

Shakespeare’s genius had to do not really with facts, but with ambition, intrigue, love, suffering—things that aren’t taught in school. He had a kind of assimilative intelligence, which allowed him to pull together lots of disparate fragments of knowledge, but there is almost nothing that speaks of hard intellectual application in his plays—unlike, say, those of Ben Jonson, where learning hangs like bunting on every word. Nothing we find in Shakespeare betrays any acquaintance with Tacitus, Pliny, Suetonius, or others who influenced Jonson and were second nature to Francis Bacon. That is a good thing—a very good thing indeed—for he would almost certainly have been less Shakespeare and more a showoff had he been better read. As John Dryden put it in 1668: “Those who accuse him to have wanted learning, give him the greater commendation: he was naturally learn’d.”

History

 

An authoritarian wolf dressed in utopian sheep's clothing

I enjoy arguments where I recognize that we share some common assumptions and/or goals but disagree on other fundamentals.  It is invigorating and forces you to clarify your own argument.

In How Society Fails Parents by Emily Oster, she is interviewing Dana Suskind.  

I accept the premise.  Society is failing parents.  More broadly, I would argue, we used to have a family centric legislative and policy perspective and we have evolved from that to zero-sum focus on ever more marginal identity groups.  If policy is seeking to facilitate good life outcomes via families, there is a reasonable chance of achieving at least some level of consensus.  By focusing on ever more exotic fringe identities, we are no longer in the same boat and government functions via coercion rather than consent and consensus.  

Family-centered policy focuses on community health, economic vitality, family income, public education, productivity, informed decision making, etc.  All things which we have let fall to the wayside as we focus on zero-sum identity politics.  

Oster asks Suskind two important questions.  

1. One of the tensions I have always seen is that when we look at the impacts of individual parenting choices — say, whether to breastfeed, or how to sleep, or whether to use day care or a nanny, or which child care setting — it’s very difficult to find any evidence that these matter on the margin. And yet: it seems clear (from your book and others) that the first several years of life are extremely important in a broad sense for child outcomes. Do you have thoughts on how we reconcile these two ideas? Is there some missing crucial specific behavior? Or is it something more nebulous?

2.  You talk about many different policies and support systems in the book. As we’ve seen, it’s tough to pass sweeping legislation with social supports. So I’m curious: If you had to prioritize, what are the three key policy priorities you’d like to see, and why those?

Suskind has interesting but frequently, to me, unconvincing arguments rooted in unrealistic academic pieties and naive assumptions.  But interesting none-the-less.

For example, I accept a premise of hers.

I became especially aware of how much parents worry about individual choices after I published my first book, Thirty Million Words, which distilled the science of foundational brain development for parents and other adults. This, of course, is the science illustrating that foundational brain development is dependent on what happens in the first three years of life. A child’s brain will never be more receptive to experience than it is in this pivotal time. Eighty-five percent of brain growth occurs between birth and the age of 3, a period during which 1 million neural connections per second are formed, which tells us this is a period of incredible opportunity and great risk.

[snip]

But there are two crucial and specific things children need to build a healthy foundation of cognitive and socio-emotional skills that will serve them throughout life: nurturing interaction with caregivers and protection from toxic stress. 

My frustration with the answer to the first question rests on no single assertion but an overall faulty assumption.

It’s impossible to ignore the overwhelming — and seemingly increasing — stress that burdens so many parents today. 

[snip]

But the issue facing our country is that we’ve made it almost impossible for far too many parents to meet those two basic needs. We’ve erected barriers in front of almost everyone — from the mundane to the monumental. And we’re only going to move the needle on improving outcomes for kids with systematic reforms, not individual choices. I actually think this is precisely why parents feel that every decision is so critical: when you have no control over the most important things, you tend to focus on the smaller things you can control.

In recent decades, more and more economic risk has shifted from the broad shoulders of government and business onto the fragile backs of American families. Political scientist Jacob Hacker describes this as “the great risk shift,” and the result is widespread economic insecurity. 

These arguments seem to be ignoring the forest for the trees.  America is far more productive today than in the past, translating to far greater incomes across the board for all segments of society.  With increased income we have increased opportunities and therefore choices but far greater economic security than in the past.  The picture of families living in increasing economic fragility simply does not have an empirical basis.  Our bottom quintile income population have a purchasing power parity consumption lifestyle of middle income quintile European.

Labor force turnover rates (voluntary and involuntary) are the same as they have been for the past ninety yearsAdditionally, even in recent decades, turnover is increasingly driven by people choosing to leave a job rather than as in the past, people being fired.  

If the two requirements are nurturing interaction and protection from toxic stress, children and families are buffered far more today than before the 1930s.  Not only has the risk/stress from employment turnover fallen, but Americans are earning far more than they used to when risk/stress was higher and incomes lower.  

In addition, pre-1930, there was no Social Security and few-to-no welfare programs.  

Today, with two-income families, everyone has the option to live more productive and lower stress lives than in the past.  If we focus on productivity and risk/stress, Suskind is simply wrong.  The economy has not created more risk for families, it has better sheltered them.  What has changed is something different than Suskind focuses on.

First, the time value of money is much clearer than it used to be.  If you take time off to care for young infants, it comes at a higher and clearer cost than perhaps in the past.  In addition, life is probably more complex than in the past.  There is stress, but not from job uncertainty and lack of job security.  There is stress from societal/technological/legislative complexity.  That is harder to measure but probably more real than arguing about economic uncertainty.

The argument that more and more risk has been transferred from strong government to fragile families seems empirically unsustainable.  There are far more government programs sheltering families from risk than pre-1930s.  Even from pre-1970s.  One might reasonably fairly characterize much or most of post-1970 legislation as being driven by ensuring greater fairness as well as far greater insurance/risk mitigation for individuals and families.

I think Suskind is broadly wrong in this part of her argument.  I would like to explore the alternative argument that increased economic productivity and improved range of choices, in conjunction with increasing complexity of technology, regulation, and healthcare might be creating stress burdens that are detrimental.  That would be interesting but is not what is advanced in this interview.

This is where the academic mindset begins to become more visible.  A naive, utopian optimism and confidence in centralized authoritarian coercive decision-making on behalf of the "beneficiaries" of such policy.  

Honestly, if I had a magic wand and could choose to (a) give the 60 million parents raising kids in this country all the right scientific insights and tools to optimize their behavior or (b) change the societal constructs in which those parents live — I would choose the latter. 

Another way to put that is that Suskind would rather redesign society according to her own worldview rather than give sixty million parents the knowledge and responsibility for making their own best decisions for their own particular circumstances to achieve their own private objectives.

This is a mindset you see all the time in much of academia.  The confidence that they know best, a preference to force solutions on everyone else, a disregard for the rights of others and an absence of confidence in ordinary people being able to make good decisions for themselves.  

This totalitarian and authoritarian worldview becomes clearer when she answers the second question.  

Ultimately, I think we need to fundamentally reorient our society around support for children and families. But you’re right, of course. Sweeping legislation is hard to come by. 

Again, there is the totalitarian mindset wanting to fundamentally transform society.  And again, an acknowledgment that democracy, people opposing sweeping legislation, is the barrier to the promised land.  Those damn peasants with their false consciousness and incapacity to accept the wisdom of their betters.

There then follows the boring old shibboleths which have been circulating for many decades - Paid Parental Leave, Expanded Child Tax Credit, Portable Worker Benefits.  Why haven't these magic wands come to pass?  Because there are costs, risks, and negative unintended consequences that go with each one of them.  Yes, they might provide some notional benefits but do the aggregate benefits exceed the measurable costs?  That is the real question and one which few such utopians can or are willing to answer.

I am sympathetic to some of Suskind's predicate beliefs and some of her desired goals and I do believe that our politics, as well as our outcomes, would materially improve were our legislators to focus on improving systemic opportunities and efficiencies for families and the middle class.

But from my reading, Suskind has multiple faulty predicate assumptions that are not empirically supportable and she demonstrates the same orientation towards centralized authoritarian coercive decision-making which is so prevalent in academia and so demonstrably ineffective in the real world.  

An Insight

 

Self-fulfilling policy blunders




















A line of thinking which seems evergreen, especially prevalent when considering government action, and particularly pertinent to the past two years of Covid public health decisions.

I see wonderful things

 

To know something, we must define it.

There has been much enthusiasm in some Covid-affinity corners for the prevalence and seriousness of "long-Covid."  The claim is that there are myriad post-Covid afflictions which are due to the Covid infection and which persist either for a long time or permanently depending on your catechism.  

As the evidence against the efficacy of vaccines, mandates, vaccine passports, lock-downs and masking rises, so seems to rise the conviction in long Covid.  

We are still only two and a half years into Covid so while much has been learned, there is much still not understood.  It feels like the early days of prior moral and health panics over Chronic Lyme DiseaseChronic Fatigue Syndrome, and Herpes Simplex.  All of which are to some extent real but none of which are as serious as the initial panicky claims regarding prevalence, seriousness and impact.  

Long Covid may or may not be real, may or may not be widely prevalent, and may or may not have a serious impact on individuals.  Right now, we don't know.  All the early research I have seen has been laughably inadequate in terms of population size, randomization, controls, methodological rigor, etc.

As is often the case when there is a moral and health panic, our understanding is afflicted by inadequate definitions about what exactly we are discussing.  From LongCovid: Can it be avoided? by Vinay Prasad.  He has other pertinent observations but I liked this.

First a definition. Mine has two parts.

Long covid is a collection of symptoms and problems after covid (1) beyond a similar level of illness from a different respiratory virus. Prolonged convalescence has always happened for some people after a respiratory virus, particularly among those who wind up in the intensive care unit, but long covid implies there is something unique to this virus. And long covid are these signs and symptoms that occur beyond comparable illness from other virus, (2) when you test people equally. If you do more scans, you will find more abnormalities, so long covid must be findings beyond the equivalent level of surveillance post (other) respiratory infection.

If we accept this 2 part definition, we must concede that the current long-covid literature is in its infancy. We shall someday see how much long covid fits. Perhaps all we know with confidence at this moment is that anosmia is part of this.

That is a useful and workable definition.  But of course, any definition will do.  There just has to be one.  All epistemology, all knowledge begins with definitions.